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ABSTRACT 
Comprised of three regular battalions of infantry, 2"d Battalion The South Wales 
Borderers, 2nd Battalion The Essex Regiment, 2nd Battalion The Gloucester 
Regiment and Brigade HQ, 56th (Independent) Infantry Brigade was only formed in 
early March 1944. Its specific task was to land 'under command' of 501h 
(Northumbrian) Infantry Division on D-Day. This Division itself was made up of 
three brigades of very experienced infantry. 
What is remarkable is that 561h Infantry Brigade's infantry battalions had all been on 
Home Service since June 1940 and were not experienced in battle. Despite this, 
within only thirteen weeks of formation, 561h Infantry Brigade task was to land on 
Gold Beach on D-Day as follow up troops and fight inland taking the town of 
Bayeux by nightfall. After this the Brigade was expected to provide infantry for 7lh 
Armoured Division in a quick push south to take Villers-Bocage. 
This study traces the journey made by the three battalions of 56th Brigade from 1940 
through to a very concentrated forming up and training period specific to the 
Normandy landings in 1944. It follows their actions from the landings through to 
the taking of Le Havre in September 1944, by which time the Brigade had served in 
four different divisions and lost its 'Independent' title to become a permanent 
member of 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division for the remainder of the war in 
North West Europe. 
No study has previously been made of 561h Infantry Brigade and extensive use has 
been made of primary evidence from The National Archives and other sources in 
this investigation. A considerable amount of new evidence has been gathered by 
interviews with surviving veterans of 56th Infantry Brigade. The evidence is used to 
explore issues that shed new light on life in the Army at home during the war, 
training for war and the Normandy Campaign. 
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'NOS A GULIELMO VICTI VICTORIS 
PATRIAM LIBERA VIMUS' 
('We, once conquered by William, have now set 
free the Conquerors native land'). 
Inscription on the Commonwealth War Graves 
Memorial to the Missing, Bayeux. 
I 
Introduction. 
This thesis will investigate the part played by 56th (Independent) Infantry 
Brigade, which was raised barely three months before the D-Day Landings. The Brigade 
was given important tasks on D-Day, during the Normandy Campaign and throughout 
the remainder of the war in North West Europe. The work will focus on the raising of 
the Brigade and its training and deployment in operations from April until September 
1944. The brigade was the smallest tactical formation in the British Army. No proper 
evaluation of a British infantry brigade involved in Normandy appears to have been 
attempted before. Certainly the role of 56th (Independent) Infantry Brigade in the 
Normandy Campaign of 1944 has not been investigated. The thesis will therefore offer 
an examination of the Normandy Campaign from a fresh perspective and provide 
insight into the British Army at Brigade level in the later stages of the Second World 
War. 
Works on the Normandy Campaign have concentrated on army, divisional or 
battalion level, but the critical role of an infantry brigade in the structure, organisation 
and operations of a division has not previously been attempted. 1 The rank of Brigadier 
is the highest field officer rank. An infantry division usually contains three brigades, 
each of three battalions. Also an infantry division would have attached to it 'under 
command', artillery, heavy mortar, anti-tank, medium machinegun, signals, provost, 
engineer, armour and other units depending on the task in hand. Some elements of these 
units as required would be passed down and come under the command of the divisional 
brigades. 
As late as February 1944 Montgomery; (the overall land forces commander in 
operations) decided that 50th (Northumbrian) Division would replace 49th (West Riding) 
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Division for the assault and exploitation of the landings on Gold Beach. In planning for 
D-Day, General Graham of 50th Division decided he required an extra brigade to fulfil 
all of his allotted tasks. Also Montgomery perceived the future need after the landings 
and initial exploitation of a spare brigade under 21 •• Army Group's direct control, to 
deploy as required. Hence 56th (Independent) Infantry Brigade was raised and was 
unique in respect of being an Army Group formation rather than part of a divisional unit 
for the majority of the Normandy Campaign. In the event the plans for a swift breakout 
after the landings were not realised and the allied army had to swiftly adapt to the 
changed situation during June, July and early August 1944, fighting in the close 
confines of the Normandy countryside known as the bocage. 
The methodology for the research behind the thesis involved an examination of 
primary and secondary sources from the British National Archive, Imperial War 
Museum, National Army Museum, regimental museums, county museums, museums in 
Normandy and site visits. This material includes written, oral, photographic and film 
sources. Many books have been written about D-Day and the Battle of Normandy and 
these secondary sources, where relevant, were used to look at how discussion, argument 
and even myth over the effective role of different forces in Normandy has developed 
over the last sixty years. In this study the most important primary source was the 
surviving veterans of the Brigade, the majority of whom have not been interviewed 
before. Forty-four members of the Brigade have helped by giving interviews and 
materials. Useful information has also been gathered from a veteran from 2nd 
Hertfordshire Regiment Beach Group who landed on Gold Beach early on D-Day, a 
veteran of 203 Field Ambulance Unit attached to 56th Brigade until August 1944 and 
two French people who as children lived in the vicinity of Tilly-sur-Seulles. Despite the 
passing of over sixty years memory has provided a useful and vivid link with the events 
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of 1944 and this oral history provides a test for the veracity and usefulness of some 
primary and secondary written sources. The text from these interviews is to be made 
available to centres such as the Imperial War Museum, National Army Museum and the 
relevant Regimental Museums as well as museums in Normandy at Arromanches, 
Bayeux, Caen and Tilly-sur-Seulles. The agreement of the interviewed veterans for this 
dissemination has been properly sought. The relationship of this project to the evolution 
of military oral history will be discussed in the conclusion. 
There are a number of reasons that make the operations of this particular 
infantry brigade and its differences from other infantry brigades at that time worthy of 
investigation. The Brigade was only formed as a new brigade in March 1944. This gave 
it little time for the three battalions to get used to working with each other and to train 
for their expected tasks on D-Day and after. Next it was made up of three regular 
battalions - 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers, 2nd Battalion Gloucestershire 
Regiment and 2nd Battalion Essex Regiment. They had been 'Home Service' battalions 
since 1940 and had not, prior to February 1944, expected to have an important part in 
the coming invasion. They were under strength as they had been used in the previous 
three years as reinforcement units based in the UK. As an 'independent' brigade they 
were to be 'under command' of 50th Division for the initial landings. They were 
subsequently expected to be taken under command by 7th Armoured Division (General 
Erskine ), as an extra brigade of infantry during the planned quick exploitation and 
breakout from the bridgehead. In the event they only came under command of 7th 
Armoured Division for a brief period of time and between June and September 1944 
they fought as part offour different divisions. 
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It is a unit that followed a much more complex path than expected from January 
1944 to the end of the campaign in Nonnandy, reflecting how the campaign developed 
very differently from that planned. In one aspect in particular it bears close scrutiny. Of 
the four Infantry Brigades that landed on Gold Beach on D-Day, it alone was not 
already tried in battle. 50th Division as a unit had been brought back from Italy by 
Montgomery as an experienced division to ensure all went well in Nonnandy. As with 
the three other 50th Division brigades, 56th Brigade had important and clearly allotted 
tasks on D-Day. It was to land, drive inland and take and hold the ground around and 
south of Bayeux by that evening. In addition it was the unit that was tasked to hold the 
extreme right flank of the British Army in Nonnandy, and make the junction with US 
forces. As things turned out even this complex task was made more difficult by events 
on Omaha Beach and the harder than expected Gennan resistance elsewhere. 
The training of the Brigade in the three months prior to D-Day was not always 
specific to task. Its late addition to the D-Day order of battle meant that it had to follow 
a steep learning curve. Many of the men bad been in those battalions for some time. A 
few bad fought in Norway or France and had suffered defeat in 1940. In the interim the 
battalions had provided Home Defence and men for units fighting abroad. By 1944 the 
battalions comprising the brigade were a mix of regular soldiers and conscripts of all 
ages. Some were recuperating from wounds or disease caused on active service in Italy 
or Bunna, while others were considered too old to stand up to the rigours of combat. It 
meant that replacements were joining the brigade to bring the battalions up to full 
strength very nearly to the day of embarkation for France. The number of replacements 
was considerable. The Brigade Headquarters of some two hundred men also had to be 
built from scratch. 
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Once landed in France the allies found defeating the German Army was much 
more difficult than expected. Realisation of this simple aim was often confused and 
complicated by differences of opinion and personality between the allied generals and 
the differing political hopes and aspirations of the allied leaders for the future. Without 
doubt the invasion of Normandy was an extraordinary event in the World Wars of the 
last century. The organisation and training of the very large inter-service and 
international allied force that landed on the mainland of Europe was more difficult than 
any previous operation carried out by the allies. They then had to maintain this force by 
sea and fight and defeat a tenacious, well-trained and equipped enemy versed in the arts 
of holding defensive positions in a campaign lasting over three months. Failure on D-
Day or soon after would have significantly altered the course of the Second World War 
and it is doubtful if such an invasion could have been re-launched. This was fully 
realised not only by the Allied leaders, both military and political, but the German 
General staff as well. 
The sources mentioned below give an overview of the written material available 
directly relevant to 56th Brigade and its operations. Important primary written evidence 
concerning 56th Brigade can be found at the National Archive: Public Record Office 
(NA: PRO) in the following series; WO or War Office; ADM or Admiralty; AIR or Air 
Ministry and CAB or Cabinet Office. Of greatest importance are the unit War Diaries in 
the series WO 171. On a daily basis a record had to be kept of actions and their results 
by each of the three Battalions2 and the Brigade Headquarters. 3 These diaries were kept 
on a foolscap sheet, typed or even sometimes handwritten on 'Army Form C 2118 War 
Diary or Intelligence Summary'. They provide a fascinating insight into the day-by-day 
progress of the Brigade. The War Diaries often contain as annexes complete operational 
orders. That for D-Day; (56 Brigade Operational Order No. 1) runs to twenty-five 
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pages. The War Diaries provide a brief overview of events, sometimes including 
casualties and positional map references. Their annexes may contain individual patrol 
reports, passwords and minute tactical details. All the war diaries carry a weekly 
register called a 'Field Return'. For the officers it gives names and ranks, but only 
numbers of men for non-commissioned officers and other ranks. However this is a very 
useful piece of information for tracking casualties, reinforcements and appointments. 
An important addition with the 2nd South Wales Borderers War Diary between 
January and May 1944 is a copy of the Battalion weekly mimeographed newspaper, 
which included Battalion Orders as well as lectures and accounts of inter-battalion 
Rugby matches! Once committed to action this seems to have been either discontinued 
or not saved with the War Diary. A copy of each War Diary appears to have been 
officially filed with the Army War Diary Section within a few weeks of writing 
according to official stamps observed on some of the War Diary pages. However at 
Brigade HQ and in the Battalions they were written typically by a nineteen or twenty-
year-old Intelligence Officer (10) holding the rank of Lieutenant, or a member of his 
section, usually within a few hundred yards of the front line. They are inevitably not 
completely reliable. No one was specifically trained to do this job - it was something 
you 'picked up'. Sometimes during very difficult fighting there are even gaps in the 
War Diaries for a few days. The War Diaries of some units operating in the same areas 
as 56 Brigade have also been examined to add to the available evidence in some actions 
or operations. However not all War Diaries were kept at the end of the Second World 
War. An example of an important loss to researchers is that of the War Diary of 47 
Commando who landed on Gold Beach on D-Day. "The unit diaries for April to July 
1944 unfortunately have not survived for 47 Commando Royal Marines". 4 
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There are oiher official documents at the National Archive with direct relevance 
to the Brigade. A good example is WO 219/30077. This is the Landing Table document, 
which shows that already by mid April 1944 the specific type and number of ships 
required to land 56th Brigade, including all its tracked vehicles and motor transport on 
D-Day, had been worked out at a time when the Brigade bad only been in being for six 
weeks. Cabinet Office papers were often written about specific actions in order to 
provide the Cabinet detail of operations and intelligence or a historical record. Useful 
papers in this series exist giving sometimes detailed information for actions involving 
56th Brigade, CAB 44/247, 'Operations 7th - 16th June 1944' and CAB 44/248 
'Operations 16th June - 29th August'. These are extensive written documents including 
maps from the Cabinet Office Historical Section. Shorter papers include the taking of 
Le Havre in September 1944, CAB 106/958 'Operation Astonia'. 
A number of studies were written soon after the end of the war and were 
officially sanctioned. In the first instance some studies and papers were written to 
inform and educate the British and United States military as to how an event or 
campaign developed. Doubtless these formed the basis of lectures or modules at Staff 
Colleges and Military Academies in both countries. Directly useful to this study is D-
Day: 30 Coros and Gold Beach, completed by May 1950 by Lt. Col A Warburst who 
took part in the Normandy Campaign. These types of narratives (the official 
description) are put together by the careful scrutiny of battalion and other unit war 
diaries and the interrogation of key people within a few years of the events. Much of the 
detail from narratives such as that produced by Lt. Col. Warhurst were then 
incorporated in the later 18 volume official British History of the Second World War. 
The two volumes directly covering this study are Victory in the West. Volume 1. The 
Battle of Normandy, (1962), and Victory in the West. Volume TI. The Defeat of 
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Germany, (1968). It will be noted that these two volumes were published quite some 
time after the war had ended and did not escape criticism for a bland exposition of 
events, and a favourable interpretation of events towards General Montgomery. 
Other, but very different, important contemporary works written by the War 
Office concern the various training manuals. Examples of direct relevance are Infantry 
Training Part Vlll. The War Office 1944. This manual for tactics up to platoon level 
was used from March 1944. It allows us to understand the tactics used by the smaller 
units within the battalions, but being published so close to D-Day one wonders how 
much time officers and men had to draw conclusions over its content. Similar 
Pamphlets in the series Infantry Training: The Anti Tank Platoon 1943 and Infantry 
Training: The Carrier Platoon 1943, help us to understand how these vehicles and 
weapons were to be used to aid the infantry battalion in action. One other pamphlet, 
Military Training Pamphlet No. 63: The Co-Operation of Tanks with Infantry Divisions 
is worthy of examination due to the controversy that was later to surround infantry/tank 
co-operation in Normandy. Yet again this was published too late in May 1944 for time 
to be given to digest its teaching. The above are good examples of the type of 
contemporary pamphlet available giving us an insight into how units were organised 
and why they operated tactically in the way that they did. 
A further source of primary written evidence lie with the Regimental and 
County Museums, where veterans of the war have deposited diaries or notes they made 
at the time or later. An interesting point is that the keeping of such diaries were strictly 
against orders. Where these exist they often shed a very real light on events. Luckily 
three such diaries have been copied to the author from the veterans themselves. 
However a search of the relevant museums showed only a small number of records 
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exist. The generation who fought in 1944 seem to have been less likely to produce 
writing for us of this type than their fathers did after the Great War of 1914-18. 
However each of the 56th Brigade battalions have left some sort of history of their 
actions. 2nd South Wales Borderers had a definitive history written by Major Boon 
published in1955,5 2nd Essex published a smaller booklet in the late 1940's6 while 
articles published between 1950 and 1980 in their regimental magazine, The Back 
Badge, trace the war history of 2nd Glosters. These are very good on actions and 
personalities down to at least NCO level, but of course offer little critical evaluation 
within the battalion actions, although they occasionally offer veiled criticism of other 
units or orders from above. 
In the Imperial War Museum (IWM) Collections rest important pnmary 
evidence in the shape of contemporary photographic, film, oml and written evidence. 
Film or photographic evidence can be used to confirm any manner of detail; what the 
infantryman carried into battle or even the sea state or weather for a particular day. 
However, again, unfortunately there is no great store of this material directly relating to 
56th Brigade. Even though trained soldiers from the Army Film and Photogmphic Unit 
(AFPU) landed on D-Day and carried on throughout the campaign, when examining the 
archives one is struck by the lack of material considering the breadth of the action. 
Careful analysis of photographs has allowed this author to offer evidence to re-title and 
date a small number of photographs within the collection. 
Another useful resource would be to investigate similar documents and articles 
pertaining to the German forces opposing 56th Brigade. However primary evidence 
documents such as War Diaries seem to have all been destroyed in the fighting and 
retreat by the German Army in August 1944. Useful documents exist but are further 
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removed from the unit. Examples include, D-Day: German Appreciations and 
Operations 61h June- 25th August 1944 and German Operations in North West Europe 
20th August - 16th December 1944, both authored by the Historical Section of the 
Canadian Army, they give a narrative from the perspective of the German Army from 
captured contemporary sources or interrogation of German prisoners of high rank. 
It is important to understand the context within which 56th Brigade operated. The 
Normandy Campaign has been ceaselessly written about for the last sixty years, yet it 
still invites comment, discussion, investigation and controversy. Because official British 
Documents concerning the Normandy Campaign were not open to public examination 
until 1974, (usually their original 'release' date was 2045 or later), the early writers 
based their works on their personal memories and through interview or correspondence 
with the main protagonists. Later writers could have recourse to examination of official 
documents, briefing notes, appreciation notes personal papers of staff officers and notes 
from Staff College courses. 
The works of three authors who were present in Normandy and beyond are 
worth exploring at this stage. Firstly Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe is a well-
written and comprehensive work. Written by a war correspondent who landed on D-Day 
by glider with 6th Airborne Division, Wilmot unusually had access to both the Western 
Allied sources and German sources available just after the war. In the Preface to the 
1964 edition Michael Howard shows the scope and quality of the work: 
Now as then it stands out as one of those rare works of military history ... which 
have enduring value both as an eyewitness account and as authoritative survey 
of a large and complex campaign... it fell to Wilmot to give the English 
speaking world the first general survey, based on documents, of the manner in 
which strategy and grand tactics had been shaped on both sides of the hill, and 
of the bitter conflicts which lay behind the great decisions ofwar.7 
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Written without access to Russian sources at the height of the Cold War and of course 
without reference to 'Ultra' - knowledge of which did not enter the public domain until 
the 1970s - his work has stood the test of time. 
The second author has a similar pedigree as a war correspondent who landed on 
Gold Beach later on D-Day. Writing about the war from the invasion of Italy in 1943 
until the end of the war in Europe, Alan Moorehead in Eclipse has completed a very 
different, and worthwhile work. In his Foreword to the book, Moorehead writes: 'In the 
beginning it was my intention ... to try an experiment: merely to sketch in the military 
details and tell the story of the collapse of German Europe sociologically and 
politically, psychologically and even emotionally'.8 This is a highly informative, 
readable and personal account of the war. It shows insight into events and personalities 
and received critical acclaim when first published. 
The third author is Milton Shulman who wrote, Defeat in the West. Shulman 
was an Intelligence Officer with the Canadian Army and with Lt. Colonel Leslie Chater 
interrogated twenty-six senior captured German Officers. He correctly claims that his 
book contains some 'unique primary source material' and for the purposes of the 
investigation of 56th Brigade it contains directly useful evidence in notes from the 
interrogation of the Le Havre fortress commander and some of the commanders of 
divisions, which at times faced 56th Brigade.9 
A very good British novel, From the City. from the Plough by Alexander Baron, 
brings to life the journey of a fictitious unit, the '5th Wessex Battalion', from January to 
July 1944. First published in 1948 this novel was critically acclaimed by The Tribune as 
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'magnificent' .10 Alexander Baron served in the Anny in the Second World War and 
landed with the first wave on D-Day. It was his first novel and it is purported to have 
sold over a million copies. There are uncanny similarities between characters and events 
in the novel to some of the stories told to this author by veterans or read in Battalion or 
personal diaries from 1944. The strength of this novel is that it highlights the effect of 
the Normandy battlefield on the ordinary British soldier. Some of the detail disguises 
real events and it is skilfully written. While serving Baron made notes on events and 
questioned men from the front during rest periods. Many veterans have or had read a 
copy. In his own Normandy Campaign history, Caen Anvil of Victory, based around the 
controversy relating to the taking of Caen and Montgomery's strategic claims, 
Alexander McKee - himself a Normandy veteran - states that 'The best description of 5 
Wilts (5th Wiltshire Bn.) at Mont Pincon is in Alexander Baron's 'From the City, From 
the Plough', a novel, written as fiction, but factually by far the best thing done on the 
Normandy Campaign'. 11 
The early release in the 1970s of wartime documents held at the British National 
Archives allowed historians new and unparalleled access and led to a number of 
important critical works by the 1980s. One of the most important is Decision in 
Normandy 12 by Carlo D' Este. This clear and comprehensive work centres on the 
strategy of Montgomery and the debate on its success or failure that still excites 
controversy today. D' Este encapsulates its content in his Introduction to the Fiftieth 
Anniversary Edition: 'Montgomery's so called master plan became one of the most 
debated and least understood stratagems of his military career. It generated nearly 
endless debate and to this day arouses fierce reaction in his critics and admirers'. D' 
Este writes fluently and authoritively about the campaign and focuses on the post-war 
controversy surrounding the relationship between Eisenhower (Supreme Allied 
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Commander) and Montgomery (Army Commander), and Montgomery's assertion that 
the Nonnandy Campaign went according to his master plan. As well as interviews with 
important politicians and generals, D' Este availed himself of American and Canadian 
material that had been available since the end of the War as well as the 'new' British 
National Archives material. 
At about the same time as the release of the PRO documents, the death of Field 
Marshal Montgomery released Nigel Hamilton from his promise to Montgomery to 
publish his three-volume biography only after the death of the Field Marshal. The three 
volumes cover the Field Marshal's life as follows: Monty. The Making of a General 
1887-1942 (1981), Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944 (1983) and Monty, The 
Field Marshal 1944-1977 (1986). Hamilton explores the disagreements between 
Montgomery and Eisenhower, and Monty's insistence that his battle plans from Alam 
Halfa in 1942 onwards always went to plan. His sometimes harsh and seemingly 
thoughtless treatment of fellow Generals is fully explored including an assessment of 
Montgomery's character. What is also very useful is to follow how Montgomery 
developed as a field commander and especially the development of his tactical 
appreciation of the battlefield. D' Este in the Epilogue of Decision in Nonnandy makes 
it clear that the two authors had a lively debate by letter. 
Montgomery's own autobiography The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery 
(1958) caused no little controversy. Without doubt the autobiography is flawed by 
Montgomery's relentless pursuit to show himself in a good light. However that does not 
mean that he was not one of, if not the best battlefield commander on the Allied side. 
The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery is a very useful book on a number of 
counts. Montgomery reproduces primary evidence in the fonn of notes that be used and 
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letters he wrote, as well as telling the story from his point of view. He gives a very 
interesting picture of those he had working around him. 
The Longest Day 13 by Comelius Ryan is an early text in the long line of writers 
who have presented D-Day by the use of oral history with supporting evidence linking 
the story. It is a very good example of how eyewitness testimony can be simply woven 
into a text that holds and fascinates the reader. The use of oral history adds to our 
knowledge of the events of D-Day providing us with detail not usually found in official 
documents. The best accounts are very human and hold our attention through the power 
of personal narrative. 
The most widely read of these offerings in the last decade have been written by 
the American writer Stephen Ambrose. Two volumes, D-Day (1994) and Citizen 
Soldier (1997) have been very successful commercially. The first follows the planning 
and preparation for the invasion to D-Day, while the second book takes up the story 
from June 7th until the end of the war in May 1945. Major criticisms have been levelled 
at Ambrose's work. He undoubtedly concentrates heavily on the American experience 
in Normandy. Yet on D-Day the British sea and air landings were not only more 
successful than the American, but they also put ashore much greater numbers of men 
and material as planned. Moreover there are some doubts whether or not some events 
took place as Ambrose has written of them. As an American writer it could be 
understood that Ambrose wrote initially for an American market. As Director of the 
Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans he had easy access to its repository 
of US military oral history. In fact it seems that a number of American writers including 
Ambrose have undervalued the contribution of the British Army and its successes from 
D-Day to the end of the Normandy Campaign. For example Ambrose does mention 
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almost in passing some problems faced on Gold Beach, but what is missing is reference 
to the bravery of the assault battalions who doggedly continued in their task of reducing 
strong points and fighting inland to allow passage for the follow up troops of the second 
wave including 56th Brigade. Also his description of the Gold Beach topography and 
defences is clearly inaccurate and replicates mistakes made by earlier American authors. 
Exploration of the actual battleground is very important to aid in the 
understanding of what happened, why certain decisions were taken and why often 
enough confusion rather than order seemed to reign. To understand relatively small unit 
actions from brigade down to company level it is vital, where possible, to visit the 
actual ground. Holmes has written, 'I had not visited the battlefield (El Alamein) before 
working on this project, and I am reminded, yet again, of the unwisdom of imagining 
that one can really understand a battle without seeing the ground'. 14 Therefore this 
author has undertaken a series of visits to Normandy to determine where possible the 
course of actions and difficulties caused by the terrain. Publications which have helped 
achieve this include the Battle Zone Normandy 15 series. Most of the authors have some 
connection with the Royal Military Academy which as part of its teaching has 
undertaken battlefield tours. Well illustrated with photographs, maps and diagrams; 
both contemporary and modem, they are ideal for a person who wants to delve into a 
certain area of the battlefield. However they give little in the way of extra insight and 
for the serious historian; no attempt has been made to acknowledge the sources of 
information. Two similar volumes in the Battleground Europe series, Gold Beach-
Inland from King 16 and Gold Beach-Jig Sector and West, 17 are disappointing as they 
really offer only an overview with a little insight into some of the actions. A useful and 
fairly comprehensive battlefield tour book for D-Day and the Normandy landings was 
found to be Major and Mrs. Holts Battlefield Guide, Normandy Beaches. 18 
16 
The picture we have of the Normandy Campaign is deeply problematic as a 
result of significant gaps and problems with both the primary and secondary sources. 
This study, utilizing fresh primary sources, will address a significant gap in our 
understanding. It will examine closely, through the use of primary and secondary 
sources and the eyes of the veterans, the journey made by a British infantry brigade 
from relative safety in the UK to speedy mobilization and intensive training, fitting it 
for close combat from D-Day to the completion of the liberation of Normandy with the 
capturing of Le Havre in September 1944. It will add to the understanding of British 
Army operations 1944 from the level of Brigade down, the problems faced and 
overcome by commanders in the field at different levels, underline the differences 
between British and German tactics and add a significant body of oral history. Together 
this will give a unique worms eye view of British operations in the Normandy 
Campaign. 
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Chapter One. 
In the Wings. Continental War to Home Front. 2nd Battalions Essex, Glosters and 
South Wales Borderers. June 1940- December 1943. 
This first chapter will be used to describe how the three battalions that 
eventually fonned 56th Independent Infantry Brigade, 2nd Battalions Essex, Glosters and 
South Wales Borderers, made their wartime journey from early exposure to battle, then 
service on the Home Front from 1940 to the end of 1943. By then, at least some officers 
became aware that the battalions would play some part in the invas~on of France in 
1944. Importantly this chapter will be used to show the differing backgrounds and 
experiences of some of the men that made up these battalions, and how induction, 
training and service in the anny affected them during this period It will also show how 
the expected use of the anny evolved and developed over three and a half years. From 
an anny very much inexperienced and lacking the experience of modem war, yet 
expecting to have to fight off a Gennan invasion, to an anny ready to take on the enemy 
through one of the most difficult of military operations - an opposed landing on an 
enemy coast. 
During the first half of 1940 all three battalions were involved in operations 
against the German Army. 2nd South Wales Borders saw action in Norway and the 2nd 
Essex and 2nd Glosters were involved in the so-called 'Phoney War' and then the 
desperate fighting in France and evacuation of the British Army at Dunkirk. Their 
service was typical of regular units at this time. They suffered from having to use 
inadequate weaponry and tactics caused through nearly two decades of the political 
pursuit for peace. 
The 2nd South Wales Borderers were part of 24th (Guards) Infantry Brigade in 
Norway, first as part of a unit called Avonforce from 01/4/40 to 19/4/40 and then 
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Rupertforce from 19/4/40 to 13/5/40. 1 Although the battalion was only involved in a 
small amount of fighting, it suffered six men killed and thirteen wounded. Two men 
won the Distinguished Conduct Medal for gallantry. The conditions were trying with a 
lack of equipment suitable for the Norwegian weather and limited air support. When 
this unsuccessful campaign came to an end, the 2nd South Wales Borderers were 
embarked on the cruiser HMS Effingham and were lucky to escape without casualties 
when HMS Effingham struck a rock and was wrecked on 171h May 1940. The battalion 
had to be transferred to another destroyer before evacuation home to a nation now living 
in uncertainty and near chaos compared with the situation of only a few weeks before. 2 
One newly trained soldier, joining 2nd South Wales Borderers on their return to Britain, 
provides this insightful vignette: 
I was called up on 161h October 1939 to go to Brecon. I lived in Swansea. The 
food was absolutely awful; the numbers of people being called up swamped 
them. We had a lot of lads from Lancashire, they couldn't understand us and we 
couldn't understand them! But it worked itself out! I joined the 2nd Battalion 
South Wales Borderers in Scotland in 1940 when the Battalion came back from 
Norway. Rather a strange brigade there- a battalion of the Scots Guards, South 
Wales Borderers and the Foreign Legion!3 
The 2nd Essex were present during the 'Phoney War' in France and then the 
retreat and evacuation at Dunkirk. Most men came off along the Mole at Dunkirk in 
good order on 30th May 1940 and were evacuated to England. However the confusion 
that reigned during the evacuation is apparent from the regimental history: 'the 
Battalion was dispersed from Aberdeen to Bulford. By 101h June 1940 Battalion HQ was 
at N~wcastle-under-Lyme and consisted of only 3 officers and 37 other ranks' .4 It took 
another fortnight for the battalion to gather to near full size of 23 officers and 895 other 
ranb Peter Giggens then a newly trained recruit to the Essex Regiment was caught up 
in the chaos of a battalion returning from Dunkirk and having to quickly reorganise: 
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I was called up in 1939 and after training and roadblock duties near Billericay, 
was sent to Dover to join 2nd Essex in France. We paraded daily at Dover 
Harbour then told we were not going over that day. After some days we noticed 
some soldiers coming back from Fr~ce and one day some wounded being 
unloaded from the ships. Finally we were briefed about what was happening at 
Dunkirk and sent to Stoke on Trent with some of those evacuated at Dunkirk, 
then on to Keele Hall where the Battalion was reformed.5 
Another new 2nd Essex soldier, Charles Benford, was similarly on his way to 
Dover at the same time when his progress was checked. He had completed four months 
training before he was sent on a draft from Billericay Station to Dover in May 1940. He 
was expecting to go by boat to France to join 2nd Essex and the BEF already fighting the 
Germans. On the first night he was billeted in Archer Hall, Billericay, having previously 
loaded his kit bags on to a train to Dover. The following morning the officer in charge 
fell ill and was taken to hospital. Unfortunately nobody informed Warley Barracks of 
this. Now another day later, having slept on a hard floor covered by only one blanket 
with his haversack for a pillow and nothing to eat, he waited for orders. In the end the 
soldiers got onto the senior corporal to go to the police station and inform them. The 
police allowed the corporal to phone Warley Barracks and explain the situation. In due 
course an officer arrived to take charge. Later a 15cwt lorry arrived with food in hay 
boxes. "Then another officer arrived. He addressed us and told us it would be doubtful 
if we would continue to Dover as they were having a spot of bother. We would have to 
stay there until further orders".6 After complaining to the officer about the hard floor 
and only having one blanket, another lorry arrived carrying straw palliasses and two 
extra blankets each. To keep them occupied they were detailed in parties of four to go to 
the bus stop, get on the buses and check people's identity cards. Eventually they 
received an entraining order and went to Newcastle under Lyme and were billeted in 
Keele Hall. There they waited to be joined by the remnants of 2"d Essex from Dunkirk. 7 
Confusion reigned as the authorities strove to bring military order out of the chaos of 
the Dunkirk evacuation. 
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Like the 2nd Essex, the 2nd Glosters were also involved in the 'Phoney War' from 
early October 1939, the Battle for France, and the evacuation from Dunkirk. As part of 
1451h Infantry Brigade they had a much harder time of it, particularly when fighting a 
fierce action at the small hill town of Cassell that blocked the road to Dunkirk. Many 
men were lost and a Cabinet Office publication states, 'the Brigade suffered heavy 
casualties during May 1940, the Brigade Command and the units were surrounded and 
captured. Only details ofBde HQ and Units escaped and returned to the UK. on 1st June 
1940 to reform'.8 Around 100 men of 2nd Glosters came home. The casualties were 
severe, 5 officers and 132 men were dead and 472 made prisoner.9 Bill Robinson 
remembers what it was like to join and serve with the Glosters. Called up in September 
1939 Bill went to the Glosters Barracks at Horfield. There they had ten weeks infantry 
training which mainly consisted of square bashing. "You couldn't get out of the 
barracks at all before you could salute properly, and despite it being a hot summer, you 
had to have greatcoat and gloves on before they would let you pass the guardroom!"10 
To him it was worse than a prison and like a prison a big wall surrounded it. He made 
good friends but they were split up and one group followed through as infantrymen and 
the others went into the Motor Transport (MT) Section. The infantry training was based 
on the cricket ground and the MT Section on the Memorial Ground. 
Just before Christmas in 1939 they were all told they had three days leave. No 
special reason was given. When they got back to barracks they had to get into Full 
Service Marching Order (FSMO), with kitbags and rifles "the bloody lot". Told initially 
they were marching to New Passage where the rifle range and assault course was they 
realised that they were going straight down Gloster Road to Bristol Temple Meads 
railway station. This had a special fish platform that they went straight onto and then 
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onto a troop train to join the BEF as reinforcements for the 2nd Battalion in France. At 
Dover they boarded two rusty steam troopships. The crossing was not very comfortable 
and it took more than four hours to get to Calais. 
Two at a time we had to go on deck with our rifles looking for mines. When we 
looked at the other ship, one minute it was there and the next minute it had 
disappeared in the swell, it was that rough! . Anyway my time in France in 
1939/40 ended up being wounded after a Stuka had bombed the truck just 
beyond Rouen. Shrapnel hit me and I had a big red X on my forehead because I 
had been given morphine. I was put on a hospital train to Dunkirk and got away 
on a destroyer from the docks and ended up in hospital at Stanmore in 
Middlesex. 11 
Once back in the United Kingdom and reorganised, these regular battalions of 
the British Army had a heavy burden to bear. The expectation was that the German 
Army after its swift victory in the Low Countries and France would follow up with an 
invasion of Britain. An immediate programme of expansion of the Army and re-
equipment was put in place. The Local Defence Volunteers (LDV -later Home Guard) 
were formed. According to Winston ChurchilJ the BEF had left behind in France 7,000 
tons of ammunition, 90,000 rifles, 2,300 guns, 8,200 vehicles, 8,000 Bren guns and 400 
anti- tank rifles. 'Never has a great nation been so naked before her foes'. 12 On 8th June 
1940 the War Office supplied a very worrying general sketch of Home Forces. It was 
expected that it would take three weeks to reform the BEF. Meanwhile, including 
Northern Ireland, there were fifteen infantry Divisions and one armoured division 
available. The average strength of each division was just over half their establishment 
figure at around 11,000 men per division. 'Two had done no divisional training, five 
very little and the rest were at a standard described as "fair''. 13 
In times other than world conflict a regiment of infantry of the line would have 
two regular army battalions, one battalion (Foreign Service Battalion) often serving 
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abroad for several years and the other (Home Service Battalion) providing training for 
new recruits and reinforcements as required for the battalion abroad. The Terms of 
Engagement for the Regular Army were seven years with the colours and five years on 
the Reserve, so that there were two benefits; firstly a pool of highly experienced soldiers 
and secondly that officers and men served for many years together. In the summer of 
1939 the terms were reversed. "A number of pre-war officers and soldiers were still 
there at D-Day". 14 Also there would have been a territorial battalion, part-time for home 
service only and containing a large number of ex regulars serving their five years 'on 
reserve'. The centres for all of this were the Regimental HQ and barracks; Brecon for 
the South Wales Borderers, Warley, (Brentwood) for the Essex Regiment and Horfield 
Barracks, (Bristol) for the Glosters. In wartime the territorial battalions increased in 
number and with the regulars were likely to serve abroad. By 1944 the earlier 
establishment figures of 1941142 infantry battalion had been increased but because of 
cross postings, training, illness, injuries and casualties when in action, this figure was 
not often attained. 
An important point to establish is that the different battalions in a regiment were 
unlikely to serve together in wartime. Each regiment had its own badges, customs, 
special days, likes and dislikes and geographical areas of recruiting and so was 
distinctive from other regiments. Each man would learn these regimental ways and 
become a part of this special group. The Regiment even used its Victorian Regimental 
number, so that the South Wales Borderers were the 24th Foot, Essex, 44th Foot and 200 
Glosters, 61 st Foot and in this way another distinction, pecking order and rivalry, were 
perpetuated. The lower the number the more senior the regiment. But in the developing 
war some battalions of a regiment might serve in the UK, others in the Middle East and 
yet ·others in the Far East. Each infantry battalion usually became part of a brigade 
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formation (normally of three battalions) and each brigade part of a division (normally of 
three brigades). A Division had other supporting arms of service attached such as 
artillery, service corps, signals and engineers and even armoured formations as required. 
Immediately after June 1940 the concentration of effort had to be on defending 
Britain, while at the same time maintaining operations in the Middle East and a grip on 
parts of the Empire not directly at war. This meant that not only was the army very 
stretched and limited in weaponry after Dunkirk but it had to be prepared to defend the 
country while maintaining an effective training programme. The 2nd Essex for example 
included physical training, tank hunting and repelling parachute troops in their training 
regime. Also they were responsible for helping train the newly formed Local Defence 
Volunteers and help in the construction of blockhouses, ditches, wiring and other 
defensive works. At this time along natural physical barriers like rivers or downland, a 
number of 'Stop Lines' were being erected in the east and south east of the country, the 
area most likely to receive the expected invasion. 
This use of trained soldiery as labour exasperated Winston Churchill, the new 
Prime Minister. A note to the Secretary of State for War on 25th June 1940 ordered, 'I 
fear that the troops are being used in large numbers on fortifications. At the present 
stage they should be drilling and training for at least eight hours a day, including one 
smart parade every morning' .15 He wanted all the labour for these tasks found from 
civilian sources. He wasn't to get his way. Further, the expectation was that trained 
infantry would not be used either to guard or defend vulnerable points or be locked up 
in fortifications, they were fit for a war of manoeuvre. In the immediacy of the crisis 
static defence was the task of older soldiers and the LDV. At least by mid June every 
active regular soldier had a personal w~pon to hand. 
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Peter Giggeris of 2nd Essex describe how at Worthing, Sussex they built a 
piJibox inside the post box of the large central Post Office. Sandbagged on the inside, 
people posting letters were "surprised and jumped a foot when the letters were taken 
from their hands when dropping them through the opening, which became a disguised 
fire slit."16 They erected Dannert Wiring17 as defences between Lancing and Worthing. 
On the Isle of Wight they put up scaffolding defences at low tide and mined the beach. 
Charles Benford believes that the battalion was responsible for erecting 60 miles of steel 
framework around the whole island. "We used to go out and take note of the tides. 
Sometimes we were out there and the tide was coming in and the officer might say, 
"come on lads one more frame before the water gets in!" 18 This use of regular infantry 
as labour was to carry on long after Churchill's minute of 25th June 1940. Over a year 
later he wrote: 'Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War 5th October 1941: I do not 
approve the idea of using the Army to dig land drains or for other work of this character 
during the winter'. 19 However as late as February 1944 the 2nd South Wales Borderers 
received a letter from James Christie, the Secretary of the Norfolk War Agricultural 
Executive Committee, sending thanks for the invaluable work carried out by the 
battalion helping farmers to harvest root crops during the autumn of 1943. Inevitably 
this work was named 'Exercise Sugar Beet!' 20 
By mid June the 2nd Glosters were in the throes of reforming and training after 
the losses in France, and use of this regular, but largely rebuilt, infantry battalion seems 
similar as Syd Hampton recalled that as the 2nd Battalion Glosters were being reformed 
Churchill's idea was to send troops back into France. They had had little training and if 
it had happened Hampton believes that they would have been massacred. While at 
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Ross-on-Wye a lot of men came from the South Wales Borderers Depot at Brecon to 
join the Glosters. They also had only been in the Army six weeks. The battalion moved 
down to Tetbury and then down to Crediton (Devon) and then along the south Devon 
coast. "Bishopsteignton was Battalion HQ. We weren't always welcomed in those days. 
Some of the shops wouldn't serve you in Torquay if you were in the Army. They were 
happy to serve the RAF types!"21 They were on coastal defence at Torquay after 
Crediton and put a lot of concertina wire on the beaches including Slapton Sands. "I can 
remember using the Forces Tavern at Halwell. Also at Yelverton we wired in the 
airfield. "22 An important point in this memory is that through expediency the army had 
to make changes it didn't like or normally carry out. These included combining men 
from one regiment into another decimated by war. This was a situation that inevitably 
worsened as the war progressed. It also shows that whatever the requirements of a 
demanding Prime Minister the need for coastal defence seemed paramount and 
instructions did not filter down the line. The use of troops in these matters was probably 
more effective, quicker and cheaper than employing local contractors. 
The invasion crisis was not to disappear with the winning of the Battle of Britain 
in 1940. A Memorandum from the Prime Minister for September 3rd 1940 stated: 'The 
danger of invasion will not disappear with the coming of winter and may confront us 
with novel possibilities in the coming year. The enemy's need to strike down this 
country will naturally increase as the war progresses'. 23 In fact the threat of invasion 
remained a real possibility to the British Government and constrained the life of the 
people throughout 1941 and 1942. Even after D-Day in 1944 a raid in force aimed at 
British shores was perceived as a possibility. The Home Guard, who were seen by 
Churchill as a genuinely important formation in resisting invasion of the UK, was only 
stood down, not disbanded, in December 1944. 
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The veterans, when revealing the dearth of transport available after so much was 
left behind in France, provide some good examples of the way necessity became the 
mother of invention after June 1940. One soldier from 2nd Glosters later recalled: "I had 
a car and motorbike licence and at Crediton those of us like that were put on a lorry and 
taken to a big motorcycle shop, Pykes of Plymouth, and told that as we knew about 
motorbikes we were to go in and pick what we needed!"24 They fonned a motorcycle 
platoon with sidecars as a mobile force in case paratroopers dropped on Dartmoor and 
used civilian lorries due to a lack of military vehicles. They were also tasked with 
teaching some of the junior officers to ride motor cycles, "But as ex- public schoolboys 
they weren't going to listen to us. We used to let them fall offi"25 2nd Essex dealt with a 
similar problem: "I was on parade one day when we were asked who could drive, I 
stepped forward and found I had the task of learning how to drive the new battalion 
transport- a fleet of single deck buses commandeered from the local bus company!"26 
With no driving instructors or manuals they started learning by trial and error around 
the parade ground. 
Gradually the situation regarding the supply of military materials improved. 
Supplies from the USA meant that the Home Guard was armed with imported American 
Springfield rifles, thus releasing Lee Enfield rifles and ammunition to the regulars. 
Against this between August and December 1940 production of new rifles in the UK 
dropped from around 9,500 per month to less than 4,500 per month entirely due to 
Gennan bombing of the Small Heath factory in Birmingham?7 
Deficiencies in transport were improved and military lorries began to replace the 
commandeered civilian transport. As ever Churchill took an early interest in the 
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maintenance the health and morale of the Army over the winter period: 'Prime Minister 
to Secretary of State for War, 1"1 September 1940, I should be glad to have a full report 
of the arrangements being made to provide educational and recreational facilities for the 
troops during the coming winter. Who will be responsible for this important branch of 
work?' 28 
For 2"d South Wales Borderers the return to the UK from active service merely 
heralded swift reorganisation and movement to a Northern Ireland threatened by both 
German invasion and internal strife. Dick Phillips remembers that after joining the 
returned Battalion at East Lothian they weren't there very long: "On the Saturday I was 
detailed as a potato peeler and the next thing we knew we had to pack our kit and get on 
a train around two in the afternoon".29 This journey seemed interminable and they 
arrived at Glasgow docks. They believed they might be off to the Middle East because 
they were putting artillery pieces on board. However there was no accommodation for 
the troops on board and it was night. They left Glasgow and later saw lights. Someone 
said, "Good God, I have been there, its Larne". They disembarked and after another 
interminable journey arrived in Omagh in County Tyrone, the Depot of the Enniskillen 
Fusiliers. The following day was Sunday morning and church parade. "The 
Enniskillen' s were coming back from the Catholic Cathedral and we were going to the 
Church of England, the band of the SWB trying to outdo the pipes and drums of the 
Enniskillen Fusiliers!"30 The posting was not a very happy one and three soldiers and a 
civilian lost their lives. 
There was a young fellow being instructed how to challenge when he was on 
sentry go by the Sergeant. The Sergeant accidentally shot and killed him. Then 
we had a chap who was drowned on a fiver exercise and the third one who run in 
the back of a TCV (troop carrying vehicle), then there was another one where a 
chap was on sentry go and challenged someone who was slightly drunk and the 
chap just came forward and he shot him. Of course we were worried about the 
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IRA. So that was four I think who died in unfortunate circumstances. I was 
company clerk and corporal for a while and of course my pay went up. I was in 
A Company. We were in Ireland for some time before coming back to UK. We 
worked, much to our dismay, for the farmers. We didn't like it and the farmers 
didn't like it either.31 
Privates Coates, Freeman and Duggan of 2nd South Wales Borderers lie in Omagh 
Cemetery and died between 15th July and 30th December 1940.32 
Back on mainland UK it became clear that the pre-war organisation for training 
could not cope with the huge influx of volunteer and conscript soldiers. Throughout the 
war there was a problem of accommodation for troops and private houses, hotels and 
estates were often requisitioned on a large scale to make up the shortfall in properly 
constructed bases. From July 1942 recruits were enlisted into what was called the 
General Service Corps for six weeks training in a common syllabus at a Primary 
Training Centre (PTC). While there the recruit undertook tests to determine which arm 
of service he was best suited for. If chosen for the infantry they were then sent to their 
parent Infantry Training Centre (ITC) where they completed their infantry training. At 
its peak in 1944 this system of PTC and ITC was handling 200,000 recruits at any one 
time. Prior to this, the pre-war capacity of the ITC's was around 18,000. By this time 
also the need for officers had expanded greatly. After selection at a War Office 
Selection Board (WOSB), candidates were sent to a pre-Officer Cadet Training Unit 
(OCTU) where training continued, for a final decision on the suitability of a candidate. 
This period might be as short as a week before a Potential Officer (PO) was sent to an 
OCTU or as long as nine weeks. Unsuitable candidates were 'Returned to Unit' (RTU). 
For Infantry Officers the OCTU course lasted seventeen weeks.33 
Major Pat Barrass of 2nd Essex came through the officer training system prior to 
the war. His account of training and selection is as follows: "I joined the army from 
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school in October 1938 and narrowly missed a place at Sandhurst with a mark in the 
exam of230/250. I became an officer via the Supplementary Reserve route in the Essex 
Regiment".34 After interview for a commission he trained for two months a year. One 
month was spent at the Essex Regiment Depot, Warley Barracks, where his time in the 
school OTC (Officer Training Corps) really helped. He drilled with the recruits and 
shared all the square bashing and cold showers. Major Barrass stayed on and joined 2nd 
Essex, which was also stationed in the main part at Warley Barracks. He attended a 
military crammer and then via the WOSB he gained a regular commission. 
Brigadier Sir Nicholas Somerville of 2nd South Wales Borderers recalled: "I 
joined the anny after leaving Winchester at the age of 1 8 and first went to a Young 
Soldiers Battalion at the Depot. I became a L/Cpl. Weapons Instructor before going to 
OCTU''. 35 Like many new infantry officers he was an officer with 2nd South Wales 
Borderers at just 19 years of age. 
Major Basil Stephens joined the Territorial Anny two days after the start of the 
war and was called up to Stroud with fourteen others. He was made a Lance Corporal 
and they slept on straw, were fed in a cafe in town and used the Drill Hall in Gloucester. 
Later they moved to be billeted in the stables at Cheltenham Racecourse and he was 
made Acting Sergeant aQd then sent to OCTU at Aldershot. However he caught flu and 
was sent home on three days sick leave. The flu turned into pneumonia and he was out 
for a further two months. He had to restart OCTU and when training was completed he 
was commissioned to a Young Soldiers Battalion of the Gloucester Regiment. After a 
spell at Burnham on Sea, where he met his future wife, the battalion returned to 
Gloucester guarding Brockwood Aerodrome where fighter aircraft were made. Then he 
was called to join the 2nd Gloucesters at Paignton, Devon. 36 
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The stories of the above three officers in training show the changes in the system 
from pre-war to the speeded up process required in wartime. Of the other officers 
interviewed for this study; two were NCO's promoted on the battlefield and therefore 
did not go through the PO and OCTU system, while a third, Captain Dennis Whitaker 
(later to win the Military Cross in Holland) did and joined the 2nd South Wales 
Borderers in Holland in early 1945. However his story follows a different course and is 
worth exploring. He joined the Army in early June 1940 in the Queens Own Royal West 
Kent Regiment at the time when Dunkirk was being evacuated. He stayed with the 
Royal West Kent Regiment through to the rank of sergeant and in the mid-1940s the 
battalion was broken up and became a Primary Training Centre for recruits. Selected 
NCO's and officers remained at the PTC as instructors. He then spent about a year or so 
training troops in Gravesend, Preston and Derby. From Derby he was commissioned on 
16th June 1944. "At the time ofD-Day we were up in the mountains ofNorth Wales on 
our final exercise before commissioning and while having breakfast heard the news on 
the radio of the Normandy landings". 37 He was commissioned into the Buffs, sister 
Regiment of the Royal West Kent, went to the regimental depot in Canterbury and spent 
more time training infantry recruits. Then he was sent as a reinforcement officer to 21"1 
Army Group in January 1945 where he joined 2nd South Wales Borders. Captain 
Whitakers' story reflects the fact that many famous regiments could have units broken 
up and men re-distributed to other regiments, and that such units could be used for 
purposes other than front line duty to fit military expediency. 
Two further 2nd South Wales Borders officers, Dennis Davis and Sam Weaver 
went through OCTU, but were then trained for the Royal Armoured Corps (RAC). Their 
story is one of too many RAC trained officers and a lack of infantry officers. Sam 
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Weaver was called up in 1942 as a Trooper in the RAC and trained as wireless operator 
on the 19 Wireless Set, which was used in tanks, then sent for commission in the RAC 
and attended OCTU at Sandhurst. He was commissioned in September 1943 in the RAC 
but it was realised that there were more tank officers than required, so 400 were 
transferred to the infantry and underwent a conversion course at Dunbar.38 
Most of the men interviewed for this study who joined as soldiers went through 
ITC training. As some of their stories show induction into army life was not always 
straightforward. AJbert Daines, 2nd Essex was conscripted into the Army on 15th July 
1943. He was exempt from service as a farm worker though the farmer forgot to exempt 
him! After six weeks training at Warley Barracks he got food poisoning and was a 
fortnight in hospital. When he came out of hospital he joined 2"d Essex at the Hawthorn 
Hotel, Bournemouth in November 1943. There he was put in D Company, 18 Platoon. 39 
Bill Speak of 2nd South Wales Borderers joined the armed forces in June 1943. "After a 
six week Basic Training Course at Brecon I went to Shelton Road Camp, Shrewsbury 
and was trained on a specialist 3inch Mortar and Bren Gun Carrier Course- that's why I 
ended up a sniper!'"'0 Don Leech, 2nd Glosters was called up into the Army in 1942 from 
Bishops Cleave, Gloucestershire. Firstly he went to Royal Hydrabad Barracks at 
Colchester, which was a depot for Glosters, Somerset and Wiltshire Regiments joining 
15th Infantry Training Battalion. "It was put to me that I was good with my hands and 
that they would like me to take a Carrier course. So rather than join the Battalion I 
stayed three months in Colchester. I went to 2nd Glosters and joined C Company in 
March 1943".41 Ernie Partridge, 2nd Glosters was called up December 17th 1942 and 
similarly went for six weeks basic training at Hydrabad Barracks in Colchester, then to 
Gloucester to join a training company. 
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Gordon (Duffin) and I were in Number One Platoon there where we did twelve 
weeks. Then we joined 2nd Battalion Glosters in March 1943. I was in A 
Company, 8 Platoon. With Platoon Sergeant 'Sturmey' Archer in charge and the 
Sergeant Major was Vicky Walker, British Army middleweight boxing 
champion. This was in Winchester Barracks.42 
Len Cox of 2nd Glosters was called up into the Army on 18th June 1942. "I 
weighed 8 stones 4lbs and was 5' 4Yz" tall. Doing the training did me a world of good. 
When I came out I was 5' 6Yz'' and 10 stones 7lbs".43 Going into the Royal Armoured 
Corps he went to Gloucester, Reservoir Camp, where they completed basic training. 
Then after six weeks he was transferred to the Glosters at 15 ITC, Colchester. Training 
there until October, he then joined 2nd Glosters at Woodhall Spa in Lincolnshire. 
The variances within each veteran's statement are significant, as it sometimes 
appears that the route taken was not necessarily PTC followed by ITC. Also it is worth 
remembering that many recruits to the regular army had been in the Home Guard and 
were already partly trained in marching, tactics and the use of weapons. One man who 
did not have as smooth a path as some in entering the army - but by this route received a 
sound longer-term training period - was Frank Clark. He was a member of the 
Territorial Army at Uffculme, Devon, prior to the war and after joining the Regular 
Army was discharged after a motorcycle accident, which left him with a leg in plaster. 
He had problems with this leg but worked hard to improve it. By 1940 his leg had 
improved so much that he cycled to Exeter for a medical and passed Al. After some 
time in depot at Plymouth, (where he found the quality of officers lacking, they were 
older and some had been brought out of retirement}, he was posted to the 70th (Young 
Soldiers) Bn. Gloucester Regiment. Here the quality of officers improved as an 
increasing number of young officers from OCTU joined the battalion. Their main 
weapon was the Canadian Ross rifle with a long sword type bayonet.44 
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It is worth reflecting here on three areas. Firstly it is the story of a young man 
who wants to join the anny and fights adversity to get in. Secondly the telling comment 
about older officers and the energy brought by the newly commissioned younger 
officers from OCTU, and lastly that the Ross rifle was the main weapon of this battalion 
to start with. The Canadian Ross rifle from the First World War was disliked and not in 
the same class as the Lee Enfield. It had not stood up to wear and tear on the battlefield 
in the previous war. It is generally remembered as a rifle that along with the American 
Springfield rifle, anned the Home Guard. It is often forgotten that they also anned other 
second line land-based units, such as young soldier battalions, naval and RAF units. 
Other notable insights given by the veterans interviewed for this study include 
the fact that at least two joined up under age. This is usually remembered as a First War 
phenomenon. Both used the excuse that they had lost their Identity Cards and only a 
parental signature was needed on a form to confirm this. Neither would they be safe 
from action. In the actions later in Holland 14739982 Private PJ Hewitt of 2nd South 
Wales Borderers, killed on 6th November 1944, is buried in Bergen-Op-Zoom 
Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery (CWGC). He was just 17. Another feature is that 
given away by Albert Daines of 2nd Essex (above). As a fann worker he was in a 
reserved occupation as was Stan Daines of 2nd Essex. They are possible distant cousins 
and despite serving in the same battalion did not know each other. This is another 
indicator that for the serving soldier it was his section of ten men and platoon of thirty 
that he got to know best. Certainly men in other Companies of the same battalion were 
often remote from each. In action, as we shall see, this became even more pronounced. 
Stan Daines reports that after one winter of working in the fields he had had enough and 
sought to join the anny. Not only should his reserved occupation have precluded him at 
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the recruiting office, but the fact he was under age was circumvented as well.45 Phillip 
Maillou of 2nd Essex is another vetemn known to have joined under age. 
There were a few of us as a gang of about six yobs got called up in October 
1942, between the ages of say 16 to 18. Three of us went to the recruiting office 
in Holloway to volunteer and explained to the recruiting sergeant that we wanted 
to join together. I was only sixteen and a half My mother had agreed and had to 
swear that I had lost my ID Card and was not under age. The recruiting sergeant 
said we had to have a medical and decide what we wanted to go in. We wanted 
something to do with driving. In the end we signed up for the 70th Essex Young 
Soldier Battalion, as there seemed little else available. So we went away with the 
King's Shilling and spent that on a pint ofbeer!46 
From 1941 until the end of 1943 the three battalions led the usual existence of 
Home Service battalions: moving around the country; sometimes becoming involved 
with building defence works in the earlier period; and engaging in military exercises 
and farming activities. Most soldiers in the battalions were very young men and it was 
a time of growing up very quickly in a country at war and in a service that demanded 
fitness and discipline. Some of the experiences were comical; some showed the difficult 
nature of living in an environment that included men from a variety of backgrounds. 
High jinks, alcohol and thieving were all variously experienced. Sometimes it was the 
fittest and toughest that suffered, and for some skills learnt in 'Civvy Street' put them 
above the others. In I 940s Britain some recruits had already been at work for three or 
four years before joining the army. 
Charles Benford of the 2nd Essex set out to go to the pictures in Kington, but it 
was full. After a night drinking scrumpy at the Swan Hotel it was time to return to 
camp. Already a large crowd was waiting at the taxi rank. The taxis took them back 
crammed in about twelve at a time. Charles was hanging outside on the running board. 
He remembers little else. "When I came to there was a sentry prodding me with the butt 
of his rifle! I look around and I am back in the camp lying outside the tent. The sentry 
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said, "Get up and back in your tent".47 His mates had waltzed him past the guard and 
got him undressed and in bed. He presumably bad got up in the middle of the night to 
relieve himself and passed out again. Harry Conn of 2nd Essex was called up into the 
Essex Regiment in 1940 and was trained initially at the Depot at Warley. As he was 
from Durham NCO's and men accused him of speaking a foreign language! He joined 
2"d Essex at Kington in Herefordshire in C Company, 13 Platoon. Boxing was a real 
strength and he became Divisional champion in 1941. After one bout near Worthing, 
Sussex he had a pain in his side, which turned out to be a burst appendix. Moved to 
Cuckfield Hospital his parents were sent for, as he was so ill he was not expected to 
survive. However he improved, but unfortunately when on leave he managed to burst 
his stitches, which caused further complications. By 1943 he had rejoined the Battalion 
at Fort Widley, Portsmouth, then on to Tenby, which included some training on landing 
craft; back to Isle of W ight and finally Durham where he managed to break an ankle. 48 
There was plenty of opportunity as Peter Giggens relates to attend courses if one 
was interested, or ordered to. He attended a number of courses including the arduous 
Battle School Infantry Training Course including gas demonstrations and major assault 
courses at height. Another course was as a Mortar Demonstration Section at a Battle 
School for officers. By this time he was Corporal i/c Section and they arrived at I a. m. 
The guard sent them to a spare hut where they fumbled around in the dark to find beds 
and blankets. The following morning a sergeant arrived with the orderly officer (female) 
for inspection. Peter was put on a charge for sleeping with the men! Now it was light a 
small area at the end of the hut could be made out for NCOs. Also a broken strut in the 
hut was put down to them as wilful damage! Peter was given a small reprimand and had 
to serve 6 days extra duty in the orderly room. His first early morning task here was to 
take tea in a bucket to one of the huts, this was full of female A TS who persuaded Peter 
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to go in and serve them tea in bed! Coming out just as the orderly officer arrived he was 
told to report to the Major. Expecting more trouble a short talk ensued during which the 
Major realised that Peter had little experience of the female in the Anny and also told 
him to read orders and turn up properly dressed next time, as he had been unknowingly 
made up to Sergeant. For the demonstrations the section appeared highly efficient 
driving up and leaping into action very quickly and efficiently. The truth was a little 
different; they had previously set up and ranged the mortars in ground unseen by the 
spectators. 49 
Petty criminality was widespread as Stan Daines of 2nd Essex remembers. One 
of the favourite tricks during training involved urinating in someone else's boots and 
tipping them out of the window after a night out on the beer. Soldiers going on leave 
were not above pinching a pair of boots and neck scarves to sell or give away. Stan and 
his best friend 'Biondie' Goodyear from Norfolk (they had joined up together) spoke a 
different language as farm boys compared with the men from London. Stan points out 
that they may not have been as good as the City boys in things like boxing, but on field 
exercises the country boys came into their own, even winning weekend passes for 
battalion shooting competitions. Darker incidents included 'Blondie' Goodyear 
receiving postal orders regularly from home. They had to watch out for the Post 
Corporal who got to know this and expect 'Biondie' to buy him a beer. Another 
unfortunate incident was when one of Stan's mates stole washing from a civilian who 
had befriended them and taken them to his house for tea a number of times. Stan was on 
guard when the indignant man arrived at the gate accusing both Stan and his mate. The 
duty Sergeant sorted this out and the thief had to face a civilian and military charge. 50 
This reveals a valuable insight into how civilians tried to do their bit for young soldiers 
away from home and the varying backgrounds of men thrown together in wartime. 
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The following three reminiscences are useful as they give an idea of how three 
young soldiers saw similar situations sometimes differently while training with the 2nd 
Glosters. At Winchester Barracks in 1943 Maurice Wells remembers that they were 
there for a considerable time and did a lot of training. "They even came and asked for 
volunteers for the Parachute Regiment. We had a practice jumping out of three-ton 
lorries. After that I don't think anyone volunteered!"51 One long exercise went from 
Winchester down to Beaulieu marching and practising tactics on the way. Then they 
marched north and two days later walked past his own front door on the way to 
Windsor. They were due to do a river crossing at Windsor. A few of them including 
Ernie Partridge nipped back to his parents' house. The next day they did the crossing 
then marched down to Henley-on-Thames where they practised some street fighting. 
They then carried on to the Vale of the White Horse. "They called a halt to it there 
saying we were using too much petrol. We had marched all the bloody way! Then there 
was an argument about marching back but we got transport in the end". 52 Another 
exercise involved invading the Isle of Wight. They practised street fighting in 
Southampton and then marched down to Southampton Water and crossed to the Isle of 
Wight. On landing the local children were spitting at them as they were the 'enemy' and 
had swastikas on their arms. Arriving back in Winchester 20 of them were sent to help 
train officers as a demonstration platoon at a training establishment at Dunbar. "It was 
so cold up there. We had to keep going around waking these officers up in case they 
died of cold". 53 
Gordon Duffin, 2nd Glosters gives a slightly different view of the same time. He 
remembers the food as being absolutely terrible. The older soldiers said it was about 
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time they made a proper complaint. At mealtimes the officer came around and asked if 
there were any complaints. An old soldier stood up: 
Yes Sir, this food is terrible, the potatoes are covered in grit and muck and there 
is nothing like enough. "Ab yes" the officer said, "now when you have finished 
your meal how do you feel?" "Well bloody hungry Sir!" "Good" he said," that 
is the answer I wanted, because I have consulted with the MO and he assures me 
that a sign of being fit and well fed is that you still feel hungry after a meal!54 
Later on the Isle of Wight they were in terrible broken down houses and had a 
cook who seemed to delight in serving up awful food. Again the old soldier asks them 
to back him if he complains. This time the result was even worse as they were ordered 
to queue up outside the cookhouse with their mess tins every morning before Reveille to 
be given their food. On the first morning they lined up and were given a piece of grisly 
meat, half an oxo cube, one and a half potatoes complete with dirt and grit, a piece of 
cabbage, four slices of bread, some custard powder and three dried and shrivelled 
prunes all dumped into their two mess tins. "Well, what the hell are we going to do with 
this stuff and we are on a route march around the Isle of Wight. We had had no 
breakfast, as we hadn't had time to sort it out with collecting it, making beds and so on. 
Comes to dinnertime we stop". When the old soldier says asks "what about our 
dinner?"55 They are told that they have been given their ration and it was up to them to 
sort it out. "What the hell could we do? We could eat the bread and jam and biscuits and 
its all making a mess where it was dumped in our mess tins". 56 Eventually they had to 
give in on the promise that they would never again complain about army food. 
Duffin was then sent to Dunbar in Scotland as part of a Demonstration Platoon. 
A Scottish officer with a kilt, dirk and all the paraphernalia that goes with Scottish 
Regiments greeted them. The weather seemed very cold after the South Coast but their 
billet was in a large mansion on a cliff overlooking the sea. They got told off non-stop, 
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but after a few days the officer said, "I think I can see the possibility of making you into 
a demonstration platoon. "51 It was the first best praise they had had since they arrived 
and they began to enjoy the perks. At Christmas nobody wanted to go on leave because 
it was so good in Scotland. The food was up to Hotel standard and plentiful. When they 
came back from town supper was waiting and they could brew up tea or cocoa. It was so 
good that only one married man went on leave. The Platoon were there to help train the 
officers and they acted out every infantry role; section attack, platoon in attack, 
reconnaissance and everything else in the manual for platoon infantry tactics. One task 
was to get the officers to appreciate being under fire: 
From a camouflaged position I had to fire my Bren gun over a group of Officers 
from 450 yards, as close to their heads as I dare. I didn't like this, so I set the 
sights to 600 yards. After I had fired a magazine I hear the Scottish Captain 450 
yards away screaming "Lower!" I went down to 500 yards on the sights but was 
still screamed at to get lower! In the end I got it low enough to the officers' 
satisfaction! The idea was to get them to hear the Crack! Thump! of a bullet and 
to work out where the thump is coming from. The crack is the sound as it goes 
over your head; the later thump gives away the firers position. On the officers 
signal I also fired to the left and right so they could hear the difference. 58 
Ernie Partridge, 2nd Glosters remembers that at Winchester Barracks it was all 
marching, training, marching and training. Up and down the Romsey road 20 miles, 
twice a week, into the New Forest and back. His memory of the scheme involving the 
river crossing at Windsor involved marching to Reading and sleeping the night in a park 
as a battalion and after three days crossing the bridge at Windsor where A Company set 
up on the side of the bridge. 
My mate Jerry Dingman said, "Have you got two bob?" I said "I haven't got a 
bleeding penny Jerry". You see my Dad died in 1942 and the Army sent half of 
our pay home, which was two bob a day ( 1 Op) so I had seven bob a week, only 
35p now! I couldn't afford a bird! He sees a youngster coming along and he 
says, "Is there a fish and chip shop near here?'' The youngster said, "I'll get you 
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some mister". We gave him this two bob and never saw him again! Training was 
going on all the time. Rifle shooting, having your rifles re-zeroed, they took 
away the 18 inch bayonets and issued us with the triangular pig stickers. 59 
The above gives us valuable vignettes into the life of young infantrymen under 
training and life in wartime Britain At this point it is worth considering in detail the 
weaponry and organisation of an Infantry battalion by 1944. The infantryman's main 
weapon was of course the rifle. During the 1930s the Army had developed newer rifles 
including semi-automatic, but pre-war constraints had not allowed production, and in 
the early years of the war soldiers still used the same rifle and bayonet their fathers had 
used in the First World War. It was not until 1940 that mass production of a new rifle 
was begun, the Rifle No. 4 Mk. 1. This rifle weighed just over 9lb and was to prove an 
excellent weapon, though it still used a bolt action loading mechanism. It fired a 
.303inch round held in a ten round magazine and had a range of a mile, although targets 
were effectively engaged from much nearer. It had a shorter cruciform shaped bayonet 
and importantly it was "soldier proof' and difficult to break. Officers were armed with 
a Webley .38 pistol, only effective at very short range. From the middle of 1941 the 
machine carbine Sten gun was introduced and was carried by officers and NCO.s. It was 
cheap to produce, easy to maintain and fairly reliable. However lacking a safety catch a 
number of accidents and deaths were caused by its propensity to fire accidentally if 
dropped or knocked, and it was not always held in high regard. The basic hand grenade 
in use was the No. 36 Mills fragmentation grenade. This could be thrown from the hand 
with a four to seven second fuse, or fired via a cup discharger by rifle. Other grenades 
included the No. 69 Bakelite blast grenade, Phosphorous: Grenade Hand Smoke No.77, 
and Grenade Hand Incendiary (SIP) No. 76. These last were often disliked by 
infantrymen. The idea of burning an enemy to death was abhorrent to many and the 
consequences of one going off accidentally while being carried were equally horrific. 
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The main section weapon was the Bren Light Machine Gun (LMG). This was a 
well-crafted, very accurate and robust weapon with an effective range of 1 ,OOOyds and 
an overhead box magazine holding 29 rounds of .303in. ammunition. Stan Daines 
remembers: 
I was trained as a Bren Gunner which paid me another Is 6d a day as a 
specialist. Each Section in a Platoon had a Bren as section weapon to provide 
immediate suppressing fire. The Bren was heavy and carried by a handle when 
on the move, the No.2 carrying a spare barrel, adjuster key, spare magazines and 
his own rifle. I can still remember the drill to clear a jammed weapon. We could 
set up to fire on fixed lines at crossroads or gaps in hedges or walls. Often 
targets were indicated by trip wires or by listening and hearing enemy 
movement60 
A small 2-inch mortar, able to fire a High Explosive, smoke or iiluminating 
2.251b bomb out to 500 yds, was carried by each Platoon. Weighing nearly 19lb it could 
be carried by one man and it was even possible to fire it horizontally against targets 
including armoured vehicles. Infantry were also armed with one-man anti-tank 
weapons. By 1943 this was the Projector Infantry Anti-Tank (PIAT). This fired a 
hollow charge anti-tank grenade to an effective range of lOOyds against tanks and 
against buildings up to 350yds. Being spring-loaded it needed the strength ofa Hercules 
to load and was not always popular, but was effective as long as the firer was brave 
enough to approach near the target. An infantry battalion also had its own heavier 
weapons carried by its'S' or Support Company, in or by small tracked vehicles called 
Carriers. Support Company included Platoons for 3inch Mortars, 6pounder (pdr) Anti-
Tank Guns, Pioneers and a Carrier Platoon with extra Bren Guns for covering or 
defensive fire. By 1944 the 2nd Essex Mortar Platoon Sergeant was Peter Giggens: 
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At Kington in Herefordshire I became part of the 3inch Mortar Platoon. The 
Platoon had six 3inch mortars, with four men to each. One mortar carried per 
Carrier plus 66 bombs and extras forced in where possible, such as a box on the 
floor with the passenger seat up. The officer had his own Carrier with wireless 
set on one side and extra bombs down the other. A good mortar crew can put 16 
bombs in the air by the time the first one lands. The mortars had to be 
dismounted from the Bren Carriers before use.61 
A 3inch Mortar had the capability to fire HE or Smoke bombs between 500 yds 
and 2,800 yds. The anti-tank guns in use by the infantry never quite did the job. The 
6pdr anti-tank gun was withdrawn from Royal Artillery service by 1944 and replaced by 
the 17pdr. The 6pdr was handed down to the infantry to be towed by their support 
Carriers. It had a range of 5,500yds and was able to fire 10 rounds per minute. But it 
could not penetrate the frontal armour of the heavier German tanks. This was the anti-
tank gun taken by the infantry battalions to Normandy. 
Infantrymen had to be proficient at using the weapons listed above and be able 
to read maps, patrol, dig defences, be fit and capable of great endurance, possess 
initiative and leadership skills ·and take quick intelligent decisions. It is pertinent to 
report two observations made at different ends of the war related to the intelligence 
required of an infantryman: 'In September 1939 approximately four out of ten soldiers 
were placed in what was generally (and mistakenly) regarded as the least skilled arm of 
service, the infantry'. Contrast that statement with this one by General Slim made in 
April 1945, showing that he believed the infantryman had to be a highly skilled soldier: 
'Any infantryman who is capable of going out on long distance patrol must have 
acquired a variety of knowledge, a quickness of perception, and a skill in handling of 
his own weapons which is required of no other fighting man' .62 
It is worth quoting Gordon Duffin, 2nd Glosters at length, to get an infantryman's 
view of this: 
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In my opinion the infantryman had to know more things than any other branch 
of the Army. Sounds daft because everyone thinks the lowest of the low are 
bunged into the infantry to be used as cannon fodder. Well that is a load of 
rubbish. There are many things you have to know. All the separate lessons on 
the rifle and the bayonet. the Bren, Sten and Tommy guns, the PIA T and each 
type of grenade. Lessons on booby traps, erection and crossing of barbed wire. 
Map reading I inch to the mile Ordnance Survey map, which tells you nearly 
everything you need to know about the ground and use of the compass including 
bearings and back bearings, bearings on noises, bearings on aeroplanes. The slit 
trench is the British Army name for what the Yanks call a foxhole. The British 
soldier on active service will live in his slit trench until such time as you have to 
get out of it to advance. It will be 4feet 6inches deep, 4feet long and 18inches 
wide. This is for two men. The spoil must be carried away and hidden! Well of 
course 4-600 men digging in it can't be done! You can't hide that amount of 
activity. Some of the spoil would be put up in front to stop shrapnel or bullets. 
You would try to dig in behind a hedge. The Jerries couldn't see behind it, but 
you could see through it for your field of fire. There are two types; the two-man 
as explained and that in a V to house the three man Bren Gun Group with the 
Bren gun at the point. There is one other trench we dreamt up ourselves and that 
is a trench in a letter T. If you are lucky you can find something to make a roof 
over the leg of the letter T for shelter.63 
Tactically within the battalion the Section was the smallest unit consisting of 2 
non-commissioned officers and 8 other ranks. There were three sections to a platoon led 
by I officer, usually a Lieutenant or 2nd Lieutenant. Three platoons made up a rifle 
company led by a Major, with a Company Sergeant Major as senior non-commissioned 
officer. The battalions of 56th Brigade went to Normandy with four Rifle Companies, 
plus S Company of around 200 men. The Battalion HQ of 5 officers and 45 other ranks 
was split in action between a main HQ and a small Tactical or Tac HQ, which went 
forward with the Rifle Companys. Usually the Commanding Officer~ went with the 
Tactical or Tac HQ. In battle the battalion could deploy just around 530 men in the rifle 
companies, plus S Company. This meant that something over 150 men were required in 
B Echelon as drivers, tradesmen or cooks. In 1944 an infantry battalion's establishment 
figure was 36 officers and 809 other ranks. 
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Usually individual platoons used fire and manoeuvre to advance their sections 
forward, and depending on the strength of an enemy position the platoon commander 
might use one, two or all three sections. Often one section was kept in reserve as two 
sections moved to destroy a target, such as an enemy sniper or machine gun. At its 
simplest the Bren gun team fired on a target to keep enemy heads down as the rest of 
the section advanced, the section then covered the advance of the Bren gun team and so 
on until the enemy had gone away, been killed or a charge could be made on and 
through a position. More complicated fire and manoeuvre could be used by using the 
Bren gun team and splitting the remainder of the section into two. These drills were 
carefully learnt and practised. In the close confines of the small fields of the Normandy 
bocage it was often the platoon or even section which had to deal with the enemy, and 
many men have commented that you would not have a clue as to what was going on 
over the next hedgerow. In towns and villages other careful drills were pmctised to clear 
built up areas. These included 'mouse holing' through walls and floors using pick and 
bayonet to break through. All of this had to be carefully orchestrated. They could rely 
on their own S Company for close support with mortar and machine gun fire, and they 
could reiy on aerial supremacy and a great weight of artillery. But things could go 
wrong and communication by radio was sometimes impossible. If the radio did not 
work properly, the old system of runners was fallen back on. 
But despite all the weight offuepower and technology the British Army took to 
) 
Normandy, the infantryman would soon learn that the German section usually deployed 
two light machines guns per section, either MG 34 or MG 42, (from their date of 
introduction into service) with twice the mte of fire at 1,000 rpm than their Brens, and 
that by a system of levers and telescopic sights, the German machine gunner could fire 
from below the safety of the lip of his slit trench. They would learn that the German 
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deployed more sub machine guns than them, and that it was more reliable. Many British 
officers and NCOs would replace their Sten gun with a Schmeisser. They would find 
that the German stick grenade could be thrown further than the 38 Grenade, the 
Germans were expert with the use of mortar, and that the German soldier excelled in 
camouflage and digging defensive positions protected by the clever use of mines and 
booby-traps. 
By 1943 it was worrying to the professional soldiers of the three battalions that 
their units were staying on Home Service. Although they took part in exercises - and by 
now 2nd South Wales Borders were part of the lorried (or mobile) infantry of 9th 
Armoured Division - they were not necessarily seen as first rate fighting units, and 
seemed to provide demonstration sections, labour or reinforcements as required. A 
further urgency was that it was obvious that a Second Front would soon be opened in 
Europe, and war may come to a conclusion without them having the opportunity to 
prove themselves. It must be said that some were quite happy with this situation, most 
did not think much about it too much, but others whether professional, conscript or 
volunteer did want to come to grips with the enemy. Those who were part of the 
battalions in 1940 had a score to settle, others bated what the Nazi regime stood for, and 
others wanted a reckoning for relatives and friends lost in battle or air raids. As 1943 
drew to a close a major problem for each of the battalions was that they were up to 200 
men under strength and a number of officers and men in the battalions were too old and 
others not fit for active service. 
January 1944 found the 2/24th forming part of the 7th Infantry Brigade in 9th 
Armoured Division. Unfortunately it had become obvious that the Division was 
losing priority and disquiet was felt that the Inf. Bde. might at best become a 
draft finding formation and at worst be disbanded.64 . 
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This fear was soon to be overtaken by events and led eventually to the three 
baualions landing in Normandy on D-Day itself. 
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Chapter Two. 
Chosen for the Second Front. Training and Organisation into 56th Undependent) 
Infantry Brigade -1'1 January to 251b May 1944. 
By January 1944 the return to Britain of experienced troops from Italy with their 
commander General Montgomery, and the increasing build up of US troops in the UK, 
showed that the opening of a second front in Europe was imminent. But as the previous 
chapter indicates there was disquiet among the senior officers of the three battalions that 
'their' battalion would be left out of future active operations. It was not only the 
Colonels in charge of the battalions that were pushing for action. Within the military 
hierarchy there were a number of senior officers with enough interest in the three 
battalions to push for their inclusion in any future invasion of Europe. 
Perhaps the key decision that ensured the inclusion of the three battalions was 
the rapid expansion in the projected size of the invasion force by Montgomery to five 
beaches instead of three. Montgomery was to be overall land forces commander for the 
invasion and subsequent breakout from Normandy. Above him was to be the American 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who held the role of Supreme Allied Commander. 
Montgomery pronounced the plans for a three divisional landing as 'impractical' after 
his first reading of them on 1st January 1944. 1 Eisenhower, Brooke (the British Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff- CIGS), Churchill and other Generals had all expressed a 
lack of confidence in the plans for an invasion as presented in 1943, but it was 
Montgomery that produced the final thrust for change.2 Interestingly one of Brooke's 
worries was the breakout from Normandy through the Bocage as he had withdrawn 
some remnants of the BEF through this area to Cherbourg in 1940. 
50 
The landings were originally projected for May 1944 but with the increase in the 
size of the initial landing force to five divisions this date was put back to June. Even so 
this was a very short time in which to plan and implement a scheme on such a vast 
scale. 
Within 56th Brigade it appears that by January 1944 the most senior officers of 
the three battalions and their Adjutants had an inkling that their battalion would be 
involved in some way in the second front. Sir Nicholas Somerville the Intelligence 
Officer (IQ) of 2nd South Wales Borderers remember that as a regular battalion in late 
1943 they felt misused and that they would miss the opportunity to play a part in the 
invasion of Europe. However with the arrival of some new officers before Christmas 
1943 they felt that their prospects might be improved. One of the new officers, who 
became a Company Commander, was Major Henry Gillespie. He had been on General 
Morgan's staff planning the invasion of Europe. "As IQ I was the CO's personal staff 
officer. Ifthe CO went off on some mission he would take the 10 with him. As IQ I had 
to get the big picture and brief down to Company level. We were often as young as age 
19 for this level of responsibility". 3 
Lieutenant Dennis Davis joined the SWB at Hunstanton in January 1944 after 
training as an officer in the Royal Armoured Corps (RAC), but due to too many officers 
being trained for that Corps he was transferred to 2nd South Wales Borderers. He joined 
C Company but expected to be posted on active service, possibly Italy. In fact he had 
had inoculations and was packing to leave when the Colonel told him "not to bother as 
we are in for the Second Front!'"' 
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Thus was to begin a very busy time for all three battalions. They were under 
strength and some of the soldiers they contained were deemed too old for battle. Other 
soldiers were psychologically unfit Also they were equipped with second-class 
transport. Despite this they had only four months to train for the Second Front. AJl 
three battalions were put on a war footing in February and from then on changes and 
exercises took place quickly. The battalions had been active in defence of the shores of 
the UK and had worked hard on exercises. Many of the younger men were well 
practised and fit for war. There had been many exercises keeping the men fit and trained 
and quite a number had worked in 'Demonstration Platoons' away from the battalion to 
help in officer training or tactical demonstrations. 
During January 1944 things carried on as usual. The War Diaries of the three 
battalions outline typical activities for a Home Service Battalion. The 2nd South Wales 
Borderers were at Hunstanton and on 2nd January they were bivouacking on Doncaster 
racecourse. Following this was a move to Kirkleathem for over a fortnight during which 
time two Rugger matches were played against Redcar Hospital and the Yorks and Lanes 
Regiment. As 2nd South Wales Borderers apparently included some ex-internationals in 
their team and Rugby is the national sport of Wales, they did very well! One Battalion 
Order posted showed one way in which men looking for extra excitement or a change 
might take as a way out of the routine of a Home Service unit: '24th January 1944-
Glider Pilot Volunteers. No more officers required, still need other ranks'.5 However 
even this was not a sure way out as the building up to War Establishment started in 
earnest within the battalions. 
Peter Giggens of 2nd Essex was part way through his training: " I was on another 
course as a Glider Pilot at Hurne Airport. Lots of time was spent in the classroom, but I 
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remember the bumpy ride in a Glider and hitting the slipstream of the tug aircraft was 
like hitting concrete".6 However at this point he was recalled to 2"d Essex. The needs of 
the Glider Pilot Regiment would have to take second place to that of a D-Day spearhead 
unit. 
An insight into the dangers even Home Service held is contained in Battalion 
Orders during January 1944 by 2nd South Wales Borderers: • Accidents- Ammunition 
and Explosives, December 1943. Accidents x 20; due to carelessness x 8; killed x 1; 
injured x 22'. 7 Many of these were accidents in training were caused by carelessness 
with hand grenades or the 2-inch mortar. Five were injured when an instructor kicked 
away a 69 Grenade, which was dropped by the thrower and did not immediately go off. 
Civilians were included in the numbers injured where unexploded ordnance had not 
been dealt with properly at the end of exercises. Orders were issued for instructors to 
ensure they were familiar with dealing with 'blinds' and other unexploded material. 
This theme continues with an order published on 22"d January 1944: '2-inch mortars 
must only be fired when there is a clear line of flight. Accidents have occurred recently 
as a result of bombs hitting trees or other obstructions' .8 This helps underline the 
realistic nature of the training. 
The 2nd Essex were now at Bournemouth and the War Diary reports a typical 
range of activities: Lt. Col. Marriott went on a three-day sniper's course for senior 
officers on 3rd January 1944, the following day all field officers received a lecture on 
Map Reference codes. 2nd Lieutenant Sandbrook and ten 'other ranks' were attached to 
3'd Battalion, 1751h US Infantry and received from them Captain IT King m and ten 
other ranks to be attached for two weeks. Unfortunately the Diary contains no further 
information on exactly what this was for. It is worth noting that while the 2nd Essex sent 
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only a 2nd Lieutenant, the US Anny sent a Captain. Other activities included the 
attachment of a Sergeant and ten other ranks to 47th (London) Infantry Division Battle 
School as part of a demonstration platoon, a Battalion HQ exercise to study camouflage 
and march discipline, and for officers, a Divisional Study Day at Chichester Barracks, 
entitled 'The Infantry Brigade in Defence'. Sports too were on the agenda with the 
battalion coming 7th out of 19 in the Divisional running races and Cpl. Coon being 
narrowly defeated in the Divisional Boxing Championships. By 24th January the 
battalion had left the South Coast and moved to Durham. 9 
Meanwhile 2nd Glosters were at Whitewell in Lancashire and their War Diary 
reports a number of exercises during the month. These included a brigade exercise to 
practise communications in the field, which involved skeleton Company HQ's and the 
full Battalion HQ. There followed a two-day exercise called 'Exercise Hoppitt' to 
practice digging and wiring in defence. The 'Bow Belles' Dramatic Society provided 
light relief on 9th January with a play entitled 'Night Must Fall' at the Atherfield Camp 
NAAFI. The 2nd Glosters were part of 47 (London) Division at the time who were 
known as the 'Bow Bells' Division, hence the play on words. On 20th January the 
battalion moved by train to Middlesborough. 10 
To get an idea of the activities outside of training that were provided by the 
battalion organisation and the communities that they were among we can turn again to 
the 2od South Wales Borderers War Diary for January and early February 1944, where 
'Battalion Orders' gives a list of the opportunities available under the heading 
'Entertainments': 
There was a Whist Drive and Social for all ranks on 30th January. A discussion 
of The Beveridge Plan led by the YMCA Programme Organiser for the northeast 
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who had apparently worked in Welsh coal mines. On 1st February there was a 
film show titled 'Coney Island' at the Boys Club in the evening. On 3rd February 
an ENSA Show at the same venue and a 'Gramophone Recital' at the YMCA 
Club on 9th February. A 'Games Knockout' - Darts, billiards and table tennis on 
gth February. The 'Brains Trust' will answer any questions on 11th February. A 
Red Cross Dance at 2000hrs the Bo~s Club 12th February and HQ Company 
dance at the Boys Club 13th February. 1 
So not only was there an extensive programme to cater for all tastes, but also an 
order allowing troops out until 2359hrs without a pass shows there was a reasonable 
latitude after 'work' to enjoy oneself within the limits of the closing hours of public 
houses and the blackout. It is also of note that the Beveridge Report provided a 
discussion subject to entertain and educate soldiers. Led by an ex Welsh miner one is 
left to wonder if the discussion followed a left wing direction. The Anny was 
effectively facilitating thought among the military electorate, which may have helped 
lead to the 1945 Labour landslide General Election. 
At this time Bill Speake joined 2nd South Wales Borderers from training at 
Brecon and along with the usual earthy marching songs they had another reflecting the 
politics of at least some of the men from South Wales. Verses one, four and five are 
enough to give a flavour of the lyrics: 
Once I was a Civvy lad, as happy as could be 
Working in a factory earning bags of£. S.d. 
Then they put me in the army, in the SWB 
And they told me it was all to save democracy 
Now the Colonel kicks the Major, and the Major has a go 
He kicks the poor old Captain, and he kicks the NCO's 
And as the kicks get harder, the privates you can see 
Get kicked to bloody death, to save democracy 
Now when this war is over, and soldier I'll no more 
Not even for the 24th, or any other Corps 
They can keep their lousy quid a week, and do the best they can 
For they won't have me for Old Joe's sake, to be their orderly man. 12 
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As Bill Speak:e remembers this was sung when marching to and from the 
Sennybridge Ranges or on route marches. But when marching in Brecon it was always 
timed so that when they passed the Duke of Wellington's statue in the centre of Brecon 
they would be singing verse four. The officer in charge for the day would be leading 
them swagger stick in hand, trying not to smile. 
The above outline of the work of the battalions during January and the first half 
of February gives a feel that the three battalions were starting to be prepared for what 
was to follow in terms of exercises and combat, but no existing documents have been 
found by the author that show this to be a fact. What is fact is that after their moves to 
the north of the country all three battalions were to take part in a major exercise called 
'Exercise Eagle' during the middle of February. This was an exacting exercise that took 
place in poor weather requiring the 47th (London) Division to act as part of a Corps 
playing the part of German forces in defence of an attack by glh Corps and 'Exercise 
Eagle gave all ranks invaluable experience under most realistic conditions' .13 
A number of the veterans of 2nd Glosters have vivid recollections of 'Exercise 
Eagle'. Ted Castle, stretcher-bearer with A Company, 2nd Glosters remembers that 
weather was terrible, it snowed and froze and they had to be out in slit trenches. The 
roads were in a terrible state under about a foot of mud from the tanks. "Never seen so 
much armour in my life. The Air Force had Spitfires diving at our positions. It was very 
realistic. I think it was one ofMonty's brilliant ideas for a scheme before D-Day". 14 
Syd Hampton, also 2nd Glosters was also impressed: "We were on big exercises like 
Exercise Eagle on the Yorkshire Moors, so we got plenty of practice for our job. There 
is a Carrier still sunk up there! The Light Aid Detachment couldn't get it out!"15 Finally 
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Frank Clarke gives another very good description of the conditions during this 
particular exercise: 
February 1944 was as cold as charity. Snow whipped horizontally across the 
Yorkshire Moors as the biting winds gnawed at one's very vitals. Some brass 
hats dreamt up exercise Eagle and the whole battalion went off to take part. I 
mercifully was sent on a Senior NCO's course. B Company were just 
recupemting from Eagle when I got back to my unit. Quite a number were 
suffering from frostbite and seventy percent of 10 Platoon were 'Attend C' the 
medical term for bedded down. 16 
However, as always a certain humour existed even in the poorest of conditions. 
The 2nd South Wales Borderers published a regular paper, (as all battalions did), entitled 
'The Sphinx' so called after 2nd South Wales Borderers cap badge. The late February 
issue was published on four sides of A4 typed paper whilst on Exercise Eagle. One 
section titled 'War News Plus- \he Sphinx Thinks' included some humorous asides 
typical of the period: ' 1. The commander of a detachment living in the back of a pub 
must have a lot of willpower. 2.The Signals line parties can't be having much fun these 
nights'. A line party was tasked with the laying oftelephone wire. By night and moving 
tactically in bitter winter weather this must have been a desperate task. A third comment 
relates to improvements in the Composite Rations or 'Compo' that were issued in the 
field for Exercise Eagle. 'The compo rations now being issued will be popular. They 
contain stewed steak, soup, vegetables, jam, margarine, biscuits, cigarettes, matches, 
salt, sweets and what one NCO thought was writing paper' .17 
For the remainder of the month the 2nd South Wales Borderers remained at 
Alnmouth, 2nd Glosters at Middlesborough and 2nd Essex were at Durham. No doubt the 
lessons of Exercise Eagle were being absorbed at all levels of command while the men 
in the battalions recovered from the experience. It had been the first major exercise of 
the New Year and was attended by a number of senior commanders who were to take 
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part in the Second Front. Also the strong rumour that the battalions were to be involved 
in some way in the invasion had reached the lower ranks: Philip Maillou, 2nd Essex, tells 
what the battalion thought would be their task and why: "We thought we were going to 
be a back up mob, putting up tents and organising camps. We had done a good job on 
this in Wales on Exercise Jantzen. "18 Exercise Jantzen was a landing exercise in the 
summer of 1943 in Pembrokeshire. 
Any doubts were put aside by the new orders that arrived for each battalion as 
they moved to the Clacton area to form a new infantry brigade. The 2nd Essex had a 
personal farewell visit and praise from Major-General Robinson, the commander of 47 
Division, at the railway station as they entrained to Clacton. 2nd Glosters went also to 
Clacton and 2"d South Wales Borders travelled to nearby Dovercourt. According to the 
War Diaries of each battalion they all arrived at their allotted camps around Clacton on 
2nd March 1944. The Brigade was to be called 56th (Independent) Infantry Brigade 
under an experienced officer, Brigadier E.C. Pepper. Born in 1899 he had already been 
awarded an OBE and CBE as a staff officer earlier in the war and in 1943 had served on 
the British Staff in Washington. Between the wars he had served in India and China as 
well as the UK. 19 Brigade HQ was established at Harold Road, Frinton-on-Sea.20 
Major-General Graham, who took over command of 501h Division on 19th 
January 1944, has this to say about why the new brigade was formed: 
When we got down to studying our assault task it was clear we had not enough 
soldiers to make sure of success. We therefore asked for and were given a fourth 
Bde - 56 Bde. This consisted of three inf bns drawn from two different divs and 
a completely new Bde HQ. No bn had been overseas so far and neither Bde HQ 
nor any bn done any combined ops training whatever. When formed about 20 
Feb it was stationed on the Essex Coast. Besides training as a res Bde for the 
assault. 56 Bde had to train to work with 7 Armd Div in subsequent phases of 
the Corps plan.21 
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Although a number of new units were being formed for the invasion of Europe 
this one was different. It had within its title the word 'Independent'. This placed it 
among the units that General Montgomery kept as 21"1 Army Group HQ troops instead 
of being allotted and tasked permanently to any infantry division. Montgomery retained 
under Army Group Reserve an unusually high number of units for Normandy, including 
eight independent tank or armoured brigades (about 1,400 tanks), the equivalent of six 
brigades of heavy and medium field artillery (about 700 guns) and six Engineer Groups. 
This added about a further twelve divisions to the British order of battle for 
Normandy. 22 However the only independent infantry brigade retained in this manner 
was 56th (Independent) Infantry Brigade. 
By this period of the Second World War the British Army infantry division was 
made up of three brigades plus other supporting attached arms of service such as 
artillery, tanks and engineer units. Occasionally, as in the case of 56th Brigade, a 
decision was taken that this unit was to be used by attachment to other divisional units 
who might be either mechanised or infantry. An infantry brigade was the smallest 
tactical formation able to operate independently on the battlefield and could be very 
much self-supporting. Typically three infantry battalions in size, it may have attached to 
it for support a company of medium machine guns, a company of heavy mortars, a 
troop of heavy anti-tank guns, a field ambulance unit and one or more troops of tanks. 
At Brigade HQ would be artillery officers, engineering officers and signals officers for 
liason with division and corps. Also it would have its own vehicles, from jeeps to bren 
Carriers to lorries and a special HQ Armoured Command Vehicle(ACV) Signals lorry 
plus the drivers and fitters including a Light Aid Detachment (LAD) to deal with 
difficult breakdowns and recovery. In command was a Brigadier which was the highest 
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field officer rank. The rank of Brigadier General was abolished in 1922. In terms of 
numbers of men, an infantry brigade could take the field with over 3,000 men under 
command, although its real fighting strength was only around half this number, made up 
of the twelve rifle companys from the three battalions, plus the three battalion Support 
Companies. 
The infantry battalions and new signals staff may have arrived at Clacton but the 
Brigadier had not, as he was working on plans in London. So the CO of 2nd Essex, Lt. 
Col. Marriott assumed temporary command of the Brigade and Major Higson MC 
assumed temporary command of 2nd Essex. Brigadier Pepper arrived to take command 
of his new brigade on 4th March. 'Things were rather chaotic as may be imagined and 
Brigade Headquarters were at their wits end as they possessed no kit whatsoever, not 
even a pencil. Also a whole host of signals equipment arrived from field telephones and 
cable to the 38 Wireless Sets used down to platoon level'. 23 As they had just moved 
from work as lorried infantry within 9th Armoured Division 2nd South Wales Borderers 
were already ahead of the game in signals training. 
Brigadier Pepper faced an enormous task and set about making the Brigade a 
homogenous unit fit for war in a very short time. A great help were the three very able 
CO's of the battalions that made up the Brigade. He had decided on devising a unique 
shoulder flash to set his men apart and after the inevitable 'Pepper Pot' flash was put 
aside it was Lt. Col. Marriott who suggested a 'Sphinx', as a 'Sphinx' appeared in each 
of the three regimental cap badges. 'Thus was born this Brigade's unique and proud 
distinguishing flash'. 24 This emblem can be seen in Appendix One page 284. There are 
in fact a number of stories as to who designed the flash depending on which battalion 
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the man belonged to. However the version above would fit the events and is the only 
written record. 
It has already been seen that all three battalions were under-strength and the 
records of 2nd South Wales Borderers are probably typical of each battalion. This shows 
that on 11th March 1944 the battalion was short of 143 riflemen and NCO's.25 It is worth 
noting at this point that when examining the battalion war diaries the information 
written down varies between not only battalions but also diary writer and no other 
battalion makes comments on shortages of men during March. Only the 2"d Essex 
makes reference to the following arrival of personnel to select those fit for war: 'On 5th 
March a Board of three Captains and five Sergeants were attached to 2nd Essex for the 
selective testing of 'other ranks'. 26 It is safe to say though that each battalion was tested 
and each was short of men. The results of testing would make the battalions even 
shorter of personnel as those found wanting left to join different posts within the Army. 
The vehicles of these battalions were by now too worn for use in war and needed 
replacing. Again it is the 2"d Essex War Diary showing the scale of replacement: 
'Between 9th and 16th March the Battalion received new vehicles - eighteen Carden 
Lloyd Carriers, seventeen Bren Carriers, two three tonners and two jeeps'.27 It should be 
remembered that Transport and Support Companies played a vital role in the effective 
operation of these battalions and the Brigade. Philip Maillou makes this important 
tactical point about the new Bren Carriers: "We ended up with the Universal Carriers. 
These were better than the Carden Lloyd Carriers as they had a lower silhouette".28 
Charles Benford adds another piece of important information as to the preparation of 
vehicles: "We came back to Clacton where we had to give our Carriers in and were 
given all new Universal Carriers and we spent a week waterproofing them and erecting 
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side screens against the waves".29 They were informed that it was up to them to do it 
properly and if they did not they would drown. 
One new piece of essential equipment caused some amusement. The Anny had 
been struggling with the forage cap of pre-war vintage and was replacing it with a new 
beret. This was nothing like the berets we are used to seeing soldiers wear today. These 
were more voluminous and being sturdily made they defied efforts to form them into 
some reasonable shape: 'Many various and devious methods were apparently used by 
the men to make this object look more presentable. (Usually with little success)'. 30 
With the re-equipping and the reinforcements needing to be assimilated, the fust 
three weeks of March showed the frantic pace that was needed to prepare for the 
invasion. The Brigade had a series of important visits from the Generals whose 
commands 56th Brigade were likely to come under; on 15th March from the 50th 
Division Commander, General Graham; on the 16th March General Erskine, 
Commander of 7th Armoured Division, who was expected to include 56th Brigade in his 
Division shortly after D-Day as 'lorried infantry'. Then on the 21 "1 March General 
Bucknall, Commander of XXX Corps visited and spoke to all the Brigade officers. 
These visits are significant as it shows that by early March the potential role of the 
Brigade had been mapped out and Brigadier Pepper and his senior officers had started 
planning. But other than those officers directly involved, very few knew what was to be 
expected of them. Much of this planning took place in buildings taken over by the War 
Office at Flat 131, Ashley Court, London. 31 
One regular visitor - to the outside anyway - was not an officer, but had a 
necessary role to play. Frank Dilworth was a member of Brigade HQ Signals Section 
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and a Dispatch Rider (DR), also commonly called a Don-R. He has outlined how 
communications were kept up between London and Clacton. After he was transferred 
from 48th Division he went to Wellington in Durham where they formed the Signal 
Section for the Brigade HQ. After about three days they journeyed down to Frinton-on-
Sea and joined the rest of 56th Brigade HQ. There he learnt all about the Brigade and its 
different battalions. He makes an important point about an extra burden for an 
independent brigade: "One of the big jobs was going down to 21 "1 Army Group in 
Ashley Gardens, London. As we were an Independent Brigade and not in a Division we 
had to do all our own admin. So every day there was this journey for one of us down to 
Ashley Gardens". They stayed about three hours while the mail was sorted and came 
back all in a day. Signposts had been removed early in the war and Don-Rs new to the 
task would find their way from a verbal set of instructions. 
You worked the rest out for yourself. You became like a bit of a homing pigeon. 
That's what your life was as a DR. You were told very little but expected to 
know a lot! Sometimes an officer might hitch a ride to London on the back of 
your bike. Strictly speaking that shouldn't have happened and you met round the 
corner from the guardroom!32 
Syd Lee was one of a number of Signallers who were all on the same training 
course at Catterick as members of the Royal Corps of Signals (RCS) and were sent in 
one batch to work in 56th Brigade HQ. Later some of them served as signallers with the 
battalions as the link between Brigade and battalions. The battalions also had their own 
trained signallers from within their ranks. "After Catterick we were all posted direct to 
56th Independent Infantry Brigade HQ at Frinton, living in an empty house with 
palliasses on the floor. We used to parade at 7.00 in the morning when it was still dark. I 
can remember going out having a few drinks at night!"33 
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Although some men in the battalions remember the time at Clacton as not being 
overactive, this may have been in comparison with the previous month and Exercise 
Eagle. Certainly many of the officers and NCO's were heavily involved checking and 
signing for new equipment. But military training was also continued as Tony Mansi 2nd 
Essex shows in this insight into both training and military humour: 
I remember at Clacton it was run on pretty military lines and we even practised 
giving instructions wearing gas masks. The old Army thing of giving a message 
to a runner starting "Send reinforcements, we are going to advance" and the 
message finally ends up after going through a number of men as "Send 3s 4d 
(Three and fourpence) we are going to a dance!" There was a lot of that sort of 
humour. It could be a bit boring, as we weren't doing much, route marching and 
so on and keeping fit. We were in Civvy billets and a lot of civilians complained 
because you were doing a lot of shouting in the street organising things and they 
would be complaining for you to keep the noise down. 34 
It gives us food for thought that a 1944 soldiers' idea of "not doing much" 
includes keeping fit and route marching, doubtless with full pack. Also of relevance is 
the point that throughout the war, including the invasion of Normandy, the spectre of 
the use of gas had not gone away. It was normal to train for the possibility of gas attack 
and not only gas masks but also anti-gas capes and leggings were available in 
Normandy and carried ready to distribute by B Echelon transport. 
It was at Clacton that the unpopular but necessary inoculations of three doses per 
man of anti-tetanus serum took place. The following account by Gordon Duffin has 
been confirmed by a number of men from different battalions: 
At Clacton we queued up outside an empty house, in the snow. Several men 
faint as they are waiting there with their shirts off and not fancying what is going 
to happen! Women passing tell off the Sergeant Major and the officer for 
keeping these poor men in the snow without their shirts on. The officer tells the 
women to bugger oft1 35 
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This insight shows that throughout the war the military were short of proper 
camps to house the great increase in military personnel and civilian properties had to be 
pressed into service. The consequence, as we can see from both the above accounts, was 
that if the civilian population chanced upon some military activity that they did not 
appreciate the result could be shouting matches between military authority and civilians. 
This situation was tolerated in a democratic society but not across the Channel. In this 
case one can imagine women feeling empathy for men young enough to be their sons or 
brothers. The loudly barked orders early in the morning and late at night would not 
endear the military to people living in their own homes in Clacton and who themselves 
were in the front line of German bombing. 
An important piece of evidence showing the importance of 561h Brigade and how 
far forward its plans had progressed in just a few months comes in an extract of a letter 
dated 19th March 1944 from General Montgomery to Lt. General Sir Ronald Weeks, the 
Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). "The situation re reinforcements is 
not good, as you say. But we must take things as they are and fmd the best answer. I 
cannot now give you back 56 Inf Bde; it is in my order of battle, has been given an 
important task, and has begun planning".36 Weeks had obviously asked to use 561h 
Brigade as some sort of reinforcement unit. The letter later goes into detail clearly 
appreciating that manpower in the infantry was a critical factor and confirms the worries 
expressed in 1943 by the South Wales Borderers about the possibility of breaking up 9th 
Armoured Division. 
The basic plan known by now to the senior officers of 561h Brigade was that the 
Brigade was to be attached to 50th Division for the landing on 'Gold Beach' between Le 
Hamel and Ver-sur-Mer. The Brigade was then to move west and south and take 
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Bayeux by the evening of D-Day and pin the forward right flank of the British Army 
linking with American forces landing on 'Omaha Beach'. They would then transfer to 
the command of71h Armoured Division as lorried infantry to quickly exploit a breakout 
south to Villers Bocage. 
Back at Clacton the solders had little knowledge of the wider picture and life 
continued with training and even a ceremonial occasion to lift the spirits of both soldier 
and civilian. A major event each year for the Gloucestershire Regiment was the 
celebmtion of 'Back Badge' Day on 21"1 March. The Glosters wore a badge on both the 
front and back of their berets and this unique distinction comes from a battle against the 
French in 180 l when the 281h Foot, later with the 61 st Foot to become the 
Gloucestershire Regiment, were fighting the French near Alexandria, holding a ruined 
fort. French infantry were attacking to their front and both flanks and French cavalry 
then attacked their rear. The rear rank of the 281h Foot were about faced and gave fire. 
Although encircled they beat off all attacks and the French took flight. This important 
regimental occasion was to be celebrated at Clacton in 1944 and in attendance was the 
Duke of Gloucester, the Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment. The East Essex Gazette. 
incorporating Clacton Times and Clacton News and the Frinton. Walton. BrightJingsea 
and Wivenhoe Times for 23rd March 1944 gives the following account under a large 
picture of the parade: 
After the parade the Duke of Gloucester visited the men at a church hall for their 
Regimental dinner. The menu was Roast Beef, Yorkshire Pudding with roast 
potatoes and peas; followed by fruit tart and cream. An issue of beer allowed the 
men to drink the health of the Duke of Gloucester. Afterwards he attended at the 
officers' mess at 'Dunedin' Connaught Gardens, Clacton.37 
The men of the 2nd Glosters remember that parading and marching on the muddy 
field was difficult, but on this important occasion it seemed the whole town turned out 
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to see the Duke of Gloucester and the parade, which must have temporarily brightened a 
war weary Clacton. However once this important piece of Regimental ceremonial was 
over it was back to preparations for invasion and on 24th March all the battalions left for 
Combined Operations training at Inverary in Scotland. 
Number One, Combined Operations Training Centre (CTC) was based at 
Inverary on the west coast of Scotland in the relatively sheltered waters of Loch 
Inverary. Since 1940 the area had been used to train personnel in amphibious warfare 
including the use of various types of landing craft, unloading from the larger Landing 
Ships Infantry (LSI) via scrambling nets into much smaller Landing Craft Assault 
(LCA) and the tactics employed for landings and developing a landing by troops. Live 
firing, including the use of aircraft for ground attack, made final exercises very real. The 
role of No.1 CTC was very important and over a quarter of a million personnel were 
trained here' between 1940 and 1944. Its remote location allowed great scope for 
training, if little in the way of entertainment for the men training there. With the build 
up for invasion in 1944 it became a very busy place, able to cope with up to 15,000 
personnel at a time. In late March 1944 all the units of 56th Brigade were sent here 
including those from Brigade HQ. Again it needs to be underlined that the battalions 
were still not up to full strength and substantial numbers of men were also left behind at 
Clacton as rear parties. For example we are told that 2nd Essex left 120 men behind.38 
One can only speculate that these were members of 'B Echelon' involved in transport 
and supply for the battalion or were men already marked down for transfer. However if 
any of those left behind later took part in the Normandy landings they were the flfSt to 
miss essential training. 
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lnverary was remote and outside the experience of most ofthese young men and 
they usually describe the scenery as awe-inspiring. Equally they struggled to understand 
that in some parts of the British Isles aspects of an almost feudal lifestyle remained. 
Along with many of his comrades Philip Maillou missed his daily paper: 
The main thing at Inverary was that we couldn't have the Daily Mirror! The 
local Lord said what could and couldn't be sold in the local shops and as far as 
he was concerned the Mirror was too near the knuckle because of the cartoon 
'Jane'. We were fed up about this as sex-starved squaddies and couldn't see the 
reason why after the long journey by road, rail and steam ship we were denied 
our 'Jane'! 39 
The Brigade did not have the equipment to land trucks or Carriers, so the 
Support Companies bad to sit on the shore and pretend they bad been landed. In 
exercise briefing notes this is known as arriving 'Dryshod'. In fact it appears that in the 
time at Inverary and during two other landing exercises involving 56th Brigade before 
D-Day very few transport personnel were able to take part in a practice landing 
'Wetshod' and were fed into exercises, usually on the beach. However outside of this at 
Inverary the Bren gun teams and mortars of the S Companys took full part: "I can 
remember at Inverary we bad to fire the Brens at targets. When ordered to cease-fire I 
still bad half a dozen full magazines so I carried on. I nearly got court-martialed over 
that, but I certainly wasn't going to carry them back!'..to 
Gordon Duffin remembers that snow still covered the mountains and it was cold. 
Also in typical Army fashion NCO training staff would still have the last laugh: 
We were put in Nissen huts and tents and it is freezing cold and we sleep 
wearing everything we have. The sergeant taking us for a road run says, "what's 
the matter with you lot?" "Well we miss our NAAFI break!" "Oh is that all you 
want! You can use the airman's' NAAFI if you want. Hardly anyone uses it 
here. Come on." So we follow him around the corner and up a hill so steep that 
when we are halfway up its on hands and knees, crawling over rocks. When we 
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get to the top there's a stone folly, nothing else! "Well there you are," he said. 
"Here's the airman's NAAFI, you can do what you like with it!" Caught again!41 
Don Leech from the same battalion has something to say about the way they 
were transported to Inverary, giving a good insight into how far a group of soldiers 
could go at this stage of the war if they thought they were not being treated properly. He 
confirms that there was a real NAAFI. Finally he gives a very good idea of the type of 
training undertaken: 
The Battalion then went to Inverary for landing craft training. At this time I was 
still with 15 Platoon. Carriers went to Inverary by train. The rest of the Battalion 
also travelled by train to Stranraer where they were herded into a cattle boat 
down in the hold. All the officers had the lovely cabins upstairs and what did we 
do? We bleated like sheep! The RSM went mad. We had our kit on and we just 
stood in the hold. It was a Nissen butted camp at Inverary. The NAAFI building 
was still standing in the 1980's when I last visited. We trained on assault boats 
there, loading from the little pier at Inverary Castle and assaulted the other side 
of the loch. We used bangalore torpedoes to cut barbed wire and we were taught 
to drop on your back on the wire and let the next bloke step on you to go over. 
We thought this was stupid, but by goodness it worked. Training also included 
very physical runs up the surrounding hills.42 
Bangalore torpedoes were sections of pipe filled with explosive. When screwed 
together forming a long tube, they were pushed under barbed wire and exploded, 
usually demolishing the defences. 
Maurice Wells also of 2nd Glosters was a member of the advance party and 
stayed for a time on Lord Lovat's Estate near Stranraer. There he got seven days 
confined to barracks for playing cards. Later they joined the rest of the battalion at 
Stranraer and took the ferry to Inverary. As they arrived they noticed a large cliff and 
hoped they would not have to go up it. They were warned that if a mist came down on 
exercise they must stay where they were because of the large drops all around. Overall 
he recalls it as a positive experience because, "We saw another part of Britain we had 
69 
never seen before, so journeying like that in the Army opened our eyes. Something we 
would never have done otherwise. '"'3 
Nicholas Somerville, IO of 2"d South Wales Borderers, explains that during 561h 
Brigade training at Inverary an emphasis was laid on getting through wire and attacking 
pillboxes because if things had gone wrong during the beach assault phase of the 
landings, 56th Brigade would have been sent in to complete the task. At platoon level 
training was therefore carried out for storming beach defences. Some units carried 
ladders to the se!! wall to surmount it and destroyed the frrst line of wire on top of the 
wall with bangalore torpedoes. Others threw chicken wire over subsequent lines of wire 
to allow men to cross, then a pole charge was placed against the side of the pillbox and 
exploded to breach the concrete. Somerville also gives a good insight into how his eyes 
were opened by the organisation, thought and detail that had gone into the training at 
Inverary. "There was a huge model of 'A Landing' and for the ftrst time I felt the 
enormity of Overlord, with the numbers and types of ships and landing craft involved. 
The authorities were allowing 12% casualties for this type of exercise before calling a 
halt.'"'4 
Thankfully the Brigade only seems to have suffered minor injuries. As well as 
the physical training aspects at Inverary there were also films and lectures as shown by 
this War Diary excerpt: 'Training includes three films, 'Combined Operations', ' 
Landing at Salerno and Anzio' and 'RAF in Combined Operations' shown to the whole 
Battalion. Officers and NCOs saw a further training film- 'The Battalion Group in the 
Assault'.45 Officers also received lectures in Communications in Combined Operations 
and Beach Organisation. 
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Important changes took place throughout this time. One in particular was a 
shock for 2nd Essex. On 28th March 1944 Major Higson posted earlier as 2i/c to 2nd 
Essex replaced their CO Lt. Col. Marriott. As an older man Lt. Col. Marriott was over 
the age which Montgomery set for his battalion commanders in the coming invasion, 
but his popularity and loss to the battalion is made clear in the War Diary for March 
1944: 'His untiring efforts together with his vast experience have done much to 
maintain a high standard within the unit. His fairness and tact in all his dealings have 
contributed much to the good feeling within the unit'.46 One of his new Company 
Commanders has this to say: 
Bill Marriott was, I suppose, old enough to be the father of some of us. This was 
a positive 'beneficial factor' at that time. He was excellent at administration and 
training and did a very necessary job in educating his young officers and in 
maintaining the morale of the battalion during three years of uncertainty. He 
delivered the battalion to John Higson in a very good state ready to undertake 
the additional and more arduous training necessary for war. 47 
An ordinary soldier from S Company echoes the sentiments of the War Diarist 
and Major Barrass and gives an example of Colonel Maniott's fairness: 
Col. Marriott was a good CO. He treated you more like a son and while he 
wouldn't let you get away with anything he wouldn't cane you like some CO's. 
One of the Sergeants lost his issue watch and he was brought up before Marriott 
who said, "You will pay £1 !" which was a lot of money in those days. But the 
Sergeant didn't lose his stripes.48 
On 28th March the Brigade Major (BM) Major Buchanan was admitted to 
hospital with malaria. Major LB Beuttler replaced him on 9th April. The BM was a very 
important officer whose job was to run Brigade HQ and had to make decisions when the 
Brigadier was absent. In a way although change was not good at this time at least it 
happened nearly two months prior to the invasion and allowed Major Beuttler to make 
his mark and settle into the job. 
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With training at Inverary complete by 5th April the battalions moved to the 
Christchurch area of Dorset arriving on the 7th April. The following day there was a 
Brigade conference for all CO's. Doubtless this was a briefing outlining the expected 
training schedule, for the tempo was to be stepped up yet again. Between 17th April and 
5th May the Brigade was to be involved in two major landing exercises and later to be 
moved to camps in the New Forest prior to the invasion. 2nd South Wales Borders and 
2nd Essex arrived in the south coast town of Christchurch and 2nd Glosters to Ossemsley 
Manor. The two battalions in Christchurch were billeted in houses and 2nd Glosters were 
mainly under canvas, though some were in Nissen Huts. Ernie Partridge had had some 
short leave. He received a telegram ordering him to report to his local railway station at 
23.59hrs and travel to Aldershot. On arrival they were loaded a company at a time into 
3 ton lorries and driven to a small village which had tents erected just outside. He was 
soon back into life in the Army: 
The Sergeant Major said, "Right you bastards, no more sending your clothes for 
washing, you are doing it yourself! Go and get some hard soap from stores, you 
will light your own fires and wash your clothes in a bucket!" Someone said 
"What about the washing line for drying our clothes?" The rep!)' was, "what do 
you think those bleeding blackberry bushes are for over there!"4 
The people of Christchurch were living in a town full to overflowing with so 
many units concentrating around the New Forest area. Bill Speake 2nd South Wales 
Borders confmns this and also shows a soldiers use of initiative when given the chance: 
At Christchurch the Barracks were full. Many men were billeted on the local 
populace. A sergeant had the job of knocking on doors and arranging billets for 
the men. The householders had little choice, the sergeant made his decision on 
the numbers in the house by its size and noted down the numbers to be billeted. 
My house was 231 Barrack Road. In the morning parades were held in the 
streets. When the battalion moved off to the sealed camp at Pennerley, a small 
party, including myself, stayed· behind to clear up. In the cookhouse, which I 
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believe was a Church Hall; we found a large bacon slicer machine and bags of 
sugar and Ftatoes. We sold them off in the area and spent the proceeds in a 
local pub.5 
It was at Christchurch that a means of transport was introduced to make at least 
one company in each battalion speedier in advance. The use of bicycles had its origins 
in the First World War and Sir Nicholas Somerville describes their tactical use: 
At Christchurch Barracks one company of the Battalion, (D Company under 
Major Peter Martin), learnt that they were going to be the 'Mobile Column' and 
had to learn to use the folding airborne bicycle. This machine appears to have 
been universally hated by all who had to use it! The idea was to make one 
company in each battalion much more mobile, which together with the carrier 
platoon was the 'Mobile Column Group' commanded by Major Barlow, the 
battalion second in charge. 51 
Two pieces of information from the war diaries give evidence to show that 
things were stepping up a gear. On an A4 sheet published to the men of 2nd South Wales 
Borderers: 'Mobilisation Instructions- This unit will mobilize for setvice overseas by 
0001 hrs 5 April 1944. Normal leave will continue until instructions issued later. The 
unit will be completed to full War Establishment including 1"1 Reinforcements'. 52 From 
the 2nd Glosters War Diary for lOth March 1944: 'Postal censorship introduced in the 
unit'.53 
From 6th until 13th April, as part of their expected commitment to 7th Armoured 
Division, 2nd Essex sent Lt. Col. Higson, 11 officers and 20 OR's (mainly NCO's) to be 
attached to 7th Queens. This battalion was part of 131 (Queens) Brigade who were the 
infantry for 7th Armoured Division. The idea was to learn the ropes of lorry borne 
infantry. A similar number of officers from 2nd Glosters were on the same attachment. 
2nd South Wales Borderers do not record an attachment, possibly the diarist failed to, or 
it was decided that because of their previous attachment to an Armoured Division they 
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were experienced enough. At the same time the battalions were still not up to strength. 
The 2nd Essex War Diary reports that during April a further 2 officers and 45 other ranks 
were posted away to be replaced by 65 other ranks taken on strength. The weekly 'Field 
Return' for 29th April 1944 requested 'the urgent return of eight hospitalised soldiers', 
apparently spread from Basingstoke to Inverary. 54 
The first of the major exercises for 56th Brigade was to be between Swanage and 
Bournemouth at Studland Bay. Here a sandy cove replicated about half the beach that 
50th Division was to land on in June. Inland the town of Wareham approximated pretty 
closely to that of Bayeux, which in the final plan was 56th Brigades' objective for D-
Day. This exercise was code named SMASH IV. SMASH I had involved 69th Brigade 
and Smash 11, 231 st Brigade. They were the two 'Assault Brigades' tasked respectively 
to take the left and right beachhead by landing first on 'Gold Beach' in Normandy, 
break the coastal defences and advance inland, thus opening up the way for the two 
'Follow Up' infantry brigades, 151"t (left) and 56th Brigade (right) to exploit this. The 
assault brigades had a second practice with SMASH Ill (69th and 15l"t Brigades). 
Smash IV had 231ot Brigade (l"t Devons, 1"t Dorsets and 1"t Hampshires) landing in the 
assault followed up by 56th Brigade exploiting to Wareham. In the original SMASH 
plans there was a paucity of landing craft and both follow up brigades were to be landed 
'dryshod' and fed into the exercise from a flank. The assault brigades would land from 
craft, in other words 'wetshod'. 
Exercise 'SMASH IV' was carried out on 20th April 1944 with the assault 
battalions landing at 0750hrs. In the end some extra landing craft were made available 
so that some elements of 56th Brigade managed a proper landing. The dryshod units 
from 56th Brigade bivouacked near the coast, but away from the landing area that was to 
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receive a bombardment prior to the landing. The next day umpires fed them into the 
exercise from either side of the beach. Live ammunition was to be used and so rules 
were laid down ensuring forward units would stay behind shellfire: 'In order that Self-
Propelled Artillery may shoot in exercise SMASH Ill and IV, no troops will advance 
beyond the following 'shell lines' within the target area. Not beyond 43 Grid until H+2 
hrs and not beyond River Corfe until H+3 hrs'.55 
An escort of one 'Hunt' Class destroyer and sixteen coastal craft protected the 
exercise. Three more 'Hunt' Class destroyers and steam gunboats provided wider 
surface cover in the area. Also there were standing fighter patrols by day and a night 
fighter on standby at night. 
Worries that the enemy might find out about the secret of the DD (Duplex 
Drive) Tanks that could swim ashore was dealt with in the following order: 
The use to which DD Tanks will be put will in no case be communicated to 
lower formations or units. A special security warning should be issued to sub 
districts that exercises will be taking place in their area in which more military 
devices may be used and that all troops should be instructed to refrain from 
commenting or speculating as to their use. 56 
Considering the security attached to the SMASH series of exercises, it is odd to 
look at the exercise maps and note that the beaches were given the same code names as 
those allotted for the real D-Day. Whether this was by accident or design is not known, 
however the probability lays with coincidental use, as an order was issued prior to the 
exercise that the code words no and KING for the beaches should not to be used and 
replaced by GEORGE and HOW. 
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All the relevant authorities were informed including the police and Home Guard 
units. There were to be many spectators. For SMASH m on 18th April these included 
King George VI, Winston Churchill, Eisenhower, Montgomery, the divisional generals 
and around twenty others of high Army, Navy and Air Force rank. These watched the 
proceedings from 'Fort Henry', a large observation bunker built during 1943 on the 
cliffs above the beach and were the 'Class A' observers. All other officers were 'Class 
B' and out in the open where there was room for 400 in large roped off area including 
some officers from 56th Brigade: 'Reserve Bde Groups: 56 Bde Tickets for 100 offrs on 
SMASH IV. These offrs will walk forward from checkpoint and will re-join their units 
as the latter pass road junc 471029 on their way to being fed in dryshod'. 57 After 
landing or entering dryshod, 56th Brigade advanced through the assault brigade and 
eventually 2nd Glosters 'took' Wareham. There was some live firing and dummy guns, 
minefields and figures laid out, but how realistic an exercise it was is difficult to gauge. 
It was very useful from the point of view of higher authorities testing the organisation 
and deployment of the many elements required, but from a tactical training point of 
view, the troops were just moved forward to timetable and were set few tasks, such as 
for example suppressing enemy opposition. 
For all military exercises there were official observers to report back. One of 
these, Brigadier Parham, sent in a very mixed response to what he had seen the 
following day, 21st April 1944. Because of the issues that he highlights, and indeed 
caused problems on Gold Beach on 6th June, it is worthwhile studying his notes in 
detail: 
Needed rigid control of exits. Stop tracked vehicles using wheeled exits. 
Organise man handling by strong willed officers or Sgt. Majors at each exit to 
see troops really do it - the modem soldier has no idea of the power of 
'manpower'. DD's were 16 minutes late and touched down with the infantry six 
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minutes late - gap between bombing and assault - get the Navy to deliver on 
time. Conditions were abnormally excellent. Cruisers and destroyers were 
effective. No duplicate observers for SP Arty. Tide was high and the beach 
frightfully congested. Mass of SP Arty and RM Gp. Centaurs jostling other tspt 
for position from which to fire off beach (since they couldn't get forward to 
better posns. off beach). Main cause of trouble is the blocking off exits by the 
Bren Carriers drawn 6 pdrs of Inf and RA A/Tk:. Regts. These have a pamlytic 
cross-country performance. The effect is that these dud vehicles hold up the 
whole deployment. It is a serious fault. 58 
Brigadier Parham's remarks seem almost clairvoyant as during the real landings 
parallels can be drawn with many of the faults he found and predictions he made. On 6111 
June on Gold Beach the tide became abnormally high, the tanks did arrive late and the 
beach became crowded with vehicles. The Royal Marine Centaur tanks were an 
important part of the landing programme, as being armed with 95mrn Howitzers they 
could reduce dug-in positions and defended buildings. He later makes the important 
point that too many units were fed in 'Dryshod' and hence did not get the chance of a 
practice landing. His fmal conclusions stating that the German heavy batteries 'will 
have a marvellous time if the beaches (as they well may) present the Derby Day aspect, 
which they did today', 59 really should have made the planners sit up and take notice. 
At least one member of 56th Brigade, Lt. Dennis Davis, was amongst Brigadier 
Parham's observers. Wearing his best battledress and accompanied by a small Padre, 
who was crippled by his new boots, he followed the exercise and took note of any 
problems. Among them included the tanks bunching badly on the beach showing a 
forest of aerials easily seen from land above the beachhead. A number of his points 
were hammered home by Brigadier Parham to avoid similar problems on the real 
In his normal procedural way Montgomery teased out the results of this exercise. 
No doubt the views of Brigadier Parbam including the report by Dennis Davis formed 
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an important part of the conference to discuss SMASH III and IV held at the Regal 
Cinema, Ringwood at lOOOhrs 25th April 1944. No conclusions from this conference 
have been found, and the reason may be 'All papers concerning Exercise SMASH will 
be destroyed after the final conference'.61 Appendix Two on page 285 shows a useful 
map of Exercise Smash. 
Within a few days of the conference on SMASH III and IV a second and more 
extensive exercise was to take place between 30th April and 4th May. This was Exercise 
Fabius and was to practice a landing of as many of the British elements as possible. It 
took place across the following areas: Fabius I at Littlehampton, Fabius II at 
Bracklesharn, Fabius m at Hayling Island and Fabius IV at Slapton. 50th Division with 
56th Brigade under command were to land on Hayling Island. There were considerable 
security worries. The possible intervention of German naval or air forces bad to be 
contained, especially after the disaster to the American 'Operation Tiger' in Lyme Bay. 
Also if the Germans by spies or aerial reconnaissance realised the scope and type of 
forces used, they might be able to have made precise judgements about the actual 
landings. The existence of the DD Tanks was still a secret to them. Another factor for 
F AB illS, especially coming so hard on the heels of SMASH, was the need for there to 
be at least four weeks between the final exercise and D-Day, so that sufficient time 
elapsed for the repair and preparation of landing craft. As well as the careful planning 
required to launch the FABillS an elaborate defence and deception plan was put into 
operation. Appendix Three on page 286 shows the area of Exercise Fabius. 
Planning documents tell us a little about the security arrangements and about 
56th Brigade. It shows that yet again the trarlsport and carrier elements were not to be 
part of the landing exercise, but were to drive around. Ferries in and around the Solent 
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were stopped during the exercise. There were also worries about considerable damage 
to crops. The exercise was also to be used as an opportunity to practice arrangements 
with civilian authorities and give the police practice in controlling the vast amount of 
traffic to be generated during the real invasion phase. '56 Bde (follow up of231 Bde) 
Marching personnel will re-embark on D-Day. Vehs will move to assembly area 
NORTH end of island and disperse from there on D+ 1. Personnel will sleep on the 
vehicles' .62 All units were to be briefed as if on the real operation and no press 
correspondents were allowed to witness or report any part ofthe FABIUS exercise. 
A second document underlines the fear of detection that by using the south coast 
it could inform the Germans about plans for the naval part of the invasion, code-named 
NEPTUNE and the land part, code-named OVERLORD. Also it might help them 
uncover the complicated deception plan, called FORTITUDE, being undertaken by the 
allies to persuade the Germans that the invasion would take place in the Pas-de-Calais 
area. To enable the exercise to go ahead the British minefield off Littlehampton and 
West Solent was cleared. The outer naval cover consisted of eighteen destroyers with 
standing air patrols of up to four squadrons of RAF fighters. In the end it was decided to 
use the exercise as a means, 'to induce the enemy to believe that F ABIUS was the first 
of a series of exercises. OVERLORD/NEPTUNE was to be the second'.63 German 
aircraft were shepherded away from the exercise area throughout the time of the 
exerc1se. 
An Admiralty document concerned with F AB IUS shows the concerns and 
actions about the weather and sea state in this weather report for 2300hrs on 5th May: 
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'WSW Force 6 in sheltered waters reaching gale force in exposed areas veering slowly 
NW late in afternoon and decreasing. Showers, moderate to good visibility. Waves 8 
feet. Immediate: AJI craft are to haul down barrage balloons' .64 
The sea state was to lead to tragedy for 2nd Essex. The Landing Craft Infantry 
Large or LCI (L) was a much larger vessel than a small assault craft and carried 200 
men. It had two side ramps or walkways which when lowered allowed men to 
disembark from the top deck either side of the bow into the water. These were the ships 
that 56th and 151"1 1nfantry Brigades as follow up troops used. The procedure was for a 
naval person to swim/wade to shore with a line and fix a thicker rope between the 
landing craft and the shore enabling the soldiers to have a steadying handline. 
Unfortunately with the LCI (L) being a larger vessel its draft precluded it from properly 
beaching and they ran aground always some way off the shore. This could mean some 
deep wading for a fully loaded soldier. On Operation Fabius with a little difficulty the 
soldiers got ashore. When it came to re-embarking on LCI (L) 295 the ship was moved 
backward from the shore by the swell, the rope was pulled tight and went up into the air 
with a number of soldiers holding on until they had to let go. Seven were drowned. 
They were Major Norman Ayres, Corporal Henry Leftly, Lance-Corporal Frederick 
Edwards, Private Charles Argent, Private Thomas Curtis, Private Ronald North and 
Private Leslie Tongue.65 This amounted to virtually the whole of D Company HQ 
Section. 
There was a court of enquiry. As a result on D-Day itself the plan was revised 
that the Rifle Companies on the LCI (L )' s were to be transferred to shore by smaller 
Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM) and according to the 2nd Glosters War Diary for 15th 
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May 1944, 'Part of Bn. transferring from LCI to LCM for beach transfer. This was 
found to be quite easy to do'. 66 
There is a postscript as follows in a letter of 15th June 1944 to the Under 
Secretary of State, War Office from Generals Bucknall and Graham: 
On 4th May 44, during a landing exercise a party of troops of the 2"d Essex 
Regiment were endeavouring to re-embark on LCI (L) 295. The craft surged 
back from the beach, however, and a number of them were dragged out of their 
depth by the starboard steadying line and left struggling in the water in full 
equipment. Although they had already spent a considerable time in the water in 
the course of their duties Sub-Lieutenant J. A Gibb RCNVR and Ordinary 
Seaman M.K. Macdonald V/62175 immediately went to their rescue. By their 
efforts the.f were able to save one man. One officer and six other ranks were 
drowned.6 
The two generals wanted to recognise the gallant action of the naval men but 
considered that the appropriate Naval authorities should decide the fonn of recognition. 
After a considerable paper chase of over twenty letters between the British and 
Canadian authorities it was unfortunately decided on 16th November 1944 that the RCN 
personnel were not to receive an award, but each should receive a letter giving: 'An 
expression of Their Lordships satisfaction at their detennined efforts in saving and in 
attempting to save life when men from L.C.I. (L) 295 were in difficulties during a 
landing exercise on 4th May 1944'.68 
Once the clearing up and debriefing had been completed after FABIUS the 
Brigade spent the rest of their time left in Christchurch preparing for the invasion. There 
was street fighting practice in Southampton, 2-inch mortar competitions, a TEWT 
(Tactical Exercise Without Troops) with the Sherwood Rangers, who were to provide 
annoured support on D-Day. Major Petre arrived with 2nd Essex to replace Major Ayres. 
On 18111 May 2nd Glosters and 2nd South Wales Borderers moved to their final camps in 
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the New Forest prior to the invasion. 2nd Essex followed on 25th May. It bad been an 
exceptionally busy few weeks. Little more could be done to prepare the men of 56th 
Infantry Brigade for action. Still each battalion was short of men. Most officers' report 
being so busy that they had little time to dwell on the future. Many officers and men 
genuinely wanted to get to France and see the job done, or get back for 1940. A few 
men report being apprehensive. Probably most hoped to do their best and not let their 
friends down. 
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Chaoter Three. 
From the sealed Camps to Sailing for Normandy. 
251b May- Evening 5th June 1944. 
By 25th May all three battalions and the Brigade HQ had moved to camps 
specially set up for invasion troops in the New Forest. 56th Brigade HQ was at 
Pennerley Lodge, 2nd South Wales Borderers were at Camp B4, around Pennerley Farm, 
2nd Essex at B3 and 2nd Glosters at B7. All the men knew that the invasion could not be 
far off. This time was passed in a curious limbo for some of the men, although there was 
plenty to prepare and even small training exercises were held in the forest area. 
Lieutenant Dennis Davis remembers taking men out into the woods to zero the 
Bren Guns and sniper's rifles in his Platoon. He insisted that the spare barrels of the 
Bren guns were zeroed as well as the barrel fitted to the gun. "We used a small sandpit 
in the woodland and ranged at around 1 00 yards. This caused a small forest fire and 
some altercation transpired between the fire brigade and myself who needed to use the 
road my men were firing across!"1 Bill Speake had a similar task and remembers 
Pennerley Camp for "boredom and rain. By now I had my own sniping rifle and only I 
was allowed to use it. I could go out (of the camp) with the armourer, Sergeant Bill 
Boast, to get it zeroed in the surrounding woodland. "2 
Both Lt. Dennis Davis and Pte. Bill Speake were in C Company of 2nd South 
Wales Borderers. Fire in the New Forest was a constant risk in drier conditions. With 
thousands of soldiers encamped in the area smoking and engaged in exercises the risk 
was greatly heightened. In fact on 30th June the War Diary of 2nd South Wales Borderers 
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reports that a "Warning of extreme fire risk was issued by the AFS and NFS". 
(Auxiliary and National Fire Services).3 
The camps were thought to be highly secure Not only was there a great fear of 
information leaking out, but there was also a danger that some might desert. Brigadier 
Hargest who acted as an observer for 21 "1 Army Group through the invasion and 
fighting in Normandy reported: 'In England (before D-Day) there was a lot of 
resentment by 50 Div about being asked to do the assault on D-Day. 69 Bde call Monty 
"fling 'em in Monty!" The numbers of men going Absent Without Leave (AWOL) in 
the New Forest amounted to well over I 000. '4 
Sergeant Dick Philips in 2nd South Wales Borderers HQ Intelligence Section, 
was a keen observer of the security effort: 
Beaulieu was completely encircled by barbed wire and outside of that were not 
Redcaps (Military police), but Green caps (Field Service Police) to make certain 
that you didn't get out. Some men did get out and there was hell to play and the 
CO addressed the battalion and he was saying how dangerous this was and that 
those who did get out should have been hanged! This was Lt. Col. Craddock and 
he was a bit of a fire-eater! 5 
One of those who did get out and went home (because he wanted to say a proper 
goodbye to his parents in case he was killed) was Bill Evans, a recent addition to 2nd 
South Wales Borderers from the Brecknockshire Battalion: 
After a few days at Christchurch we moved to Beaulieu and the sealed camp. 
Like many others I remember this as like a prison with rain teeming down, 
living in tents with duckboards to walk on. At some stage I went 'over the wire' 
and back home to South Wales in order to say goodbye to my family in case I 
did not survive the invasion. By the time I got home the local policeman had 
already visited, looking for me. I went and saw him and promised to be on the 
early train back. No punitive action was taken on my return, probably the 
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thought that any punishment at that stage would have meant replacing a 
rifleman.6 
On the inside of the wire lslwyn Edmunds remembers: "When I was tasked to 
make sure that the perimeter remained sealed during one nights' guard duty, L/Cpl 
Jones advised me not to be too efficient. He said that any men going over the wire 
would be back in the morning. They were."7 
Islwyn Edmunds, BiH Evans and Corporal Mel Jones were members of the same 
section in B Company, 2nd South Wales Borderers, otherwise called 'Rorkes Drift 
Company' after the action fought in the 1879 Zulu War by B Company. Corporal Mel 
Jones, known by some as 'Mad Mel' later won the Military Medal for bravery. 
Although the 2nd South Wales Borderers was an excellent battalion, commended by the 
GOC Northern Ireland after its service there, it had suffered through its role at home. 
Many men like Bill Evans had been transferred to the battalion with little warning to 
make up its numbers and with little integration or training within the battalion to build 
morale. In his battalion history Major Boon the OC of B Company recorded that even 
by early May 1944, B Company only had a strength of 50 men instead of 120. 'It 
reached its full establishment so late that the company never carried out one exercise as 
a formed body before it went into action. The Battalion can be justly proud of the hard 
work and spirit which overcame such disadvantages. ' 8 
A wartime family tragedy nearly made Don Leech of 2nd Glosters desert. He had 
just found out in the sealed camp that his brother had been killed in Burma fighting with 
lOth Glosters. He was initially refused permission to go home by his company 
commander and he threatened to desert. He walked out into the woods of the New 
Forest to decide what he was going to do. The orderly Sergeant followed him into the 
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wood and sat down next to him and asked him to go back with him. I said "Jack I am 
going home, I don't care what the Company Commander says, I'm going home. I have 
got to get out of here somehow. "9 When he went back into the office he expected to see 
his company commander again but some quick thinking on the part of the officers 
diverted this. He was taken to the S Company OC, Captain French, who told him that as 
he was a trained reserve Carrier driver he was transferred to S Company. Further he told 
Don that, "a Carrier is waiting to take you to the station at Southampton from where you 
can go home, but you must be back by Sunday night."10 This was the Wednesday. It 
meant he had Thursday, Friday and Saturday at home. 
As ordered he caught the train back early Sunday morning and it went by Great 
Western Railway to Reading. Then the problems started when he attempted to catch a 
connecting train. Due to the mobilisation forD-Day the timetable was all changed. Vast 
troop trains were now moving through and he finished a long way from Beaulieu. 
Starting to walk back a man with a motorcycle and sidecar offered him a lift and 
dropped him at Hangman's Cross, a short walk to base. When he arrived back six hours 
late at six in the morning the battalion was on the move. Captain French saw him and 
got him a breakfast and sat down beside him. "Captain French was worried I was going 
to desert and not come back, but I told him that I have been allowed to see my father, 
which was all I wanted. Captain French said 'forget it now' and he sat and had a 
friendly sympathetic conversation with me." 11 
The planning and briefmgs started when the camps were 'sealed' at 2359 hours 
on 25th May 1944. This meant that only a few men with special permission would be 
able to leave or enter. Many men make mention of how good the planning and briefings 
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were. Major Pat Barras, 2nd Essex was one of the men to recall this along with his 
distaste for the camps: 
When we were locked up in the tented camps in the New Forest the battalions 
faced a number of problems. Training had to continue in the now limited space. 
The weather was sometimes poor. But time was also spent looking at the 
excellent models of their invasion area, which showed detail down to hedges and 
roads. Also much use was made of the aerial photographs. The French 
Resistance may have supplied some photos. We could also hear the occasional 
air raid some way off. 12 
The young Intelligence Officer of 2nd South Wales Borderers, Lt. Nicholas 
Somerville, was amazed at the importance his post apparently gave him within the 
battalion. His task was to look after the briefing maps and he was not allowed to leave 
the briefing tent. The maps had bogus names on them but were to all intents otherwise 
correct. Certainly a few officers realised their geneml destination. Moreover, it did not 
take much to work out that Bayeux would be the objective on D-Day. Among 
themselves some officers reminded each other not to forget their knitting - an allusion 
to the Bayeux Tapestry. Few other parts of the coast of France fitted. A large model 
down to every hedgerow could be viewed. "I asked for an oblique photo of the landing 
beach and the request went via the Colonel. It was in my hands in 36 hours. The ability 
for a soldier in my position to ask for such a thing and receive it was astounding. "13 
Sergeant Dick Philips, the Intelligence Section NCO of 2nd South Wales 
Borderers, equally remembers that: "The briefings were wonderful really. There were 
these photographs of the area where we were going to land and relief maps showing 
every cottage and every tree. When we actually landed and got off the beach we would 
have no problem in fmding our way." 14 
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The 2nd South Wales Borders Signals Officer became very ill after the camp had 
already been 'sealed'. This was a very late stage for a replacement as important as this. 
The replacement was Sam Weaver, trained in the RAC, converted to Infantry and at that 
moment in a holding unit for officer reinforcements at Aldershot. His only signals 
experience had really been during Royal Armoured Corps training. On arrival at 
Aldershot he stated that he had specialised in signals, which was stretching the truth. 
Arriving to join 2"d South Wales Borderers on 25th May, it was not long before he had 
to own up to his lack of expertise and learnt the destination of the battalion from his 
Signals Sergeant: 
When l arrived I was honest with my Signals Sergeant 'Nobby' Cowan about 
my relative lack of experience, but Nobby accepted me and we got on and 
worked well together. In the camps everything was secure from the risk of 
soldiers letting slip any plans. Letters written by soldiers were not posted until 
after D-Day. In the 'inner sanctum' certain officers were told where we would 
land and then briefed subordinates on real maps with bogus place names and real 
aerial photographs. It was on one of these photographs that when using a 
magnifYing glass Nobby Cowan pointed out the name 'Bayeux' to me on a road 
sign! 15 
The messing and recreational arrangements in the camps were looked after by 
American troops. Football, rugby and boxing matches were arranged on an ad hoc basis 
and 'Stars in Battledress' put on concert party entertainments. Frank Rosier, 2nd 
Glosters, remembers his favourite 'racy' novel and interaction with the Americans: 
We saw 'The Inkspots' at one concert party and I was trying to finish a risque 
book 'No Orchids for Miss Blandish.' Your kids would read it today but then it 
was much sought after by us all! The cooks were black Americans and 
basketball matches took place between us and the cooks. After white American 
officers objected, they were forbidden to socialise with us. 16 
For B Echelon drivers there were different tasks to complete. George Barker of 
2nd Essex explained that they had to waterproof the trucks. Also they did not have 
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briefings like the Rifle Companies had as they were going over there just after the 
landing and would be directed to join them. "Our main job was waterproofing the 
transport and a man called Skinner went and did a course, then he came back and told us 
how to do it. We covered parts of the trucks with this waterproofing compound and I 
suppose some of it was never removed!" 17 
Frank Dilworth one of the Dispatch Riders with 56th Brigade HQ gives a very 
good sketch and insight into life in the camps which is worth quoting in full: 
In the sealed camps we still went out with messages until the last few days. They 
were like prisoner of war camps all barbed wire. You used to be able to get 
things in the NAAFI but the biggest worry was that everything would quickly 
disappear until the next lot came. When we got down there the frrst day - the 
Americans were administrating these camps - we went for breakfast and these 
Yanks were dishing up the breakfast. There were Cornflakes, scrambled eggs, 
fried eggs, bacon and so on. We had never seen as much as this before. Before 
dinner time our cooks were back in the job. The Americans had used a weeks 
worth in one sitting! These Yanks were all right. We played them at cricket one 
day, baseball the next then rugby and football. We didn't tell them all the rules! 
We had one camp entertainment, two women and a fella, but I wouldn't have 
wanted their iob for all the tea in China! The women were catcalled all the time 
and all sorts! 8 
Gordon Duffin, 2nd Glosters, also has vivid memories of the camps, food and the 
higher standards of hygiene as practised by the Americans. His descriptions are again 
very useful in helping our understanding of what life was like for the short period of 
time the invasion troops lived in the camps and the culture shock when living and 
working alongside Americans for the first time. After marching from Ossemsley Manor 
they entered the camp, which was surrounded by triple Dannert barbed wire. Inside 
were square American tents about 12 feet by 12 feet, much better than the British army 
Bell tents. In these tents there was enough room to stand up in them unlike the bell 
tents. They slept on camp beds with mattresses, blankets and a bolster for a pillow. This 
was very much better than normal arrangements and seemed almost luxurious. They 
90 
were supposed to be refitted, but according to Gordon were hardly given anything new 
as "Our quarter bloke would make Scrooge look like Father Christmasl"19 Americans 
staffed the canteens dishing up American food. The first meal was an eye opener: 
They were shouting, "Come on, chow, chow, chow!" Three long wooden 
benches, with an American straddled across each bench and he has a great big 
square Dixie full of food. You go one side of him and he goes dollop! Into your 
mess tin and if you left it there he would fill it up until it overflows. About four 
men had been served when an American voice shouts "stop, stop! Don't issue 
any more food, what the hell do you think you are doing?" He was an American 
MO and very concerned about the state of all the mess tins. "You can't eat out of 
them you will die of food poisoning! Throw them all over there." He orders our 
QM to arrive. "I have condemned all these mess tins, each of these men need a 
new set of mess tins." The QM says, "that's impossible Sir I haven't got any." "I 
don't care, get them new mess tins." The QM goes away and comes back with a 
new mess tin for everyone. 20 
The new mess tins were a bit greasy so the men were moved to a series of 
containers for cleaning the new mess tins. They had to wash, rinse and sterilize in 
separate tubs. More normally they were used to 100 men dipping their tins in a bucket 
of greasy lukewarm water. There was a canteen in the camp where they could get free 
coffee and doughnuts and free magazines like Yank and Picture Post. "You could buy 
the better American cigarettes, Camels and Lucky Strike for about shilling for 50. The 
lads smoke themselves silly. So we are in these tents and we have no training. "21 
Still men were arriving and leaving. The 2nd Glosters seemed to have reached 
their establishment figure. According to their War Diary report of 23"' May the 
Battalion now consisted of 39 Officers and 794 Other Ranks. However the 2nd South 
Wales Borderers War Diary of 27fb. May reports still being short of 32 Other Ranks and 
NCO's. 2nd Essex War Diary reports on 22od May that 8 Other Ranks were drafted as 
unsuitable, on 25fb. May 6 Other Ranks left the Battalion, on 28fb. May 1 Sergeant and 2 
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Other Ranks joined and finally on 29th May 19 Other Ranks joined. It was one week to 
D-Day. 
A number of men from A Company, 2nd Glosters had to deal with an accidental 
shooting with tragic consequences. For stretcher-bearer Ted Castle it was not a good 
introduction to his Army job: 
One man accidentally shot himself He had just come back off guard and hadn't 
unJoaded his rifle or put the safety catch on. He threw himself down on his bed 
then his gun went off and he was killed. I was about a yard from him when it 
happened. He was the first casualty I ever dealt with; he was next to me in the 
tent you see. He had dropped the rifle on the floor and it had gone off, the bullet 
going through his chest and out of his back at point blank range. There was 
nothing you could do. Major Lance was there immediately."22 
Ernie Partridge of the same company was outside the tent, "I was talking to 
another chap outside and he said, "What's that Ernie?" I said, "It's a bloody rifle gone 
offi" I had to help carry him (Kenneth Townsend) and bury him in the little village 
church.23 14656343. Private Kenneth Townsend. Died on 29th May 1944 and is buried 
in Boldre Churchyard not far from the sealed camp. 
So these men waited cooped up in the sealed camps doubtless wondering when 
the order would come to move off. Overall one gets the impression of boredom or 
impatience to get on with it, well trained, fit and ready, but still held on the leash. 
Finally they were all briefed on the 'Bogus' maps and mock up models. On 27lh May 
the Platoon Commanders were briefed, then the next day the 'other ranks' were briefed, 
a Company at a time. When these tasks were completed Brigadier Pepper lectured each 
Battalion in turn. 
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Part of the address to the 2nd Glosters by their CO was circulated as a Special 
Order of the Day on 29th May 1944. 
From: Lt. Col. Biddle. To: All Ranks - "The Sixty First are about to re-enter 
France. The task before us will be hard, but we have a debt to pay off towards 
those of this Battalion who defended Cassel towards the end of May 1940. We 
shall now have the opportunity of demonstrating the fruits of four years waiting 
and preparation. As the commanding officer of the 6th Battalion said at 
LEDRINGHAM "up G1osters and at 'em!"24 
This was probably typical of the sentiments expressed by the various CO's to 
boost morale and keep the men going while the tedium of waiting continued. By the end 
of May all the men had been briefed in both large and small groups, and seen the 
models of the landing areas and the photographs taken by plane. The officers were all 
properly briefed as to the role of 56th Brigade and their battalion, although only a very 
few knew the final destination. Only on the landing craft would maps bearing the 
correct place names be issued. At this point it is worthwhile examining in detail the 
topography of Gold Beach, the existing German defences, 56th Brigades' part in the 
planned landings and the hoped for outcomes in the first 24 hours. 
'Gold Beach' is on the Normandy coast north of Bayeux, a town most famous 
for its ancient tapestry chronicling an invasion the reverse of 1944. The landing areas 
were between, and inclusive of, the coastal towns of Asnelles/Le Hamel in the west and 
La Riviere in the east. Since January 1944 the Germans under Rommel had been 
frantically improving the defences all along this coastline. The 50th Division plan 
divided the landing beach into two parts code named 'Jig' in the west and 'King' in the 
east Both Jig and King were further sub-divided into 'Green' (west) and 'Red (east). 
The next landing beach to the west was the American 'Omaha' Beach, over fifteen 
kilometres away. To the east and three kilometres away was the Canadian 'Juno' Beach. 
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The Gold Beach landing area is approximately six kilometres wide. It consists of 
a very wide sandy beach at low tide leading to a low bank, behind, which is marshy 
ground known as ' Le Marais'. This area is two hundred metres wide at La Riviere and 
seven hundred and fifty metres wide at Le Hamel. At high tide the sea comes near to the 
bank on normal tides. In the middle of the beach two small streams join and exit to the 
sea, La Gronde Ruisseau (the word 'Gronde' is transcribed as 'Grande' on some maps 
and led to some confusion on D-Day as to its size) and Le Hable de Heurtaut (spelt 
Heurtot on 1944 maps). Behind 'Le Marais' on the La Riviere side of the beach the land 
rises fairly steeply to 50 metres running across the back of 'Le Marais' for four 
kilometres where it turns inland and south west above the small village of Meauvaines. 
This feature dominates the eastern side of the valley running inland and is called the 
Meuvaines ridge. Behind the far western side of Asnelles!Le Hamel the ground rises to 
55 metres and where it reaches the coast forms a cliff for over 1 kilometre until it 
reaches Arromanches to the west. This feature forms another ridgeline running from the 
sea to the southwest parallel to the Meuvaines Ridge. Between the two lies a fairly flat 
valley some 2lh kilometres wide dominated by both ridges. Once landed 56th Brigade 
had to advance inland initially for 3\lz kilometres with its axis of advance following a 
road on the west side of the valley through the hamlets of Buhot and Ryes. Then it had 
to turn west with various objectives for the battalions to gain. The Germans had open 
positions containing mortar, machine gun and heavier artillery up to 105mm along each 
ridge. Appendix Five on page 288 can be used to identify the main features and towns 
of the landing area. 
Both Le Hamel and La Riviere were heavily fortified and included a heavy anti-
tank weapon, 88mm at La Riviere and variously reported as 75mm to 88mm at 
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Asnelles. These guns dominated the length of the beach with crossfire and were 
positioned in concrete emplacements with a thick wall facing seawards impervious to 
gunfire from the sea. Between these were two 'Wiederstandnester' or 'Resistance Nests' 
each constructed of a number of concrete bunkers. The one nearer Asnelles at La 
Cabane des Douanes was armed with a 50mm cannon and 37mm cannon, while the 
second near Le Hable de Heurtaut had a 50mm cannon. Each of these 
'Wiederstandnester' contained machine guns, were wired in and surrounded by mines. 
Between the two in the centre of the beach was an open machine gun position. A 
partially completed heavy gun emplacement; the Mont Fleury battery of 4 x 122mm 
cannon; stood one kilometre inland above La Riviere. Two further Wiederstandnester 
were positioned well behind the beach on rising ground dominating the beach. The first 
near the lighthouse above La Riviere consisted of I x 75mm and I x 50mm cannon, 
while the second was a kilometre west of the Mont Fleury battery and consisted of 
machine guns with possibly a light gun. 25 
A War Office report by the Army Operational Research Group published in 1945 
discussing Gold Beach states: 
Elsewhere there was only a thin chain of infantry strongpoints extending inland 
to a depth of 200 to 300 yards, with plenty of local support weapons but weakly 
backed by artillery. The normal infantry strongpoints which were strung along 
the coast at intervals of 1,000 to 2,000 yards were roughly of platoon strength. 
Weapon pits within these strongpoints were normally sited for all round defence, 
though the greatest weight of fire was towards the sea. Guns in the beach 
defences were often sited to enfilade the beach. It was found during the assault 
that many of the guns were protected by concrete walls that rendered them 
almost invulnerable to 4.7-inch fire from the sea and could not fire directly 
seawards. 26 
Designed to rip the bottom out of landing craft or blow them up, underwater 
obstacles were of five types. Firstly rows of wooden stakes, often ·with a shell attached, 
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then wooden mmps with a shell attached Finally iron 'Tetrahedm' with a single shell 
and Hedgehogs with Teller mines or a single shell. There were also obstacles of 
'Element 'C' type. These were metal constructions with the aspect of a field gate. All 
these obstacles were generally in the upper half of the tidal range and were covered at 
high tide. The density varied from one every 2 yards to one every 3 yards of front. 
Beach wiring was usually in zigzags, and all obstacles were sited so that the weapon 
pits could enfilade them. 
The Gold Beach landings were to be accomplished by 50th Division and for this 
phase 56th Brigade came under their command. Two Brigades were to lead the assault, 
break the coastal defence crust and push inland. On King Beach the assault brigade was 
69th Infantry Brigade with the 5th East Yorkshires, 6th Green Howards and 7th Green 
Howards who had all served in France, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Africa and 
Sicily and were highly experienced. Equally famous were 231"1 Brigade landing on Jig 
Beach comprising the 2nd Devons, 1 "1 Hampshires and 1 "1 Dorsets. They had all served 
in Malta, Egypt, Sicily and Italy. The 151st Brigade and 56th Brigade were to land two 
hours after the assault phase and push through the assault battalions. 151"1 Brigade 
landing on King Beach comprised 6th Durham Light Infantry, gth Durham Light Infantry 
and 9th Durham Light Infantry and had served in France and Belgium, UK, Egypt, 
Cyprus, Iraq, Libya, N. Africa and Sicily. 56th Brigade was to follow 23181 Brigades 
assault. Both 15181 and 56th Brigade had to be prepared to assault the beach area if the 
assaulting battalions failed. Otherwise they would only be landed when the beach was 
secure. The 8th Armoured Brigade of 417 Dragoon Guards, Nottinghamshire Yeomanry 
and 24th Lancers supplied armour for the landings, some of it comprising DD tanks. 
The 12th Kings Royal Rifle Corps were the infantry battalion working with this armour. 
Of this brigade the Nottinghamshire Yeomanry were experienced, having fought at 
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Alam el Halfa, El Alamein, Medenina, Tebaga Gap, Akarit, Enftdaville and Tunis with 
gth Army. 27 
It is interesting to note and compare the experience of the infantry brigades to 
that of 56th Brigade. 56th Brigade must have been something of an unknown entity and 
despite being made up of regular battalions from famous regiments there must have 
been a question mark over how it would perform in battle. Interestingly when 
interviewing former officers and men of 56th Brigade they largely exude an air of 
confidence about this period and certainly those who had already served for some time 
with the battalions show a pride in their regiment and a marked degree of team spirit 
Other armour to be used in the assault included specialist Armoured Vehicles 
Royal Engineers (A VREs) from 81 51 and 82nd Assault Squadrons, Royal Marine Centaur 
tanks and three field regiments of Sexton self propelled 25-pounder guns. Also landing 
was 47 Royal Marine Commando who had to push westwards inland alone across 
country for over sixteen kilometres and take Port-en-Bessin from the land. There were 
many other units landing who had to perform various tasks. Not the least of these were 
the Royal Navy demolition teains or Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units (LCOCU), 
who were among the first to land. They had to disable or demolish the obstacles placed 
in the sand. Amazingly Royal Navy frogmen had already reconnoitred the beach in 
December 1943. The long list of units makes the point well that 50th Division had a very 
large number of units attached to it for the assault phase. The Germans expected a high 
tide landing, as they thought this would give an advantage to any assault force of not 
being exposed to direct fire while crossing the sand. The Allied plan envisaging landing 
at low tide to ensure that at least there was a good chance of putting the infantry and 
armour down, without exposing the craft to underwater devices. Many of the landing 
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craft involved had to be preserved because they were expected to make a number of 
trips between shore and supporting ships at sea. 
Now that the geographical nature of the ground and the German defences in the 
area have been examined a closer look can be taken at the 56th Brigade plan. '56 
Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. I' runs to over forty pages of instruction and 
plans. Carrying on its front cover the emblem of the Sphinx, it was marked 'BIGOT 
NEPTUNE TOP SECRET'. Further it is marked at the bottom 'TO BE DESTROYED 
BEFORE LANDING'. 28 Bigot was the highest order of security classification for D-
Day, Neptune being strictly speaking the naval and landing operation although this 
order continues to be operational well inland. The first phase of Operational Order No. I 
took place in the final days in the sealed camps by certain officers having to finalise the 
landing craft loading arrangements. This was complex, as the rifle companies and some 
HQ elements of each battalion, would land together and be put ashore as a brigade. But 
the Carriers and some jeep transport would go by Landing Craft Tank (LCT), while the 
rest of the soft skinned transport would go by the much larger Landing Ship Transport 
(LST). Sir Nicholas Somerville, explains what this task meant for an officer of each 
battalion: 
An important and worrying task for me was to organise the loading scales for 
the landing craft. All the transport went on an LCT, but the rest of the Battalion 
had to be split between three LCI's. Which meant one of the four rifle 
companies would have to be split and the command, signals and medical staff 
had to be split in case one ship was sunk. 29 
The Brigade landing plan required that Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM) 
capable of carrying a platoon at a time were to be used to trans-ship from the Landing 
Craft Infantry (Large) LCI (L) to shore. This was the change brought about by the 
drownings during Exercise Fabius. Secondly the tracked vehicles of the battalions were 
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to land at the same time as the rifle companies from LCT's'. Later spread over two tides 
would come the rest of the transport. The Brigadier and half his staff were carried on a 
LCH, which stood for 'Landing Craft Headquarters', and carried better signals 
equipment than a normal LCI (L). This was to be LCI (L) 255, and hasty arrangements 
were made to cut away part of the interior to carry the extra mdio equipment. Originally 
another cmft- LCI (L) 302 was to be used, however it could not be made seaworthy in 
time and as late as 13th May LCI (L) 255 was substituted.30 Appendix Four on page 287 
is taken from 56th Brigade Operational Order No. I and shows the planned order of 
beaching on 0-Day. An explanation of the cmft numbers is required at this point. For 48 
hours over D-Day each craft carried a number written white on black for easy 
identification. This was called the 'Landing Table Index Number' or LTIN. These 
numbers were usually carried at an easily seen point such as the bridge structure. The 
L TIN number allowed each soldier to recognise his craft when tied up. However these 
craft also carried two other numbers on the bow. The top number indicated which 
flotilla each ship belonged to and the bottom its unique identification number. For 
example one LCI (L) carrying the 2nd Essex bow number was 264 (Flotilla) 305 (ships 
number). Its LTIN was 2905. A problem for modem historians is that in landing 
photographs the LTIN is rarely deciphemble and that number is the one used in the 
planning. The landing tables for the whole invasion appear to have been worked out in 
April 1944 and through enemy action, damage or breakdown a ship may later become 
· unavailable. It would be easy enough to swap an L TIN and not cause any confusion. 
Also in April 1944 there was still a frantic effort going on to procure enough landing 
craft. A final amended list of cmft for 50th Division was issued on 4th May. Even so, it 
can be seen that changes still had to be made as a fmal decision on the craft carrying the 
main HQ of 56th Brigade was not made until ten days later. In the event Fmnk Clarke, 
2nd Glosters remembers: "On the LCI (L)'s at Southampton we could recognise our own 
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landing craft easily by the emblems like Mickey Mouse painted by the crews on the 
funnels and gun shields!"31 At Appendix Four can be seen a copy of the original 
diagrammatic plan showing the order and type of craft used, as published in 56th 
Brigade Operational Order Number I. 
On page one of Operational Order No.1 there is a basic briefing as to where and 
when the Brigade will land, including the map references for 1"1 US Division at Omaha 
and the 3rd Canadian Division at Juno. "INTENTION 3, 56 Brigade and att trps 
(attached troops) will be prepared to land on nG Sector at any time from H + 2Y2hrs 
onwards and adv to and secure the high ground from inc 7781- MONUNIREL 7777-
inc GUERON 7876. "32 MONUNMIREL is a misspelling and should read Montrnirel. 
In the light of what happened to the Brigade on D-Day it is worthwhile 
examining what this meant in some detail. The Brigade was to land and push up to 17 
kilometres inland, taking Bayeux and establishing itself 3 kilometres south of Bayeux 
and 1 kilometre west of Bayeux, thus holding the forward edge of the battlefield and the 
extreme right (west) flank of the British Army in Normandy. This seems a bold 
expectation following a sea crossing and landing and shows the extent to which the 
Allies were confident of quick success and that their intelligence expected weak 
German resistance. It also shows some trust in the ability of 56th Brigade. The 
movement of 56 Brigade in carrying out its task was in three phases. Phase A 
(Codeword GRAPE) covered the landing and assembly. Phase B (Codeword PEAR) 
was the advance to and capture of the high ground north of Bayeux including the bridge 
at Vaux-sur-Aure. Phase C (Codeword STRAWBERRY) was the capture of the high 
ground to the west and the feature south of Bayeux around Montmirel and link with the 
Americans. Phase A took the Brigade from the landing beach 2 kilometres inland to the 
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orchards just southwest of the fann at Buhot, where it was to meet and reorganise after 
the landing. Phase B moves them to take a line dominating the high ground 2 kilometres 
northeast of Bayeux, while finally Phase C should have taken them south of Bayeux. 
Appendix 5 is the planning map showing the expected Phase Lines to be reached by the 
end of D-Day by the Gold Beach units. 
The way to Buhot was to be marked by Unit Landing Officers (ULO's) who 
landed on the heels of the assault brigades with a jeep and three ORs/NCOs and marked 
the route from the beach with blackboards, signs and chalking on walls to show the 
way. Although very simple this was an effective way of marking a route for units. 
Under the command of the Brigade was a Machine Gun Company of 2nd Cheshires 
(Vickers Medium Machine Guns), less one platoon; a heavy mortar platoon of 2"d 
Cheshires (4.2 inch mortars), a troop of 208 Battery Anti-tank 6 pounder guns, I 47th 
Field Regiment, less one battery, tanks of the Sherwood Rangers and 203 Field 
Ambulance unit which had been under command at Lymington since 23rd April 1944. 
The areas were to be secured as follows: 2nd South Wales Borderers were to advance to 
Vaux-sur-Aure west of the landings and secure a junction with the Americans 
advancing from Omaha, the 2nd Glosters would take the centre of Bayeux and move 
south and west of the town; while the 2"d Essex would skirt the town and push south. 
The ground east of the 56th Brigade area of operations was to be taken by 151"1 
Brigade.33 
The tasks are then further defined. On advancing 2nd South Wales Borderers 
were to be led by their forward body of one rifle company on airborne bicycles, the 
Carrier platoon less one section, the mortar platoon less one section and the anti-tank 
platoon less one section. Their tasks were to 'mop up' a Radar Station near Pouligny 
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and a 105mm four gun position at Vaux-sur-Aure (by D-Day this had been reported as 
empty). Then, leaving a detachment at the bridge at Vaux-sur-Aure, they were to 
advance 2 kilometres west and block the Sully road, also block the main Bayeux to 
Cherbourg road just west of Bayeux and patrol into Bayeux. They were further to make 
combined posts with American troops at bridges at Sully and Vaucelles. 2nd Essex had 
to have a forward body ready to lead from Buhot, advance to Ryes (with the rest of the 
Brigade) then move southwest and seize the high ground between Sommervieu and St. 
Sulpice and then patrol in strength into Bayeux. Then 2nd Essex was to move south of 
Bayeux and establish links with 2nd South Wales Borderers to the west and 151"1 
Brigade to the east. Meanwhile 2nd Glosters were to advance with Brigade HQ and 
establish themselves at St Sulpice north of Bayeux. It appears that the plan was to keep 
2nd Glosters in reserve until support was needed by one of the other battalions. In the 
case of Brigadier Pepper becoming a casualty Lt. Col. Biddle, OC 2nd Glosters, would 
take over command of the Brigade. In fact in many respects the plan mirrored Exercise 
Smash. If 2nd Essex could not complete their tasks 2nd Glosters would pass through them 
and take the high ground south of Bayeux. 
There was a contingency plan in case Bayeux was strongly held on D-Day. This 
was to either push on to Bayeux on D + 1, or meet an enemy counter-attack. This 
envisaged the possibility of a whole brigade size attack on the town. Appendix J to 
Operational Order No.l34 gave a number of installations that were to be preserved and 
these included the hospital, sanatorium, post office (PTT), reservoir and bridges. Further 
. notes stated that the destruction of civilian communication installations were to be 
avoided if possible, that other medical and monastic buildings suitable for medical 
purposes were to receive particular care. In addition damage to power cables was to be 
avoided. A further part of the Appendix was concerned with preserving the following 
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antiquities: the Cathedral, Maison du Gouvemment, the library and tapestries (including 
The Bayeux Tapestry), and the picture gallery in the Palais du Justice. 
A considerable emphasis was placed on hygiene and disease prevention. This 
underlines the fear that the British soldier once in Normandy would be under threat 
from more than just the enemy: 
Appendix D to Operational Order No. I. Disease Likely to be encountered. 
(a) Enteric Fevers are endemic, food poisoning, dysentery and diarrhoea of 
the gastro-enteritis type occurs. 
(b) Respiratory diseases, cerebro-spinal, Diphtheria, Scarlet Fever as in this 
country with reported epidemics assuming large proportions in the years 
of the German occupation. The incidence of Pulmonary Tuberculosis in 
the civilian population has also risen due to malnutrition following on 
occupation. 
(c) Skin disease- Scabies and septic skin conditions due to campaigning. 
(d) Infective Hepatitis, smallpox, Typhus and Polio-mylitis all occur with 
higher incidence due to war conditions. 
(e) Venereal disease is widespread.35 
In the paragraphs that followed on preventing sickness, emphasis was laid on 
unit officers as well as Medical Officers pulling their weight in order to prevent disease. 
A considerable paragraph was given over to the prevention and treatment of Venereal 
Diseases. Brothels were out of bounds; units should have available supplies of 
condoms. Units would treat fresh cases of Gonorrhoea and at Corps and Army level VD 
Treatment Centres would be established at the earliest opportunity. 'Men who contract 
VD immediately before embarking or in the opening phases will embark or remain with 
the unit under treatment by the unit Medical officers. ' 36 It is an interesting sidelight on 
events that soldiers partially incapacitated through VD would remain and potentially 
fight with their units. Strict rules were laid down regarding water supply and sanitation 
including the digging of latrines in the field. 
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After being briefed on the above one is left wondering at what the ordinary 
soldier thought about the country he would soon invade. He was given a pamphlet 
prepared by the Political Warfare Executive and issued by the Foreign Office called 
'Instructions for British Servicemen in France'.37 If he read it he would find that it 
informed him on all aspects of civilian life in France and dealing with the civilian 
population. As well as learning about the French way of life and the proper way to 
behave towards the people of France, he would also learn that his unit Medical Officers 
warning about disease was in no way overstated. The pamphlet told him that because of 
the German occupation, as many as one in twelve Frenchmen was a victim of 
tuberculosis. The incidence of Venereal Disease in French towns supporting German 
soldiers brothels was estimated as many as one in eight. He also learnt about the 
deprivation of food and that a Frenchman was shot for active resistance every two hours 
- over 5,000 a year. Plus the number of French people deported for labour to the Reich 
was estimated to be one million and over 150,000 French persons were in prisons or 
concentration eamps. Finally one and a quarter million French soldiers were held as 
prisoners of war. 
A very thorough intelligence briefmg covering eleven pages of close typescript 
forms over a quarter of Operational Order No. 1. It is interesting to note within this that 
the German 716 Infantry Division is identified as the main opposition on Gold Beach. 
This unit is often referred to as being a very much second rate 'static' division with a 
mix of eastern Europeans as well as German soldiers within it. Operational Order No. 1 
though, does not hold out much expectation that this unit will be an easy adversary: 
It is a low category division. The average age of the personnel is 32-40 yrs. Of 
these only 50% are German, the remainder being Poles, (30% ), Czechs and 
Russians. Their equipment includes French, British and Polish weapons. It is 
difficult to estimate the reaction of these foreign elements when faced with 
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invasion, but it will be unwise to be too hopeful. Similar troops fought well for 
the Germans at Dieppe and it should be n:imembered that however strong their 
desire may be to desert and surrender or even fight against the Germans they 
would be given few opportunities to do so and escape with their lives.38 
Intelligence had not picked up the very important fact that a first line field 
division - 352 Infantry Division- had taken command over coastal and inland defences 
from Cabane des Douanes west. This was to have a considerable impact on 231 "1 
Brigades' assault and the timetable for the development of operations by the follow up 
units of 56th Brigade and I5I st Brigade. In the event German units in the first 72 hours 
after D-Day were to prove highly resilient and effective. 
Each of the battalions of 56th Brigade published a similar operational order 
copying much the same information, except tailored where necessary to reflect the role 
of that particular battalion. Indeed 56th Brigade's Operational Order Number I merely 
reflected 50th {Northumbrian) Division, Operational Number I. It meant that from 
Division down to battalion, those who needed it had been able to read and digest a 
common plan. Only officers received a copy, and this was to be collected in before 
leaving the sealed camps. 
On the naval side equally difficult preparations had been going on. 56th Brigade 
was to be transported by Force G-3, part of Force G (Gold). We learn from the official 
naval summary that over the last few months Force G when forming had been at a 
disadvantage to Forces S and J as these had been formed earlier and had had more time 
in training. Force G was not formed until I 81 March I944. The Force G commander was 
Commodore Douglas-Pennant and he had established his HQ at Weymouth on 14th 
March I944. Thus the Royal Hotel, Weymouth became for a short period HMS 
Purbeck. The commander for Force G-3 (56th and 15I81 Brigades) was Captain Dolphin 
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on the Destroyer HMS Albrighton. After Exercise Smash on the 28th April 1944 the 
force transferred to the Southampton/Solent area. A meeting on 181 May 1944 was held 
to discuss the extension of landing obstacles in the invasion area. Here it was decided 
that these needed dealing with 'dryshod', in other words when they were standing in 
less than two feet of water. After taking everything into account; including adjusting 
'H-Hour' for the tide to be at an appropriate state in each area; Admiral Ramsey took 
the decision that practical dates were 5th and 6th June, with 7th June being used as a final 
resort only in extreme necessity. This was communicated to Eisenhower on glh May 
1944 and it is worth noting that important operational decisions were taken so close to 
the invasion date. Already there had been considerable worries about damage to craft 
and wear and tear especially after the rough weather of Exercise Fabius in early May. 
Many craft had been operational in the Mediterranean in the previous twelve months 
and later heavily used in training. Despite this by D-Day 97.6% of British craft and 
99.3% of US craft could be used, which refleCted great credit to the crews, maintenance 
and repair organisation.39 
The majority of craft for 56th and 151 81 Brigade were to come from the Royal 
Canadian Navy (RCN) and an excellent picture of their problems is given by a 
Canadian report which tells us that the LCI's used by the RCN for these Brigades were 
Mark l's. The Americans had given them 24 craft and the Royal Navy 6, to make up the 
number for the required three flotillas. They had been heavily used since the landings in 
Sicily and their crews had had little training in operating landing craft, neither had there 
been time to properly train all the engine room personnel in Grey Diesel engines and 
using variable pitch propellers. Parts and tools had been hard to get. 
When they reached the United Kingdom in the autumn of 1943, the LCI's were 
in a shocking condition. Repair yards were already hard pressed with landing 
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craft by the hundreds, and tools and spares were still in short supply, and such 
vital items as tachometers and temperature gauges were scarcely obtainable. The 
R.C.N. Flotillas maintenance parties accomplished wonders. Through the winter 
and spring, working to an unknown deadline, no efforts were spared to clean up 
and re-equip the LCI's and get their engines running well again.40 
At 2330hrs on 25th May 1944 the Naval holders of sealed operation orders were 
directed to open them. On 28th May 1944 a further signal named D-Day as 5th June 
1944. This order also specified the different 'H-Hours' for the five landing forces. For 
'Force G' the HQ ship was HMS Bulolo, which carried the Gold Beach senior officers 
on board included Commodore Douglas-Pennant, Major-General Graham and Group 
Captain Simonds. All personnel had been 'sealed' in their camps from 24th May 1944. 
All mail was impounded, telephone and cable facilities forbidden. In cases of 
emergency, special permission of a CO was required to send telegrams. Like the Army 
the Navy were ready to go. 41 
Back in the New Forest the waiting had ended and according to the various 
battalion and 56th Brigade war diaries during the evening of 3ni June the Rifle 
Companies and any other personnel who were to land with them loaded into lorries and 
still under strict security travelled to Lymington to load onto the LCI (L)'s which then 
took them round to Southampton docks. The War Diaries show that 2od South Wales 
Borderers left their sealed camp at 1430hrs and loaded at Lymington on three US LCI 
(L) at 1730hrs of the 70th US Division, the only US LCI (L)'s reported as landing on 
Gold Beach on D-Day, and they were the heavier Mark 2 type ofLCI (L). By 1900hrs 
they had sailed around and were tied up at Southampton Docks in the Atlantic Liner 
Dock. 2nd Essex were next on the move leaving camp at l700hrs. The 2od Glosters 
followed at 1930hrs and we know that they took refreshments on the way and were 
loaded as follows; A and B Companies on LCI 2906, part of Battalion HQ and D and S 
Companies on LCI 2907 and the remainder of Battalion HQ and C Company on LCI 
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2908. Their craft sailed for Southampton at 2100hrs. Finally the Brigadier and his staff 
loaded at 2200hrs on LCI 255 (Craft not LTIN number).42 
Peter Giggens, 2nd Essex Mortar Platoon Sergeant, was to travel with the Unit 
Landing Officer (ULO) to mark the route from the beach to Buhot, the Brigade forming 
up point. They helped with the final loading at Lymington. Then Captain Chell, a 
signaller, 'Titch' Holden (Mine detector from the Pioneer Platoon) and Peter left to be 
the advance party. They boarded· an LCT carrying a mix of vehicles from 6111 Green 
Howards, including their HQ Carrier, jeep and FOO (Forward Observation Officer) 
with a 25pndr Sexton and their jeep. "We were to land earlier with all that was 
necessary to sign the route to the forming up point at Ryes. Some of our ammo pouches 
were full of chalk to write on walJs/boards. There were ready-made sign boards on the 
jeep.'"'3 
For Charles Benford, the 2nd Essex Carrier Platoon Sergeant, "What amazed me 
was seeing all those landing craft, different colours denoting a different stream to go 
across the Channel. It was like a Regatta, it really was. If the Germans had had an Air 
Force they would have bad a field day!"44 Charles was to land with the Rifle Companies 
and re-join the Carriers later. 
Philip Maillou was with 2 Essex Anti-Tank Platoon. They were split up in case of loss 
of a ship: 
When we fmally loaded a few days before D-Day we had our six-pounder anti-
tank gun loaded onto a DUKW (An amphibious lorry). They hauled the gun up 
onto the DUKW with about five of us. Our Carrier and driver went off on an 
LCT and our DUKW was loaded onto a LST. All six anti-tank guns were spread 
out on other craft. We were split up into sections of two guns, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 
Sections.45 
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Gordon Duffin remembers while waiting at Lymington in a field to board their 
landing craft: "Mustangs and Thunderbolts were flying over continuously. Then 'come 
on!' We march down to the landing craft and load up and sail round to Southampton 
Docks. The wags are saying, 'We're not going to go anywhere, its just another 
exercise!'.46 
His friend Ernie Partridge 2nd Glosters adds this: "we got some smashing grub 
and then orders that we would parade at 1200hrs with full kit, everything you could 
carry, spade, full size packs. Then we got on these lorries and drove down to 
Lymington."47 
Most vehicles in the Brigade drove from the New Forest and were loaded at 
Southampton mixed with other similar units and were to land later. Final checks were 
made on all vehicles and some vehicles had to be replaced by spares standing by. 56th 
Brigade vehicles had a brown square painted on the mudguards and white numbers 
painted on these, 69 denoting 2nd Essex, 68 2nd Gloucesters and 67 for 2nd South Wales 
Borderers. All the vehicles also had big white stars across the width of the vehicle for 
identification and a Sphinx on a yellow background on the other mudguard. Because 
they were an independent brigade they did not carry the TT signs of 50th Division. 
Driver Syd Hampton, 2nd Glosters, vividly remembers that they took a very long 
route to get to Go sport, travelling over ninety miles. They were breaking normal driving 
rules because the engine was sealed up with waterproofing. One Gloster Carrier broke 
down with a driver named George Easter. He just got left. Every few yards there was a 
Military or Field Security Policeman. When they got to the outskirts of Gosport they 
halted under some trees for a long time and kept under armed guard. People were going 
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to church and it seemed like another exercise and that they had been fooled. Eventually 
they drove to the loading hard. By this time D-Day had started and a staff car arrived 
carrying Montgomery's Chief of Staff, Freddie de Guingand. He addressed them and 
told them what was happening. To replace the broken down Carrier there was one from 
a Staffordshire Regiment waiting - and he came ashore as a 2nd Glosters. 
About ten days after D-Day when we were in France and crt;P,ing along in a big 
traffic jam, lo and behold I saw 'our' Carrier, now part of 43 Wessex Division! 
We were loaded on LST's, three being loaded at a time. We were on LST 519, 
which was an American ship. As we were backing on we had to go on the top 
deck. This chap with an Austin did a half shaft in. They pulled him out with a 
tractor and he was given twenty minutes to load this RN vehicle with RN and an 
Anchor painted on the side rather than 56 Brigade signs! He took that ashore and 
it stayed with us. We took all the top deck up with Gloster vehicles, while the 
tank deck was loaded with Jerry cans of petrol. We thought if this gets bombed 
there will be no swimming away! 48 
Brigade HQ Dispatch Rider Frank Dilworth had his motorcycle put into the 2nd 
South Wales Borderers Signals Ml4 Half-track and they were loaded up from 
Southampton. On every corner was some type of military police. They went through 
Southampton about quarter to seven and at the time people were going to the pictures. 
At one big cinema going into Southampton there was a big queue and no one took any 
notice of them. They had seen so many troop movements that they thought it was just 
one more exercise. The only difference was that they bad ammunition on and the 
vehicles were waterproofed. It was a quarter to ten at night when they went on the boat. 
They went on first, reversing and being pushed up the ramp by a truck. When loaded 
they went out into the Solent, where the storm blew up and they spent a very rocky 
night and day there as the flat-bottomed craft were slipping all over the place. "We were 
fed these tins of self-beating soup. There was no shelter and we had to sleep where we 
were in the vehicle. Facilities were limited, only a little wash place and small toilet. 
Some of the vehicles were shifting so they lashed them together. "49 
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Tony Atcherley, also of the Brigade Signals unit, approached the day with some 
emotion and finally learnt their destination: 
I wrote what might have been my last letter to my mother, which started "By the 
time you read this I shall be in France". We knew that this batch of mail would 
be held back and from now on our mail would be censored. On 4th June we 
drove the short distance to the harbour and embarked. We embarked on quite a 
small landing craft; it had enough room for a number of vehicles. On board we 
reported to a lieutenant of the Glosters a quiet thoughtful man who did all he 
could to keep us all calm and cheerful, except on one occasion when he forlornly 
reflected it was a Sunday and people would be out in London in Kew Gardens 
enjoying themselves. With a genuine beach assault map he now showed us that 
we were to land in Normandy between the villages of Le Hamel and La Riviere 
about eight miles north east of Bayeux which we were to take. Of course we 
knew all about the famous tapestry from schooldays and now Operation 
Overlord was to put Williams conquest into reverse. 5° 
Lt. Nicholas Somerville, 2nd South Wales Borderers, remembers the time spent 
with the rifle companies in Southampton Liner Dock and some amazing sights on the 
journey: 
Embarking at Lymington and moving round the Solent to Southampton the sheer 
number of ships, Mulberry harbour sections and PLUTO was amazing. 
Expecting to go next day a Welsh concert on deck took place. Singing much of 
the night. In the morning a Royal Marine Launch was touring the docks with a 
signaller using semaphore, postponing Overlord by 24 hours. As an ex-signaller 
I could read the message and was appalled by this apparent breach of security. 
Later I realised that the area was pretty much sealed and this array of shipping 
could no longer be hidden. Everyone was allowed ashore and letters home were 
written. Officers (despite the youthfulness of some) helped those who had 
difficulty. "Try to get the word 'love' in somewhere!" This type of contact 
between officers and men helped to establish an even closer relationship. 51 
The singing by the South Wales Borderers while the craft were tied up at 
Southampton is remembered by many with emotion even those outside of 56th Brigade 
and it was an established tradition within the battalion to sing before a battle: 
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Dusk began to fall and small knots of men gathered on the decks. Someone 
started a song and the others joined in It was a typical Welsh scene. Soon an 
informal concert developed. The soloist sang from the bridge while the audience 
in the shadows of the deck took up the choruses. The songs echoed across the 
water and troops on other craft, less happy in their land of birth, leant against the 
nearest rails, silently listening. 52 
But with the poor weather pushing the landing day back by 24 hours men were 
allowed to leave their ships and go into the large Customs Sheds on the quayside where 
sandwiches, tea, newspapers and writing paper was provided. Outside a 'circus' of both 
Allied and captured German aircraft flew to allow men to differentiate between types. 
Not surprisingly this noise got on the nerves of some men, doubtless feeling the tension. 
At least for the Brigade rifle companies they had the relative luxury of leaving their 
ships and using the quayside NAAFI, those already loaded on the LCT's had to sit it out 
in the Solent at the mercy of wind and sea. Then that afternoon of 5th June the men 
returned to their ships and were told that shortly they would be leaving. Around quarter 
past seven that evening the ships gradually formed a line and left harbour. 
Oordon Duffin, 2nd Glosters, was not a good sailor but had to go up on deck to 
watch although he found it cold and chilly. Men were lining the sides of the LCI waving 
and cheering. An officer appeared whom he did not know and asked Gordon his name 
and then introduced himself. The deck was stacked with 14-man composite (compo) 
ration boxes and the officer invited him to help himself. "I wasn't hungry. I said "do 
you like peaches?" ''No thank you," he said. I got out this 2lb tin of peaches from a box 
and ate them. Then as it was cold went below and went to sleep. ,,sJ 
Major Pat Barras, 2nd Essex, remembers it as: 
First a general stir, then the ships disentangled themselves and sailed sedately 
down Southampton Water, then into the more choppy water of the Solent. The 
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Isle of Wight was on the left. We saw a lot of RN large ships full of sailors 
lining the rails giving three cheers as each of our ships sfa5sed. This was 
inspiring and really dinned it into us the size of the operation. 
Ted Castle of 2nd Glosters equally remembers the scene as they sailed down the 
Solent at around 7 o'clock. "I remember us steaming out with warships on each side 
cheering us as we steamed out and we cheered them back. As we passed the Needles it 
started getting a bit choppy and overcast, some of the lads were violently seasick, I 
decided to stay on deck until later. "55 
The short ten-day period spent by 56th Brigade in the sealed camps is remarkable 
because it shows how well the Brigade had quickly settled down to the idea and 
practicalities of being an important part of the invasion force and the 50th Division plan. 
During interviews, the veterans of 56th Brigade do not appear to see this period as 
particularly special. This should not be surprising. Most were ordinary men, serving 
their country and prepared to follow orders. New insights are given by the South Wales 
Borderers interviews of this period, showing on the one side how the natural response of 
men to see their parents prior to sailing, perhaps for the last time, was dealt with by 
junior NCO's in a very humane way. On the other hand officers with so many things 
still to organise might not have had the time to think carefully about such issues. At one 
stage the South Wales Borderers Commanding Officer in one fire eating speech 
threatened deserters with hanging. 56 In fairness this should not be seen as a surprising 
response by a man in his position at such a time. 
Particularly for 56th Brigade, the sources show how near to the invasion many things 
were finalised and even many new soldiers brought into the battalions. Despite previous 
landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy it can be seen that the higher staff were unsure 
about the process and made changes to landing procedures up to the time the sealed 
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camps were entered. Finally the anecdotal evidence from the veterans of 56th Brigade 
brings to life a period prior to D-Day not often expanded on in the available literature. 
The invasion force was on its way. Many men remember being cheered in turn by 
each naval vessel as they passed and that they cheered back. According to many men 
the Brigade vessels left one behind the other in line, with the Brigadiers Pennant flying 
from the leading cmft. Once past the Needles though, the rough sea forced most to retire 
to the cramped conditions below and wait for the morrow. 
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Chapter Four. 
Smashing through the German defences and achieving objectives. 
D-Day to Midnight 7lh June 1944. 
This chapter will follow the progress of 56th Infantry Brigade as they proceed 
towards landing on Gold Beach. It will explore how the British plan became modified 
due to unexpected German resistance on Gold Beach during D-Day and the effect this 
had on the original 56th Brigade plan during the fust 48 hours of the invasion. 
During the night of 5th to 6th June 1944, Convoy G-3 was shepherded 
towards the Normandy coast through the swept channels. For the men of 56th 
Brigade being transported by the various types of craft, it was a rough night. Both 
the LCT and LCI (L) had a shallow draught and it felt to the men that they were 
slipping sideways as much as moving forward. Frank Rosier of 2nd Glosters felt that 
"The flat bottomed boats were all over the place. I have never felt so ill in all my 
life!"1 
On the LCI (L)'s carrymg the rifle compames of 56th Brigade the 
accommodation was cramped to say the least. Each landing craft was carrying 
around 200 men below deck, who had with them their webbing, packs, entrenching 
tools and weapons. The LCI (L) was 158 feet long and only 23 feet wide with an all 
welded steel hull. For armament they carried 4x20mm and 2x0.5inch Browning 
machine guns. The crew consisted of 3 officers and 21 men. and the ship could 
maintain around 16 knots. The accommodation for troops was arranged in three 
compartments with drop-down bunks. The normal exit to shore was from the top of 
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the deck via two gangways, 28 feet long, each side of the bow. The ships would 
beach in nearly 5 feet of water and the gangways extended forward, hopefully 
enabling the men to land in shallower water. It will be remembered that after the 
drownings during Exercise Fabius the plan was to tranship in deeper water to the 
smaller LCM allowing these to drop the men in shallower water. 
As British shipyards were fully extended the LCI (L) were built in the USA 
from a British sketch. When completed they were sailed unescorted to the UK, 
proving their seaworthiness. In British shipyards plastic armour was added around 
the conning tower and guns. The armament was light by US standards, but 
considered adequate by the Royal Navy. Because of crowding, their effective 
operational time when loaded was 48 hours. However they had a considerable 
range. The US LCI (L) used by 2nd South Wales Borderers were slightly larger, 
being a later model.2 
Some men managed to stay well despite the rough sea, while others became 
very seasick. Gordon Duffin and Ernie Partridge of 2nd Glosters were typical 
passengers: 
Well of course after eating the tinned fruit I woke up later at night and was violently 
sick. Ernie pipes up in the dark, "Are you all right kid? What did you do with your 
bully sandwich?" It's in me mess tin. "Can I have it?" he said. He managed to get 
down, find my bully sandwich and eat it! The engine noise altered then stopped 
"Ab we are going back!" They kept on saying that! There was row and noise all the 
time, blokes shouting and banging, ships firing and so on. All this had become 
normal on exercise. 3 
Issued with bags (Vomit), that quickly became full, the rudimentary toilets 
hanging over the stem were difficult to use in the rough seas. The smell and noise in 
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these cramped and enclosed spaces must have led to a very uncomfortable journey. 
The knowledge that if the craft was hit, there would be little chance of escape must 
also have made it a worrying journey. Maurice Wells of 2nd Glosters was on one 
ship that had a near escape: 
During the night there was this almighty scraping along the side of the ship. We all 
thought what the hell was that! "It's all right. It's only a mine!" If it bad gone off 
none of us would have survived. It was bloody rough on the ships. You got in 
wherever you could. It was very uncomfortable.4 
Some officers were quartered in the more comfortable surroundings of the 
ships officers' cabins in the conning tower. Self-heating cans of soup, usually 
described as tomato flavour, were given out and appear to have been enjoyed by all 
those who could keep the contents down. Many tins made it to shore for later use. 
They were thought to be something of a marvel. Also on the decks were stacks of 
extra rations to be taken ashore. Those men going on deck during the night noticed 
the lines of buoys that had been laid marking the channel swept free of sea mines. 
Men also describe the constant noise of aircraft flying over the convoy. As day 
broke they were allowed on deck and saw that the Normandy coast was in sight. 
On arrival in front of the French coast I was impressed by the bombardment from 
the Rocket Ships and HMS Ajax and also one of the Field Artillery Regiments 
going ashore firing from their landing cmft, as was an Infantry Battalions' 4.2inch 
Mortars. These last two were good for morale but probably quite inaccurate due to 
the bucking waves. The coast was wreathed in smoke and dust. I also saw the 
smaller LCA's making their way in. To our far right much heavier fire seemed to be 
occurring on Omaha beach. 5 
Some men of 56th Brigade were already on their way in. The Unit Landing 
Officers (ULO's) had loaded with their men and jeeps onto the LCT's of the assault 
brigades and landed with 69th and 231"1 Brigade first line vehicles, close behind the 
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initial assault. Peter Giggens, the 2nd Essex Mortar Platoon Sergeant, went ashore 
led by Captain Chell, with Titch Holden from the pioneer platoon and another 
signaller. They had ready-made boards on their jeep to put up, and their ammunition 
pouches were full of chalk to write on walls to sign the way to the forming up area. 
As they came in two sailors in front lowered the ramp, but the LCT hit a mine. This 
blew off the ramp and the two sailors and the first jeep disappeared. The LCT 
slewed around parallel to the shore. Titch Holden thought that if he could drive the 
jeep off as fast as he could he might clear the ship and be able to continue. Not 
surprisingly the jeep nose-dived and sunk. It was salvaged and rejoined later. They 
got off up to their chests in water, and waded ashore. They had of course lost all 
their direction boards and the chalk had got soaked and was useless. The noise was 
terrific with shelling and mortaring still hitting the beach. They managed to get off 
the beach and struggled to get up inland to Buhot. Titch stayed on the Beach under 
the control of the Beach Master. Reaching Buhot and identifying the RV spot, 
Captain Chell and the signaller went back to the beach to try and help the battalion 
and brief Colonel Higson when he landed. Peter remembers that although there 
were other soldiers about, he felt pretty lonely.6 
Sergeant Dick Phi lips, of 2nd South Wales Borderers HQ, landed with their 
Unit Landing Officer on Jig Beach with the 1"1 Hampshires assault battalion 
transport. There were the four of them including Dick, Captain Talmadge, a jeep 
driver and one other soldier to help with the battalion signs. 
The sea was quite rough; we had these wide bows that made it worse. I was still 
going up and down from the voyage. During the landing we saw these young chaps 
with the Africa Star lying in the surf I thought these poor buggers; they have been 
through North Africa. They didn't even get up on the sands you know, and I thought 
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that was terribly unfortunate. When we landed there was a lot of shelling and it was 
a bit hairy. I said to the driver to get behind that knocked out tank for protection, but 
we drove into the hole where a shell had exploded behind the tank and the jeep went 
down and we had to leave it. Captain Talrnadge and I grabbed hold of the battalion 
signs and took them towards the rendezvous area. As we were leaving the beach 
there was a chappie going up the bank and a shell exploded at his feet in the sand 
and we saw his body coming toward us in the air. We got away with this, and then 
there was a farmhouse surrounded by a high wall with double gates, and there was 
an elderly lady outside there and she was jumping up and down, clapping her hands 
as these fellows were leaving the beach.7 
Captain Talmadge and Sergeant Philips carried on marking the route. The 
shelling continued fairly heavily and at one stage a Spandau opened fire quite 
nearby and a section of British assault troops went down in a field of high corn 
while Dick Philips and Captain Talmadge were on the road to Buhot. Later they 
came across a car with four dead German officers in it. In one field near the RV at 
Buhot they saw many German bodies blown to bits, probably by naval gunfire. 
They had come ashore where they had expected and had little difficulty in locating 
the RV. Their exploit has been described in the 2nd Battalion South Wales 
Borderers History: 'The route had been marked in a most gallant way by Captain 
Talmadge and Sergeant Philips who landed with the assault wave and while there 
was still fighting on the beaches they penetrated half a mile inland' .8 
On Jig Beach DD Tanks were supposed to land first, but due to the poor sea 
state a decision was taken to launch the tanks closer inshore or direct off the landing 
craft. The effect of this was to make them late, and the first assault battalions landed 
without armoured support. Also some of the assault battalions on Jig Beach were 
not landed at their intended place. The Germans at La Riviere and Le 
Hamei/Asnelles proved tougher nuts to crack than supposed, particularly on the Jig 
Beach side of the landing, where the defenders of Le Hamel were from 352 
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Division. Partly the problem had been the low cloud base that caused the early 
bombing to miss these targets completely, as well as the improved defences at Le 
Hamel. 
A good description of the problems on Gold Beach that morning is provided 
by the Admimlty Battle Summary, showing how the obstacles, sea and weather 
state, meant that the sailors really had to work hard to get inshore. Because of the 
conditions it was decided to launch the DD tanks 'dryshod' off the LCT's: 
Also obstacle clearance was presenting much greater difficulties than expected. 
Obstacles were considembly thicker and heavier. The tide was higher than expected. 
The clearance teams landed first ashore and were virtually unsupported. H-Hour on 
Gold Beach was at 0725hrs. This village (Le Hamel) proved a very tough nut to 
crack and held out until 1600hrs at least. It caused the landing of 56 Brigade to be 
held up and repositioned. It cost the 191 Battalion Hampshire Regiment over 200 
casualties. The 75 tons of bombs planned to be dropped on the town were dropped 
3000 yards to the south on fields due to the low cloud cover. The Self-Propelled 
Artillery of 147 Field Regiment were to fire on it during the run in. Their 
navigational MTB and Control LCT fell astern due to the weather. They 
concentrated their fire with that of the regiment on their left and Le Hamel was not 
fired upon. Three destroyers engaged Le Hamel, but the low trajectory of their guns 
had little effect on the concrete bunkers and slit trenches. No calls for RN support 
came from the Hampshire's ashore due to the CO and 2i/c becoming early 
casualties. In the end a concentrated bombardment of the position took place by 
LCG, (Landing Cmft Gun), LCF (Landing Cmft Flak), and destroyers as well as the 
use of Petard firing tanks from land to demolish German positions.9 
This explains why 15181 and 56th Brigades were held up and had to circle at 
sea causing more seasickness to the waiting infantry. Despite the hold up to the rifle 
companies the LST's and LCT's carrying 56th Brigades vehicles seemed to have 
moved ashore on time as evidenced by Phi lip Maillou, 2nd Essex. He was put ashore 
with his 6-pounder anti-tank gun loaded onto a DUKW that carried them from their 
LST to Buhot. He remembers how rough it was and that as they approached shore 
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they could see the aircmft going in bombing and strafing and some Landing Craft 
firing rockets. 
About half a mile from the shore the Captain decides it was time to let us go and the 
ramps are put down. All the tankies and that shouted, "Good luck lads!" I was 
sitting right behind the driver and I said to him, "I hope this will float mate!" He 
replied "So do I, it's the first time it has been in the water! Never been in empty, let 
alone loaded!" The blokes are all shouting "Good Luck! Good Luck!" and there's 
all this stuff falling into the water, probably not picking us out, we, were too small a 
target We were going in there and just off shore we could see mortar bombs 
landing, which didn't make us feel too happy. We came out and up to turn right on 
the road to Ryes and Buhot. We landed about 11.30am. We had a map reference to 
make the rendezvous. There were some wounded and dead lying about there from 
the frrst wave, but we had been told not to stop for anything, just press on. There 
was thick acrid shell smoke. We thought it was gas at some time. When we got up 
to the RV the DUKW lads said "righto! We are going to leave you here. We said, 
"What do you mean? We haven't any transport!" Off comes the gun with a few 
rounds and we had the Bren gun. We had to stay there on our own for about an 
hour. There were bangs and crashes and bullets whistling. There was still fighting 
going on close by above Buhot. Then people started arriving, and the Carriers 
turned up. 10 
Philip does not remember bumping into Peter Giggens who was already 
there alone. Charles Benson from the 2nd Essex Carrier Platoon had different 
problems: 
I was on an LCT carrying only Essex vehicles. We were very lucky we had few 
casualties on that day. The taking of Le Hamel was not straightforward and we were 
landed in a different place than planned. Getting the Carriers off the beach was quite 
a job. We had to break the sea wall down with tools. When we got to drive onto the 
track there was an 18-inch drop and you had to be careful not to bury the nose. In 
actual fact we just had enough clearance to get onto the tmck and spin the Carrier 
around. Once we were onto the track and we were moving round the back of Le 
Hamel I could still see fighting going on. 11 
Both of the above landed nearer to Le Hamel than the rifle companies and 
clearly earlier. From their descriptions, it seems likely that both ended up on the 
Cabane des Douanes road leading via Les Roquettes to Buhot. The Beachmaster 
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had already closed the beach between Le Hamel and the Cabane des Douanes as the 
Gennans in Le Hamel could easily observe and fire on the area. The infantry had 
now been at sea circling for an extra three hours. Because of the situation at Le 
Hamel and the fact that La Riviere had not been finally cleared, General Graham in 
the HQ ship Bulolo, decided to send 15151 and 56th Brigades in at the centre of Gold 
beach at Le Hable de Heurtot. 
However there were added problems. The tide was now much higher than at 
the planned landing time, and the sea state was rough, causing a much higher tidal 
surge than expected and many more difficulties were to be encountered by the 
troops when they landed. This included the fact that now offloading onto the LCM's 
was not an option, due to the considerable losses by the smaller landing craft in the 
assault phase. Many of the LCM's had had to turn back in the rough seas and 
according to the Admiralty, landing craft losses on Gold Beach were 34 LCT's, 52 
LCA' s and 3 LCP (L )' s. Most of these were lost in the first wave of landing craft. 
Sailors operating the landing craft were reluctant to use the kedge anchors and many 
craft broached sideways in the surf filling with water and blocking parts of the 
beach to other landing craft. In spite of the brave work of the LCOCO, mines fixed 
to posts caused half of these landing craft casualties. 12 According to an Operational 
Research Report shortly after D-Day, the Gennans had placed nearly two and a half 
thousand obstacles across the Gold Beach landing areas. 13 
So now between 1200hrs and 1230hrs the rifle companys of 56th Brigade 
came ashore. It is worth considering the after action report of the 264th Canadian 
Flotilla which carried them to the beach: 
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At 0940 the LCI's had arrived at their waiting position off Jig Green. The tide was 
already falling when, at 1150, the Reserve Group Commander in HMS Albrighton 
ordered the LCI's to beach on Jig Red because the obstructions on Jig Green were 
almost impenetrable. They beached in precise flotilla formation, in line abreast, 
within five seconds of each other at 1159, nearly two hours after their scheduled 
time according to the operation plans. In the special case of LCI 255 carrying 
Brigadier EC Pepper and his staff with signals equipment, an LCM was allocated to 
facilitate the safe disembarkation of the Headquarters Unit; LCI 255 therefore did 
not beach. There was a heavy surf running, which piled up dangerously on the 
shallow beach across which the troops had to make their way. Although the distance 
from the LCI's to shore averaged only 12 feet and the depth of water at the ramps 
was less than 3 feet; the surf caused some of the troops to hesitate up to 15 minutes 
before disembarking. The delay made unbeaching more difficult, but there was 
hardly any firing by this time and it was not until after unbeaching that bullet holes 
were found in the super-structure of two of the craft. No casualties were suffered by 
army or navy personnel during the landing. 14 
Landing Craft 295, (The craft involved in the 2nd Essex drownings during 
Exercise. Fabius), damaged propellers in collision with an LCM and was also twice 
holed by obstructions. LCI 288 was damaged by beach obstructions and 288 and 
302 had ramps tom off by the surf. 302 and 310 had their kedges fouled by 
obstructions and the three heavier US landing craft were stranded until the next high 
water. The tide was already falling. Despite all these ills though, they had safely 
delivered two thousand men to their destination. In the Naval and Army documents 
there are discrepancies between times of landing, but these depend on whether the 
time is concerned with the moment the ship touched the shore, or the moment when 
all men from the ship were ashore. Certainly by 1230hrs all ships were unloaded. 
Again there are some discrepancies, but it is likely that the 2nd Glosters landed on 
the east of the flotilla, 2nd Essex in the middle and 2nd South Wales Borders to the 
west. The timings given in the Battalion War Diaries give 2nd Glosters as landing at 
1158hrs, 2nd South Wales Borderers at 1200hrs exactly, 56th Brigade HQ at 1215hrs 
and 2nd Essex at 1230. According to their War Diary the 2nd Glosters "quickly 
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cleared King Red beach area and advanced along the coast road. "15 The Brigadier 
and HQ Group went via the village of Meuvaines to Buhot, the 2nd South Wales 
Borders moved along the sandy beach towards Le Hamel, before moving to the 
coast road and Les Roquettes, and 2nd Essex similarly followed the planned 'Yellow 
Route' via Meuvaines. 
In 1944 the development of the modern coastal road had been abandoned. 
George Church of the 2nd Hertfordshire Battalion, Beach Group, reports that in June 
1944 it was a rough track used mainly for moving farm animals, but was driveable 
with care. Within a week of D-Day the Royal Engineers had established it as a 
proper carriageway. 16 The original coastal road bordering the shore had been lost in 
places to the sea, but parts can still be traced today. 
Syd Lee was the Brigadier's signaller, and his experience of landing in the 
LCM after being violently seasick was: 
We drove off the landing craft and had a dry landing in the jeep. I was sitting in the 
back with the 22 Set. As we drove off the beach I remember driving up this dirt 
track with the infantry plodding up either side. The Brigadier was driving at the 
time and I remember the infan~ were pushing bicycles and he ran into one of the 
bicycles as he was driving past! 1 
The various descriptions of the landing provided by the men of 56th Brigade 
give a slightly different emphasis on the landing than that of the Royal Canadian 
Naval report above. 2nd South Wales Borderers and some of the 2nd Glosters faced 
extreme difficulty when landing. 
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Bill Speake of the 2"d South Wales Borderers, as a man of reasonable height, 
describes how on leaving the US LCI he disappeared below water and managed to 
save himself only by pulling on the hawser rope to shore. This had been swum 
ashore by an RCN navy rating, and fixed by iron bars hammered into the sand on 
the beach. He went under a number of times, his equipment dragging him down as 
he struggled along the hawser. His abiding memory of this incident is that of the 
400 cigarettes he was carrying, only the 20 in a sealed tin in his helmet survived. 18 
Islwyn Edmunds of 2"d South Wales Borders explains that the men of B Company 
were expected to be a mobile force, so that as well as their 80lb packs they had to 
carry a collapsible bicycle. The CO Colonel Craddock led the way off down the 
narrow gangplanks into the sea with a "follow me". He was wearing his soft hat and 
carrying a swordstick and pistol as personal weapons. He disappeared under the sea. 
Following a little way back, Islwyn was sure he was drowning as he went under a 
number of times, but was saved by Lance Corporal Melvyn Jones picking him up 
and thrusting him forward. Islwyn lost his bicycle and rifle but there was a dump of 
cycles just off the beach and he had to pick another. He replaced his rifle by picking 
up one of many "laying around on the beach". 19 
Lieutenant Dennis Davis helps solve how a bicycle dump came to be on the 
beach. He was a Lieutenant in C Company 2nd South Wales Borders and not one of 
the cyclist Company. His platoon were one of the last off the American LCI (L) and 
he decided to put back on the large waterproof waders they had been issued with, as 
the tide had receded somewhat. Hence he landed ashore fairly dry. He recollects 
that he probably said, rather than ordered, his platoon something like "I am putting 
mine on, so you can if you like". He and his men carried bicycles ashore and put 
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them in a dump on the beach.20 The 2"d South Wales Borders Signals Officer, Sam 
Weaver, was festooned with all sorts; codebooks and frequencies in a haversack and 
held this over his head when entering the water. Colonel Craddock went first and 
Sam followed having a terrific struggle with water up to his chest and the 
waterproof anti-gas overtrousers filling up with water. Looking back he realised not 
a man had followed. One of his signallers Higgins said later, "We weren't going to 
follow you seeing you up to your neck!"21 
Meanwhile B Company 2nd Glosters had their own problems. Firstly Major 
Basil Stephens had to persuade the captain of his craft to get in closer. Some bad 
language ensued but as the Major was holding a sten gun he won the day. To be fair 
to the Navy man the ship was in his charge and any accident to the ship or men was 
his responsibility. Doubtless the view from the ship's bridge when running in and 
seeing so many craft foundered at the tide's edge had a sobering effect on the 
officers in command of the cmft. On the same cmft B Company Sergeant Fmnk 
Clarke was faced with a major problem. The portside gangway of the LCI had 
twisted on the way in by grounding. Frank wanted to get his men off the other 
gangway, but they were persuaded by some very blue language from the bridge to 
continue disembarking off the twisted gangway. 
At the bottom of the gangway there was a gap and Fmnk tried to lower 
himself gently into the sea, especially as he had no idea of its depth. Also as his 
platoon was the assault platoon, each was carrying a bicycle as well as the normal 
80lbs ofkit. He half jumped down and went up to his waist in water. His waterproof 
over trousers split and filled up and he dropped his bike and had to feel around the 
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bottom to retrieve it. Luckily while this unloading was taking place they were not 
under direct fire, only the odd shell landed in the sea pushing up geysers of water. 22 
Ted Castle, A Company 2 Glosters, only imagined he was in trouble: "Then 
we piled down this bloody gangway and I slipped into the surf and it came up to my 
chest and I thought I was drowning! When the Sergeant Major pulled me up it was 
only up to my knees!"23 Whereas Maurice Wells, 2nd Glosters had good reason to 
think it was the end: 
We came in to land off the sea; I went into a shell hole. All you could have seen was 
my tin helmet and PIAT above the water! With the anti louse (this was in fact an 
anti-gas preparation) powder and everything, it took three weeks to dry out 
properlv. With a PIAT and Sten gun and all my other kit I was pretty loaded 
down.2.r 
Emie Partridge, a quite tall soldier only just coped. When he got off into the water it 
was up to his chest. A Lance Corporal in front of him was only 5'2" tall. "I'm 
holding him up and got all my bloody gear on, B Company in the boat next to us 
had all their bicycles as well. Chaps on the beach shouting come on lads! Come on 
Glosters! Follow this path."25 While Gordon Duffin, also of A Company 200 
Glosters, recounts that in retrospect the scene held a certain amount of comedy: 
Then a sailor type would shout 300yards! 200yards! IOOyards! Prepare to beach! 
Down door! We were thrown forward as the crew had promised us a dry landing. 
The bad sign when you got up top was if the chains holding the ramp were tight. 
They were! That meant it was deep water and we have to jump in off the ramp, I do 
and weighed down go under then ~nd up, so I am completely soaked. To give us a 
dry landing we had these waterproof trousers tied above our waist with string. If the 
string got wet you couldn't undo the bow. So I had a sheath knife ready on top of 
my pack. As the water gets shallower my legs get heavier. So I get my knife out and 
slit open the legs to let the water out. The officer says, "Do mine Duffin" so I had to 
go and slit his then another and another. So I did a few expecting to get shot 
hanging about. 26 
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By this time it is probable that all the forward elements of 56th Brigade were 
ashore, the rifle companies, Battalion HQs and support company Carriers. The 
senior officers had scanned their maps for confirmation of their exact location as 
they had been landed as much as a mile and a half away from the planned beaching 
point. The men were hustled off the beach as quickly as possible following the few 
established tracks, or the flailed routes made by the mine clearing tanks. With the 
beach still being sporadically shelled and mortared and being the spot where the 
expected counter-attack would leave troops at their most vulnerable, men were 
moved inland as fast as possible. 
It was during this part of the assault, as explained by Tony Mansi, 2nd Essex, that 
men who had not been in action before were shown their first graphic examples of 
the meaning of war: 
Getting onto the beach I noticed that there was a photographer taking pictures of our 
landing. From the beach up onto the road a flail tank beat the ground exploding 
mines and engineers put iron stakes into the ground and put white tape on them to 
mark a safe pathway to get up onto the road. Once we got onto the road there was a 
lot of firing going on. When we looked further down the beach we could see houses. 
Also there were German prisoners being taken down to the beach and dead bodies 
lying about. Sergeant Chandler being an old soldier made everybody stop and look 
at these dead German soldiers. There were chaps there who had their stomachs 
blown out and very gruesome to look at. It was the first time many had seen 
anything like this. He sai?i "Come on, I want you to have a look at these, as you 
will see a lot more of this". 7 
2nd Glosters, A Company, moved up a track just east of Le Hable de Heurtot. 
At its top had been one of the smaller German positions, Wiederstandnester 35a, its 
defenders obviously killed in another graphic illustration offirepower: 
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We moved inland and were amazed that the Germans hadn't fired at us, but we had 
landed further down. As we came off the ship I remember seeing some casualties. 
About three badly wounded Devons huddling up under a groundsheet. Then we 
went up this sandy lane. At the top of the track we saw Germans hanging in trees 
having been blown out by our guns. There was not a mark on them they had been 
blasted uf into the trees. Some of our chaps opened fire on them thinking they were 
snipers.2 
Experienced soldiers from 1940, who had spent much time with the 
battalions in the UK, soon reacted with second nature to danger. The yolinger and 
inexperienced men were lucky to have them near in the first few actions. Bill 
Robinson was a 2nd Glosters driver who landed with the rifle companies and picked 
up his transport later. He remembers that the track up from the beach was only wide 
enough for a half-track. They dumped their inflated Mae Wests at the side of the 
track. When the half-tracks went by they had to stand on the bank by the side. The 
half-tracks ran over the Mae Wests and the noise they made when they burst 
frightened the life out of them! 
On D-day I was fortunate in one respect that I had been under fire and knew what to 
expect, most others hadn't. So when we got to the top of the track we were in open 
country and the grass was really high. We were on top going down and from the left 
a shell whistled down and there was a puff of smoke where it hit. It was a smoke 
marker. Some of the eight or so with me said, "What was that?" I told them that 
another one would be coming in a minute on the other side and we should get down 
and wait. While we were looking the Germans shelled the area and hit a couple of 
Bren Carriers. If we had gone on we would have been in it. This was only about half 
a mile from the beach. 29 
From the top of the rise, men looked back and felt that they could walk back 
to England on the number of ships they could see. Perhaps Gordon Duffm was in 
the area being hit in the action described above: 
Down comes about twenty shells or mortar bombs right across our track. So we all 
get down. The Sergeant Major, who had been at Dunkirk, shouted, "Take cover, but 
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get ready to move when I tell you and bloody well move!" Then another load came 
down. We thought, "we can't move through this lot." But he knew better. Almost 
before the noise had stopped, he shouted, "Run, move your bloody selves, follow 
me!" So we all got up and followed him. He knew enough to get up and move over 
this little crossroad before they had reloaded. Jerry still shelled the crossroad behind 
us.lo 
The Brigade moved along the coast and inland to Buhot. As late as 1400hrs 
1st Dorsets were still fighting for control of the area around Buhot and captured a 
company of German pioneers, including horse transport, there. It was a slow 
process for the rifle companies from 561h Brigade of stopping and starting, with 
sections of ten men spread out thirty yards between each section. The roads were 
covered in debris, not only from abandoned equipment, but civilian telephone lines 
were down and caused problems for bicycle and jeep alike. At the start of the move 
they were under fue from both the Meuvaines Ridge and the opposite hillside above 
Buhot and Ryes. Frank Dilworth gives a good account of the confusion from a 
Dispatch Rider's point of view: 
The rest of the day was very confusing, not sure where you were. I went firstly with 
the South Wales Borderers HQ, then had to find the Brigade Tactical HQ. They had 
an ACV lorry as an armoured office, which were very hard to handle, just a big steel 
box on four wheels. I found them in the end. Linemen were running out telephone 
lines, and then they were broken and they had to do it again.31 
The units gradually turned up at Buhot and the War Diary of 2nd Glosters 
report that before 1600hrs Marine Commandos finally cleared the area, enabling the 
Brigade to assemble in the orchards south of Buhot. At least one Brigade signaller 
was involved with the Commandos in clearing this area, joining them and becoming 
useful, when he discovered on landing that his signal set was smashed with 
shrapnel. In the 2nd South Wales Borders assembly area were about half a dozen 
horses and cows killed by shellfue and the scene and smell was disgusting. By 
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1735hrs the village of Ryes was reported clear of enemy by 231 81 Brigade and at 
1745hrs Brigadier Pepper ordered the Brigade to advance as prearranged. The 2nd 
South Wales Borderers advancing via Ryes and La Rosiere to Vaux-sur-Aure and 
2nd Essex to St. Sulpice via Ryes. 2nd Glosters stood firm as Brigade reserve with 
Brigade HQ. By 1930hrs Ryes and La Rosiere were reached and the 2nd Essex and 
2nd South Wales Borderers were moving into unknown enemy territory. Prisoners 
captured at Ryes proved a surprise, for they were members of I Battalion 916 
Grenadier Regiment from the 352nd Infantry Division, the unit not picked up by 
Allied intelligence. Still sniping was being carried on in the rear areas and as the 
forward units advanced they ran into trouble, as Tony Mansi, 2nd Essex, recalls: 
We were split up into platoons and we were the first leading our company. On the 
open ground we kept quite close to the tank for protection really. As we got into 
more dense countryside with hedges and where there were copses and trees, the tank 
commander asked us to go in front to scout out if there were any German 88mm 
guns around. Some places we stopped when we came under sniper fire. Then the 
platoon officer had a couple of our own snipers sent forward to try and spot them. 
They were mainly up in trees. They held us up for quite some time. At one place 
there was a small village and I remember seeing this long brick wall and of course 
we couldn't see over this wall. Sergeant Chandler said, "Right over you go! When 
you get to the other side start giving us covering fire." When we got over the wall 
there was nothing but green fields and trees in the distance. He shouted for covering 
fire and as it was our first day in action lads were just firing off their weapons into 
an area to see if we could attract fire back. That's how it went the rest of the day 
until finally we arrived at St. Sulpice where we stayed for the night. I don't think we 
felt frightened it was just the unexpected, not knowing what was in front of you. 32 
2nd South Wales Borderers met more determined resistance and one of their 
objectives on the way to Vaux-sur-Aure was the German Radio Direction Finding 
(RDF) station near Pouligny. The leading Company came under Spandau fire just 
past La Rosiere. Captain Josh Wickert, firing from the hip in the lead Carrier, 
promptly knocked out the German post. The RDF Station gave some brief 
resistance, but the Germans set fire to it and abandoned it as D Company attacked. 
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In the gathering darkness the exploding ammunition from the RDF Station lit up the 
sky. Earlier in the action a 2nd South Wales Borders Carrier had blown up on a mine 
in the verge. After this Major Peter Martin, who was leading the forward party, was 
talking to a Forward Observation Officer (FOO) in a tank. As the tank moved, it set 
off another mine in the border of the road. Peter Martin caught the full blast in the 
stomach and was badly wounded. A stretcher carrying jeep immediately evacuated 
him.33 By 2350hrs the 2nd South Wales Borderers forward party were able to report 
the capture of the bridge at Vaux-sur-Aure and they held it until the main body 
arrived. During the night "Bn established defensive locality Vaux-sur-Aure. Active 
patrolling by enemy during the night twelve prisoners taken". 34 
In fact 2nd South Wales Borderers were one of the units of the whole British 
invasion force who advanced furthest on D-Day. They had lost four men killed, two 
by mortar fire on the way to Buhot, Sergeant Reynolds and Private Price and two 
from sniper fire, Privates Massey and Parr. Ivor Parr was killed in the locality of 
Magny and initially a local French family buried his body. Later as things calmed 
down he was re-interred by locals at the church ofMagny, where his grave remains 
today. The other three are buried at Bayeux. The Battalion also had about twenty 
other men wounded. 
After the overnight crossing of the Channel, and a day spent keyed up or on 
the move, carrying a heavy load, and many of them under fire for the first time, the 
men must have been very tired. Dennis Davis remembers that upon reaching Vaux-
sur-Aure, he counted about ten Panzerfaust anti-tank rockets abandoned around the 
bridge, then had to lead a quick patrol into the woods. They did not find any 
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Germans, but did come across German horse lines including wagons from a nearby 
abandoned 1 05mm gun emplacement. In one wagon Dennis shot the padlock off a 
locker and liberated two bottles of Benedictine. Returning to his slit trench near the 
bridge, Dennis fell asleep sitting up cleaning his Sten gun. 35 Nick Somerville 
remembers feeling that they had been extremely lucky, and was also very concerned 
at the non-appearance of US units that 2nd South Wales Borderers were supposed to 
link with. Lieutenant Nick Somerville had been very lucky himself, as twice during 
the day, the man behind him had been killed.36 Private Bill Evans remembers that 
the very narrow roads had high banks. When they stopped he simply got in a hollow 
covered by a low tree and improved his position by breaking the branches down to 
cover him. 37 At one stage during the night two of the South Wales Borders 
Companies exchanged fire, luckily without harm being done. Sergeant Dick Phillips 
of the Intelligence Section provides this picture of his first night in Normandy: 
At Vaux we were in a farmyard and the little Padre, who was about five foot tall, 
was soaked to the skin. There was a lot of firing going on between two of our own 
companies, but there was also an attack. We were quite safe inside the actual farm. 
This firing had been going on between the two companies and then this lot 
(Germans) came with automatic weapons, but we were safe and sound where we 
were. Probably they came from the west. They came in, did a quick burst and 
withdrew.38 
The 2nd Essex War Diary reports that by 2130hrs the forward body had 
secured the St. Sulpice crossroad and the rest of the battalion moved in. Civilian 
sources said that the Germans had left hours earlier and they had probably left 
Bayeux as well. During the night with tanks of the Sherwood Rangers for support, 
patrols 'felt' towards Bayeux and the anti-tank ditch to the north west of the town 
but returned after resistance was encountered. The War Diary reports only four men 
wounded on 6th June. Phillip Maillou, reunited with the Carrier for his six-pounder 
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anti-tank gun, had to set up ready at St. Sulpice in case the expected counter-attack 
developed: 
We run into St. Sulpice, We went into the fields on the right. We were getting into 
Bocage COUJltry. We sighted the guns to cover the road and a bit of the village in 
case they came at us. We pulled about twenty yards off the road and had to cut 
down some of the hedgerow to get a field of fire. We were all chopping away. We 
heard a bit of firing away to our left. A German motorcycle and sidecar came down 
the road and the Vickers (Medium Machine Guns, 200 Cheshires supporting 56th 
Brigade.) opened up and got them. It shows you how close everything was to have 
the Vickers up with the Battalion. A little later a staff car came up and they copped 
it as well. I think they were German War Correspondents. We spent the night in the 
ditch there. Next morning one of the older members of the gun crew was sent back. 
Probably aged about 35, he looked an old man to those of us aged 18! His knee was 
all swollen and that was the last we saw ofhim.39 
Major Pat Barrass, Officer Commanding C Company, 2nd Essex, had had a 
busy day. That evening he remembers that: 
As dusk was falling you could see the spires of Bayeux beguiling in its closeness. 
Junkers 88 were taking off from Carpiquet near Caen and turning over our position 
to go and bomb the shipping. If you had a long stick you could touch them they 
were so low. Later you could see the AA fire in the sky. There was background 
noise, but quiet where we were so I caught up on some sleep. The nights were short. 
'Stand to' was before dawn.40 
Back at Buhot at 1940hrs, Brigadier Pepper decided to move forward to 
Magny with Brigade HQ and 2nd Glosters. On the way 2nd Glosters ran into German 
opposition and took 31 prisoners and had four men wounded. They arrived at 
Magny near midnight and dug in around the church. Brigade HQ was established in 
a farm to the rear. Patrolling was carried out and a troop of 105mm guns was 
captured. Brigadier Pepper had concluded that as it was so late, he did not wish to 
get his battalions tangled up street fighting in Bayeux, so he decided to send them in 
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the morning. What the Brigadier did not know was that there were hardly any 
Germans left in Bayeux since much earlier in the day. 
Starting at 0400hrs that morning Obersturmfuhrer Peter Hansmann of 12th 
SS (Hitler Jugend) Panzer Division, with two armoured cars, had carried out a long 
reconnaissance from 12th SS HQ at Chateau le Quesnay via Caen and Bayeux to 
Magny and St. Sulpice to report by wireless on the situation. At Bayeux he found: 
Older soldiers who could have been our fathers were standing at the garden fences 
talking with the civilians. The closer we came to the centre of town, the larger grew 
the crowd of people. There were supply vehicles, VW-Kubels, motorcycles, 
uniforms of all the different services, only the Kriegsmarine were missing. 41 
He reported that the military police were trying to restore some order and 
was told that artillery had already fallen into the town. They could hear heavy 
fighting to the north. Travelling carefully to Magny, they observed and reported 
from here at 0745hrs the landings, and stayed long enough to see most coastal 
defences finally suppressed. At this time British infantry and tanks were advancing 
onl{three kilometres from them. Realising 12th SS was 100 kilometres away, 
Hansmann knew there was little hope of relief from Bayeux as, "Those we had seen 
there were mostly members of the national labour service and administrators".42 
They may have been observed as they watched the landings as they only just 
escaped a salvo of naval gunfire falling around them. They then returned to HQ via 
Ryes, Bazenville, and Creully. Finally having to travel south of Caen to get back, 
shocked by the size and force of the allied landing and the impotence ofthe German 
Army to repel it. 
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In fact on the morning of D-Day the best hope of reinforcement for the 
Germans on Gold Beach was Battle Group Meyer of 352 Division. This force was 
made up of two infantry and a reconnaissance battalion and included self-propelled 
guns, infantry gun and anti-tank companys. However by 0530hrs on 6th June this 
group was travelling from its positions south and east of Bayeux in the opposite 
direction, towards the American parachute drop zones on the Contentin Peninsular. 
Too late the German commanders ordered its return and concentration against the 
British landing on Gold Beach. Short of an infantry battalion, sent to Omaha Beach, 
it did not return until late in the afternoon. Only some elements were in action by 
1600hrs, although at 1630hrs they did capture Brigadier Senior of 151 81 Brigade at 
Bazenville, just over two kilometres south east of Ryes. He later escaped, 
wounded.43 
Despite the decision to hold fast, and being behind the forward two 
battalions, 2nd Glosters were not to have a peaceful night. A number of Germans in 
Magny had been lying low and now under cover of darkness tried to get away. A 
few ran past the Battalion HQ where Sergeant Davis of the Pioneer Corps shot one 
with his sten gun, thus winning the £5 for the first person to bring down one of the 
enemy. Then Lieutenant Tucker, aB Company Platoon officer, was walking along 
the road near the slit trenches by the church, and started to engage a figure in 
conversation in the gloom thinking it was his own men. Realising suddenly it was a 
group of Germans; he fired on them at the same moment as they fired at him. Both 
missed, and the Germans ran for the hedge across the road and up some steps cut in 
a bank. The whole platoon blazed away but missed. Sergeant Frank Clarke was 
particularly annoyed, as this lack of fire discipline had soldiers firing over their 
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mates in front, putting them in danger. Later Lt. Tucker was ordered to take two 
men and find the 2nd South Wales Borderers and check they were at Vaux-sur-Aure. 
Arriving at the 2nd South Wales Borderers outposts on bicycles they were 
challenged, a grenade quickly followed and all three were wounded.44 
This meant Sergeant Frank Clarke became platoon commander, possibly the 
ftrst in the Brigade to have to do so. Later, due to heavy officer casualties, sergeants 
and corporals would command many platoons. As with the other battalions the night 
was spent dug in, a genuine expectation was a major counter-attack and clearly 
there could be German troops anywhere. Some German soldiers were lying quietly 
among them. As Private Dufftn came back to his Company after a few hours spent 
in a forward position, four Germans - a whole Spandau team - jumped out of a 
hedge with their hands up. Next a sniper in the Church tower fired on the men 
below. Some of his bullets disturbed Tony Atcherley in the Brigade ACV signals 
truck as he was contemplating his 19th birthday. Luckily the armoured sides of the 
vehicle protected Atcherley. Frank Rosier on the orders ofLt Nordbruck opened fire 
with a Bren gun on the church tower, a tank trained its gun on the tower and the 
sniper eventually gave up. The bullet splashes on the church tower can still be 
seen.
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Brigadier Pepper now decided to move on Bayeux. First 2nd Essex were to 
move, going east and south of Bayeux centre. 2nd Glosters would advance on a line 
approximately parallel and half a kilometre to the west, to take the central part of 
the town. 2nd South Wales Borderers would leave a force holding the bridge at 
Vaux-sur-Aure and advance west towards the small village and chateau at Sully. 
138 
Still no contact had been made with the Americans. 2nd Essex and 2nd Glosters 
encountered little difficulty. Although there was some sniping most Germans who 
were still in Bayeux melted away. The Sherwood Rangers troop of tanks supporting 
2nd Essex added muscle to deal with any sniping. Initially the town seemed deserted 
and deathly quiet as the leading 2nd Essex men passed through, but soon French 
people thronged the streets. There was some firing around the railway station and 
German mortar fire, but the hold up was only brief. Once the progress of 2nd Essex 
was clear, 2nd Glosters entered the central part of the town and pushed on to the 
Cathedral square, being mobbed as they proceeded. Both battalions lost a Carrier on 
the way in due to mines. Arthur Dyer, a Lance Corporal Brigade signaller attached 
to 2"d Essex, explains what happened in his 'illegally' kept personal diary: 
Moved off about 0830hrs to follow Carrier in our Ml4 (Armoured half-track radio 
vehicle). Carrier went ahead out of view; we went along and pulled up to negotiate 
trip wire across road. This done we again moved forward speeding and ran into a lot 
of bumps in the road. George (the driver) steered his way through the maze just in 
case they were mines. By a miracle we missed every one. A Carrier behind us hit 
one and it turns out they were mines. The Signals officer was seriously hurt. We had 
gone ahead looking for the leading Carrier and stopped short of a cotner and sent 
the DR to investigate, he returned immediately saying there were Jerries around the 
corner. We had taken the wrong road and arrived in Bayeux before our troops.46 
They managed to turn round and returned to find the 2nd Essex Signals 
Officer. Here they waited for some time before proceeding. The Signals Officer, 
Captain Heam, had survived though badly wounded. His excellent written account 
describes following the Ml4, which went out of sight. Captain Hearn had an 
increasing premonition that something was wrong and had the Carrier slow down to 
check the map. As they turned a corner they hit a mine that blew off the Carrier 
track with a "shattering explosion.'"'7 The driver and signaller in the back climbed 
out and ran for cover, Captain Hearn found he could not move and his leg was badly 
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injured. In fact it is likely that he was saved from further harm by following orders 
and previously lining the floor of the Carrier with filled sandbags against such an 
event. He put the handbrake on and switched off the ignition. Everything was quiet 
and he called for help. An old Frenchman appeared and had a long conversation 
with him. Then his sergeant turned up, followed by the Medical Officer. He was 
removed from the Carrier by which time the M14 had returned. From his stretcher 
he could see the Carrier had a smashed track and sprocket and a large hole in its 
side. He could also see two mines, which the Carrier was resting against when the 
explosion threw it across the road and saw two more laying on the road within 
touching distance. He was safely evacuated to the UK. 
On the way to Bayeux 2nd Glosters also lost a Carrier in similar 
circumstances. Moving forward to investigate the anti-tank ditch it blew up with 
another shattering roar, on a Teller Mine, and the shocked crew staggered away as it 
burst into flames. A double row of mines was unearthed to clear the road and a 
bulldozer pushed the remains of the Carrier into the anti-tank ditch.48 
But by l230hrs the 2nd Glosters were in the centre of the town and were 
caught up in something of a very large party. However there was still the odd 
German at large, and the following description of just one small action in the town 
gives a good idea of events. Sergeant Frank Clarke and his platoon had to break 
away from the festivities as they received information from a Frenchman that there 
were some Germans in a house near the Cathedral. A high wall with a bolted gate 
surrounded the house and Frank got two large privates from Bristol to give him a 
leg up, so he could peer over the wall. The men were overly enthusiastic and shot 
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Frank over the wall, were he fell into a large rhododendron bush. Taking cover by 
the bush, Frank observed the house, noticed a large window at ground floor level 
and a door and what, in the sunlight, appeared to be sandbags with a machine gun 
barrel poking above. Quickly moving to unbolt the door in the garden wall, he let 
half the platoon into the courtyard. A Lance/Sgt. was sent to cover the back and 
Frank entered by the unlocked front door, the two Bristol lads by the window, 
which they shot out. The house appeared empty including being bare of furniture. A 
check was made upstairs with nothing found. As they were leaving Frank noticed a 
low doorway leading down to a cellar. He got the Bren gunner to start at one end of 
the room and slowly fire down through the floorboards. This produced a lot of 
shouting from below and ten Germans came up to surrender. Lining them up outside 
by the garden wall, a large number of French people appeared and began to get very 
ugly with the prisoners. Only by the threatening use of their weapons did the 
Glosters get the prisoners away for escort to the beach with only the odd black eye 
and kicked backside. Afterwards Sergeant Clarke realised he had not searched the 
prisoners or checked the cellar.49 
The report in 56th Brigade War Diary, shows that by 1800 hrs, as planned, 
2nd Glosters completed clearing the centre of Bayeux and moved through to the 
southern outskirts of the town reporting the railway bridge on the St. Lo road as 
destroyed 2nd Essex had moved through and around Bayeux and both battalions 
were well established on the high ground south west of Bayeux, between St. Loup 
Hors, (2nd Glosters) and Montmirel, (2nd Essex) with the valley of the River Aure to 
their east. They were thus in a position to block any counter-attack from the south or 
west. It is an interesting point that the War Diaries of 2nd Glosters and 56th Brigade 
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disagree slightly as to the exact location of Battalion HQ and the rifle companies on 
this evening, although in a broad sense the units were located as described above. It 
may be that the Diaries were written at different times of the evening and positions! 
adjustments were made later. 50 
Meanwhile 2nd South Wales Borderers were out on the extreme right flank 
of the British Army and advancing to contact. After leaving a six-pounder anti-tank 
gun and rearguard of one platoon of A Company to cover the bridge at Vaux-sur-
Aure, they moved to the farm at Le Parquet and sent patrols into Bayeux. The 
personal diary of the Intelligence Officer gives a broad but compelling picture of 
events: "We moved at 0430hrs to get onto the high ground NW of Bayeux. We 
arrived to find the whole area full of snipers in the orchards. They were very well 
camouflaged and most were up trees. The battle developed into section stalks in the 
orchards.'.s1 Bill Speake of C Company was directly involved in events to get one 
sniper who had shot and wounded his Company Officer, Major Gillespie. Gillespie 
was passing a gate into a small orchard when he was shot and wounded. The cry 
went up for company snipers and Bill and Jarman, the two Company snipers, were 
briefed to get into the orchard and get the German sniper. Bill cmwled up the lane 
and carefully through the hedge into the field. He then crawled and rolled into a 
good vantage point in the field. Satisfied he had got there unobserved, he cut a stick 
into a Y shape. He had just rested his leather bound sniper scope onto the Y, when a 
great bang deafened him and the scope flew up in the air and came down on the 
back of his helmet. Bill gmbbed the scope and exited the orchard pretty quickly. 
The scope had a bullet score down the side. Bill had escaped death by inches. 
Returning to Company HQ he found Jarman already there. They suggested that a 
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Bren Gun Carrier and two Brens taken into the field would sort the sniper out and 
this was thought to be a good idea. By taking out the tops of the trees with the Bren 
guns, the Carrier crew killed the Gennan. He was found to be attached to the tree by 
his belt.52 
Meanwhile, (passing the above action on the way), Lt. Davis had been 
ordered to carry out a reconnaissance with four men into Bayeux, where he 
established at the outskirts of the town that the Gennans bad gone. He explored a 
few roads back and set about returning. When at a cemetery on the edge of Bayeux, 
they were forced to hastily take cover as a trigger happy Bren gunner, probably 
from 2nd Glosters, opened fire and bullets ricocheted off the tombstones. Moving on 
they were fired on from the direction of Sully Chateau. A French fanner was 
working apparently unconcernedly in the next field moving his cow with its peg 
from one area of grass to another. As Dennis explains "the Bocage was so dense 
that just moving into the next small field made you invisible to the enemy."53 
2nd South Wales Borderers also had to deal with the Gennans at Sully and 
capture bridges there and at Vaucelles further south. Major Dauncey with A 
Company were sent into action. However as well as having to carefully move 
through sniper-infested territory, they discovered that Sully was strongly held, and 
after a sharp firefight withdrew to the Battalion finn base around Le Parquet 
Overall on this second day of invasion the Brigade had reacted well. The 
first major French town across the whole invasion front, Bayeux, bad been captured 
with very little damage or casualties. The area of the 50th Division bridgehead had 
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been expanded and consolidated. A great worry was that still there was no contact 
or junction with the Americans from Omaha Beach, and it was obvious that the 
German Army were still in force on the right flank. The movements of all three 
battalions had been difficult. Initially 2nd Essex and 2nd Glosters advanced not 
knowing how much opposition lay ahead, through roads sometimes heavily mined. 
2nd South Wales Borderers had moved into, and taken, a large area of difficult 
Bocage type countryside, apparently infested with snipers. By that evening a 
number of German snipers had been killed and a dozen captured. 
Major LF Ellis on Page 210 of the official history- Victory in the West-
has criticised the speed of the advance of 56th Infantry Brigade on D-Day. On pages 
212 and 213 he also levels similar criticism against 50th Infantry Division as a 
whole. The fact that the Germans were fighting from well-prepared emplacements 
of concrete shelters and reinforced buildings on Gold Beach must be taken into 
account. The main aerial bombardment was dropped wide, and therefore did not 
touch the two most heavily armed positions at either end of the landing area. These 
both held heavy anti-tank guns that covered the length of the landing beach. The 
tough German resistance caused heavy casualties to the assaulting brigades. As well 
as the bravery of the men, the use of specialist armour was an important reason for 
the success of the assault. More than one beach pillbox position was neutralised by 
a petard-firing tank. Even so many tanks were lost to bogging down or hits from the 
German guns. Once ashore the soldiers pushed into the unknown against prepared 
positions, both on the ridges lining either side of the broad valley, and in the few 
villages along its length. Snipers and individual Spandau teams could hold up a 
whole battalion until they were dealt with. Also there was an expectation of strong 
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counter attack. Even by the evening of the 7th June commanding officers were 
awaiting a German onslaught. 
They were not helped by the misreporting that that Panzers were speeding to 
the scene, or on the other hand wildly optimistic reports that had, for example, 56th 
Brigade War Diary reporting Caen being taken by 3'd British Division at JOOOhrs on 
7th June. There is also very clear evidence that although some of the German coastal 
units were weak or of mixed value, all four of the British infantry brigades landed 
on Gold Beach, advanced against Germans soldiers not afraid to fight individually 
and in small teams whatever the cost. Although universally described as snipers, it 
is not logical that so many snipers existed in the German Army. They must have 
been ordinary trained and determined soldiers, prepared to stand and fight against 
overwhelming odds, in a contest which usually ended in their death or capture. 
Despite the advance of all Gold Beach infantry and armour on 6th and 7th 
June 1944, some German soldiers were left roaming almost at will in the rear areas 
between the British forward positions and the landing beaches. For example the 
War Diary for 1"1 Hampshires reports for the morning of 7th June that a number of 
snipers were reported in the area of Buhot. A patrol of 4 jeeps was sent to winkle 
them out. As late as lOth June, 6th Border Regiment of 10 Beach Group were 
reporting on the prisoner of war cage situated on their beach: "A party of P.W. in 
LE HAMEL was 210 strong one evening and 232 strong next morning; all Germans 
wishing to join 10 Beach Gp must send written application to the Adjutant." Despite 
the jovial nature of the report, it is not known what these 22 German soldiers were 
doing for the three days they were at liberty in the area. 54 Whatever was going on 
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behind them though, for the men of 56th Brigade, from glh June 1944, the fight 
against the enemy was going to get distinctly tougher. 
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Chapter Five. 
Fighting in the Bocage. Chateau Sully to Tilly-sur-Seulles. 
June 81b to June 201b 1944. 
By the morning of 8th June, British forces landing on Gold Beach had a well-
established bridgehead from the coast to three kilometres southwest of Bayeux. 231 81 
Brigade had taken Arromanches, the Longues battery and controlled the ground to 
Bayeux. 47 Commando had extended the British occupied area as far west as Port-en-
Bessin on the coast. To the southeast and east of Bayeux 151 '1 and 69th Brigades held 
the ground and had linked with Canadian forces. 56th Brigade held the flanks southwest 
and west of Bayeux. Meanwhile the first units of 7th Armoured Division were landing 
and by lOth June, 49th Infantry Division was to land. Many men and much material were 
landed directly on the beach, and the Mulberry Harbour at Arromanches was under 
construction. Despite this the rear areas remained far from secure. The second line of 
transport for 56th Brigade came ashore from D+ 1. Even at this stage their landing and 
journey inland was often far from straightforward. Landings were already 12 to 24 
hours behind schedule. This was due to the German resistance at Le Hamel and La 
Riviere, and the increasingly poor weather in the Channel. This weather eventually 
culminated in a three-day storm from 19th June, totally wrecking the US Mulberry 
harbour and badly damaging the British Mulberry harbour at Arromanches. 'No such 
June storm had been known in the Channel for over forty years.' 1 This continuing poor 
weather seriously impeded the allied build up in Normandy and affected the plans for 
advancing out of the bridgehead. Appendix Six on page 289 is useful in showing where 
the actions south of Bayeux described in this chapter took place. 
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Syd Hampton, a driver with 2nd Glosters, described how they were loaded onto 
the top deck of LST 519, an American LST. All the vehicles had large white stars 
across their width for identification, and a Sphinx badge on a yellow background 
identifying them as 56th Brigade vehicles. "We didn't carry the TT sign, as we were an 
Independent Brigade. We took all the top deck up with Gloster vehicles, while the tank 
deck was loaded with Jerry cans of petrol. We thought if this gets bombed there will be 
no swimming away!"2 They were unloaded m1to a Rhino ferry, three lorries abreast and 
six deep, off Gold Beach in the early morning of D+ I. They observed cruisers and 
destroyers still bombarding targets inland. Then the engines of the ferry broke down and 
they drifted for three hours before it was repaired. 
We came up by a merchant ship landed high and dry, and Jerry bombed this, and 
you could see men running about on deck with hoses. I had never seen cannon 
shells before, and it was like a line of torches going along. I can tell you my 
knees were knocking and I couldn't do anything about it! We eventually hit the 
beach broadside on. I was about third off and turned right, while the others, for 
some reason, turned left. Everything in the back was wrapped in tarpaper for 
waterproofing. We eventually got off the beach and ended up in a field that 
night. Jerry seemed to be bombing everywhere.3 
They had harboured in a field near Courseulles in the Canadian sector. Next 
morning, as it got light, they got going and drove through the adjacent field, observing 
too late the Achtung Minen signs and some Canadian lorries already blown up. Syd and 
two other lorries carried on. Passing some infantry, and driving quite fast, they carried 
on until soon they were stopped by French people shouting and pointing, "Les Boches, 
Les Boches!" So they turned round and went back to the infantry and stopped to talk to 
the officer. 
This Lieutenant said, "I thought you knew something I didn't know! We have 
been sent to clear this area!" So we carried on and found a few more wagons, the 
Sergeant Major was there organising it. We pulled off so they could get some 
tanks past. The bloke behind me went sky high on a mine. All the side of his cab 
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was gone; his second driver was blown out, into the back of my wagon. So 
overall we had a pretty rough landing! We caught up with the Battalion in 
Bayeux. Only half of us had made it off the LST and the others got in the next 
day.4 
George Barker, a veteran of Dunkirk from 2nd Essex, had an equally pressing 
time. Their LST on D+ 1 could not get in very close, so the ramp was let down in deeper 
water. George was last off: 
We had done our own waterproofing, and we had a groundsheet fixed top and 
bottom of the radiator to protect it from water pushing through. The drill was, 
you got off the boat, and as soon as you got on the beach you stopped and ripped 
this off, to stop the radiator boiling over. Well they dropped the ramp and these 
15cwt lorries went off, and two of them were swimming! When it was my turn I 
went down, and my wagon was under the sea! I was praying, please come up, 
please come up! I got off and I missed these floating wagons and reached the 
beach. I stopped and this beach bloke said, "Don't do that. Get on! Get on!" I 
said, "We have to get the waterproofing off''. He said "No keep going!" So I had 
to stop when we got off the beach. That's when I saw a line of casualties and it 
hit me, and I thought, Oh Christ! 5 
They drove straight through the middle of Bayeux to join the Battalion. On the 
way a sniper in a church tower fired on them, and the convoy drew up until a tank put a 
shot into the tower and stopped the enemy fire. They got just south of Bayeux and into a 
meadow that had a little brick building at the entrance. This was the guardroom. The 
cooks' wagons were there as well. The battalion were a mile or so down the road. 
"There were a lot of chaps walking about dazed really". 6 
For 2"d Glosters and 2nd Essex, the next two days were spent on consolidation 
and sending reconnaissance patrols forward on foot and by Bren Carrier. Although there 
was little direct contact with the enemy, they were not necessarily far away. In hindsight 
it may well have been the time to push forward fast; German reinforcements were 
gradually making their way to the scene. In the 50th Division area, the powerful Panzer 
Lehr Division was approaching as quickly as it could, trying to avoid the dominating 
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allied air cover. But the cause of the delayed British advance was twofold. The build up 
through the beaches was much slower than expected because of the weather, and there 
was still no contact with the American forces to the west. The fact was that the men 
ashore were already thinly spread, and the plans laid in Britain for a rapid armoured 
thrust, by at least a brigade of 7th Armoured Division supported by 56th Brigade, was 
impossible. 
2nd Glosters had lost two men killed in the taking of Bayeux and were dug in 
south of the town. Contact was made with the locals and bartering took place. Men 
began to get used to living in slit trenches dug in the fields or gardens of houses. A 
regimental magazine article7 reports that it 'was pleasant to be situated in civilised 
surroundings which made it difficult to turn houses in the front line into strong points as 
thoroughly as might be done, with a friendly French family looking on'. Battalion HQ 
was in a school, A Company HQ near a large garage, which supplied the MT with Ford 
spare parts and two vehicles, and D Company HQ were in the main square by the 
undertakers. In a minor action Corporal Penn was killed on 9th June. Fired on from the 
other side of a football field on the outskirts of Bayeux, this Welsh Rugby player 
charged across the pitch firing his Sten and was killed. "He was the biggest and 
toughest bloke we had. So we thought if he's dead, what chance have we got?"8 The 
railway line was guarded in the expectation, (of the men at least), that a train full of 
anned Germans soldiers would appear. Unable to dig in because of the stony nature of 
the embankment, and feeling quite exposed despite the darkness, Bren gunner Gordon 
Duffin heard rustling and clinking noises. Just about to fire he heard an English voice 
"where is everybody, I aint' half cold!" It was a drunken member of the battalion. An 
officer had him marched off under close arrest.9 Unusually, A Company temporarily 
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acquired horse transport, courtesy of the 105mm German Army battery they had 
captured at Magny, and invented their own 'Horse Transport Officer': 
We got a German horse and cart and loaded all our kit onto it. We wanted a chap 
who could handle a horse, and there was a Gloucester chap, a real old Swede 
hasher! He had been in India with the mules, so they made him horse transport 
officer. He gets on the cart and starts shouting at the horse and its not going 
anywhere. Old Jack is shouting and swearing, and Major Lance came up 
grinning and said, "The horse you're shouting at does not understand English, 
does not understand any other language except German, and it certainly can't 
understand Gloucestershire!" The horse and cart disappeared after Tilly. We 
reckoned Jack had flogged it to a French farmer! 10 
A little to the south of the hamlet of St. Loup d' Hors, 2nd Essex were similarly 
waiting for the next move, although one long reconnaissance by the Carrier platoon led 
by Captain Harrison nearly ended very badly, as Charles Benford explains. "We went 
out miles on reconnaissance. We eventually drove into one village, which was full of 
Germans. We had to spin round quick and get out of it. If they had had an anti-tank gun 
covering the road we would have had it!"11 Major Pat Barrass had C Company HQ in a 
typical Norman farm, with the Company forming a defensive position on the road to 
TiJiy-sur-Seulles. Their frrst enemy was a grey van coming down the road. Major 
Barrass went up with the forward section and they fired a shot. The van stopped dead 
and "a German with the biggest fat bottom you have seen jumped out the other side and 
disappeared into the bushes and got away!" 12 The next Germans to arrive were a 
motorcycle combination with two men. The forward platoon let them through, and at 
the farm entrance a sentry stepped out and signalled them into the farmyard. This they 
complied with and were captured. Out of this, Major Barrass swapped his Sten gun for 
the Germans' Schmeisser machine gun. This weapon could take the Sten gun 9mm 
ammunition, and was reckoned to be a much more effective weapon than the Sten. 13 
Similarly a German Press correspondent drove into C Company position and was 
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captured. 'It seemed to us that the Boche were badly disorganised and some of their 
units could have little idea where the front actually was' .14 
But on gth June, while the other two Battalions were situated near Bayeux, 2"d 
South Wales Borderers took part in 56th Brigade's most significant action since the 
landing and taking of Bayeux. To their west a Chateau at Sully was still fully occupied, 
and barring the way to a meeting with the American forces gradually pushing south 
from Omaha Beach. It was decided that they had to clear this situation up. A conference 
took place back at the bridge at Vaux-sur-Aure at 1030hrs between Brigadier Pepper, 
Lieutenant Colonel Craddock of 2"d South Wales Borderers, and representatives of 5th 
Royal Horse Artillery, 90th Field Regiment and 2"d Cheshires. 
The chateau was a difficult building to attack. It was a substantial late 17th 
Century building, surrounded on three sides by trees, in close bocage countryside, and 
built on rising ground. It had to be approached via a narrow bridge, after which 
followed a sharp left turn allowed an advance on the Chateau. Before this at the bottom 
of the hill, after the bridge, was the small village of Sully. This was likely to contain 
Germans in strength. It was thought that around l 00 men held the area. It was suspected 
of being a regimental headquarters, which would suggest a more heavily manned area, 
as a German regiment was the size of a British Brigade. In fact this proved to be the 
case and the chateau was the HQ of 726 Grenadier Regiment from 716 Infantry 
Division, but under command of 352 Infantry Division. However, there was a hurry to 
take the position, and A and B Companies of 2nd South Wales Borders received their 
orders to attack at 1100 hours, and were expected to put in their attack as close to noon 
as possible. This gave very little time to get these two companies briefed and in 
position, reconnoitre the area, and liase with supporting units. It has been pointed out, 
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that later in the campaign when the Battalion was more experienced, they would have 
demanded more time for preparation. 15 
There was a great deal of support promised, including a squadron of tanks from 
5th Royal Tank Regiment (A Squadron), a field regiment of artillery (90th Field Regt.), a 
platoon of 4.2inch mortars (2nd Cheshires), and the fire of a 6 inch naval cruiser, 
directed by a Forward Observation Officer (FOO), Captain Noble from 5th Royal Horse 
ArtiJiery. This support list provides a good example of the firepower available to troops 
in Normandy, certainly in these early days. It also gives an example of the complex 
planning and liaison that was needed. However as the action progressed, some of these 
arrangements broke down, not least because of the lack of training and co-operation 
between arms in this type of terrain. 'As so often happened in Bocage fighting, no one 
saw the battlefield until he got there' .16 The cruiser was to shell the chateau, the tanks 
give covering fire from the right flank, and the artillery to put down concentrations of 
fue on the road in front of the advance, the bridge, and finally on the chateau itself. 
A Company were to advance and establish a firm base, B Company pass through 
and take the village. Then A Company was to leapfrog them and take the chateau. The 
first problem was that due to the terrain, the FOO could not fmd anywhere to observe 
the chateau properly. So because of the danger to 2nd South Wales Borders from the 
naval shells, this part of the plan was not put into effect. Secondly, the Germans put up 
a staunch defence from the beginning. The lead Carrier blew up on a mine and was then 
fired on by an 88mm gun. However Sgt. Babcock in the second Carrier managed to 
eliminate the 88mm crew and extract the rest of the Carriers. Then A and B Company 
became crowded on the initial access road and the supporting artillery fire was too 
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close, some shells exploding in the trees and wounding several men. 5th RTR had only 
landed the day before and found the terrain very difficult to operate in: 
The country proved to be very close in this area allowing Boche infantry to get 
very close to the tanks. On one occasion a tank under command of Lieutenant 
Garnett was boarded. Prompt action by the officer using his Sten gun and the 
operator his revolver saved the situation. 17 
Over the bridge the hedges and ditches were lined with Germans, who were 
supported by an 88mm gun and 20mm Flak cannon. The Germans were also employing 
a light mortar and grenades. B Company Commander, Major Boon, took a few men, 
and going through a hedge they stalked the 88mm. Bursting back through the hedge 
they captured the crew of the 88mm tracked vehicle, then Major Boon attacked the gun 
crew firing bursts from his Sten gun and throwing a grenade. The remainder of B 
Company soon joined and captured a further 20 Germans from adjacent fields. At this 
point during a lull in the fighting Lieutenant Colonel Craddock armed with his 
swordstick and in company of his 10 and Signals Officer, walked up to the chateau. 
(Using the battalion signals officer as a personal signaller was unusual, and took the 
officer away from his duties co-ordinating the signals net.) Momentarily everything was 
quiet, until a grenade was thrown at them and the defences opened fire. AJI three made 
it back. Then A Company, reinforced by a Platoon of B Company, made an attack. 
There were now apparently many Germans out in the woodland, and the fighting 
became confused and desperate, including some vicious band-to-hand fighting. It was 
now clear that this area was heavily defended. Ringed by wire and with well-hidden 
snipers, the Germans were operating from deep bunkers within the chateau grounds, and 
had further 88rnm guns located around. There were many acts of heroism in this 
fighting. 18 The Brigade War Diary at 1700hrs states, 'On reports being received that the 
situation at Sully Chateau had deteriorated, Bde Comd went forward to investigate' .19 
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But the situation got worse. Lieutenant Colonel Craddock was wounded in the 
shoulder. Craddock would not be removed from the scene, but an enthusiastic Brigadier 
Pepper now supported him. More Germans seemed to be reinforcing the chateau 
defenders. In fact these were soldiers retreating from the American forces now 
advancing from Omaha Beach. German Self Propelled guns appeared and destroyed a 
Sherman Firefly and blasted some of the 2nd South Wales Borderers positions. 
Bill Evans, ofB Company, remembers that the attack was mounted in very close 
country, which seemed infested with snipers. His Section turned left up a lane. 36 Jones, 
was hit by shrapnel and his cheek laid open. Bill took out his own field dressing to 
cover the wound but was told that he should have used Jones own dressing. Then was 
screamed at to "leave him for the stretcher bearers!" The following day Private Jones 
died of wounds and is buried at Ryes CWGC. {14478536 Private Frederick Jones. As 
there were many Evans, Jones, Williams etc. in 2nd South Wales Borderers they were 
known by the last two digits of their number and surname). Moving up the lane, B 
Company came under fue from two machine guns and an 88mm firing on its lowest 
trajectory. The order was screamed, "B Company do a right flanking". The idea was to 
get round behind the chateau. The bank was over a metre high with a near impenetrable 
hedgerow on top was barged through to come out into a field. Looking through a second 
hedgerow, that hid the chateau, Bill saw three German tanks firing on them. Also the 
Germans were firing heavily from the dugouts around the chateau. The tanks were down 
by the river where a bridge of railway sleepers allowed them to cross. This still exists 
today. When they opened fire, one tank was already on the B Company side of the river, 
and two on the other. Then came the cry, ''Recall, recall."20 
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The German tank on the 2nd South Wales Borderers side of the river knocked out 
three more South Wales Borderers Carriers, an anti-tank gun and Brigade jeep. This 
tank now covered the bridge. Taking in the situation quickly, Brigadier Pepper decided 
that with no hope of reinforcing the two engaged companies with more infantry, and 
with the onset of night, (it was 2000hrs) they must start to withdraw to avoid darkness 
and further confusion. This was successfully accomplished being covered by smoke 
fired by the artillery although the men were still under heavy fue. Some were lucky to 
make it, others not. The Brigadier was put in a tank, and the last officers out were five 
officers crammed into the CO's Carrier. The 10, Nick Somerville, was lying on top of 
the Battalion 2 i/c Major Barlow, when the Carrier took a hit behind. An 88mm shell 
splinter punctured Lieutenant Somerville's helmet, cut his head, and broke the barrel of 
the Bren gun. 21 On the bridge the FOOs' tank toppled into the water, accidentally driven 
through the bridge parapet, drowning Major Noble. 
By now the fuing was dying down, and C Company was brought up from 
Bayeux to patrol the village northeast of the river. Later that night C Company were 
able to patrol into the chateau and reported it empty. They took possession of it the 
following morning. It was beginning to burn, and either the Germans had fired it, or the 
actions of the previous day had caught it alight. Bill Evans, of B Company, remembers 
moving up the drive flanked by a lawn each side to the front door. The roof of the 
Chateau was on fire, and on one lawn Bill saw up to nine dead from 2nd South Wales 
Borderers laid out in a line, including his friend Private Blackett. On the other lawn was 
a Spitfire fighter plane with a placard proclaiming the unit at the chateau shot it down. 
Alert to booby traps, doors were pushed open gingerly, by use of the bayonet attached 
to the rifle. Moving through the hallway and turning into a huge empty room on the 
right, they carefully opened cupboard doors and the cardboard boxes they held. All they 
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found inside was a regimental supply of condoms. There was some comment regarding 
the size ofthese!22 That afternoon at 1600hrs (9th June 1944) patrols of 2nd South Wales 
Borderers, C Company, fmally made contact with US forces. 
Probably over 250 members of 726 Regiment, at best equalling, and possibly 
outnumbering the attackers, had in fact held the chateau. The position was well. wired in 
and defended by three 88mm and one 20mm gun. It had deep, prepared concrete 
dugouts from which underground passages radiated out to pillboxes on the perimeter, 
each connected by slit trenches. The 2nd South Wales Borderers captured over 85 
prisoners and all the German artillery. The HQ and Intelligence Section appropriated 
typewriters and map cases from the chateau. The action at Sully cost 2nd South Wales 
Borderers two NCO's and eleven men killed. The armour support lost four killed and at 
least six wounded. They had lost three tanks. There were numerous 2nd South Wales 
Borderers of all ranks wounded, including Lieutenant Colonel Craddock, who was 
evacuated to England, and Major Barlow was given command of the Battalion. Major 
Barlow ceased the practise of using his signals officer as his personal signaller. 
Brigadier Hargest, Official Observer with 50th Division, says that the battalion 
suffered 100 casualties. Also he compares the strength of Chateau Sully with the Radar 
Station at Douvres La Deliverande. This held out, surrounded by British forces, from 6th 
June to 17th June 1944. Hargest states 'It (The Radar Station) was not comparable in 
strength with the Chateau at Sully'. 23 When considering 2nd South Wales Borderers 
casualties, it must be remembered that these came only from two rifle companies 
totalling less than 250 men, plus some men from the Support Company. Therefore the 
casualty rate was very high, and this became the norm for infantry in the Normandy 
Campaign. 
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This was the first major action by a unit of 56th Brigade, and is worth exploring 
for that reason. There is no doubt that the men had fought well and been well led. At 
critical times officers, NCO's and men had stepped up to the mark when needed. A 
number of awards were given for this action. Four officers received the Military Cross, -
including a member of the Royal Army Medical Corps attached to the Battalion- seven 
NCO's and men received the Military Medal, and Colonel Craddock was awarded the 
Distinguished Service Order. The terrain, lack of reconnaissance and planning, poor 
intelligence, and the availability of only two of the rifle companies, caused both infantry 
and armour to face severe problems. The other rifle companies were engaged in holding 
bridges over the River Aure and the Battalion firm base, tasks of primary importance. 
Expected to prepare and execute an attack so quickly, the Battalion did very well under 
the circumstances. What is interesting is that the men engaged did so well, despite most 
of them being new to combat. The fact is they stuck to their task until called off, in 
circumstances that were clearly mounting against them. What is unfortunate is that 
above the level of battalion and brigade, these harsh lessons were not quickly learnt, and 
in their turn both 2nd Glosters and 2nd Essex in the coming days, were to suffer high 
casualties due to similar problems. The chateau - one of three around Sully, and 
properly called 'Chateau Le Petit Sally'- no longer exists having been so badly damaged 
it was later demolished and the German bunkers filled in, although modem aerial views 
clearly show the entrance drive to the Chateau. 
Finally a British plan ~o rapidly expand the bridgehead was being put in place. 
After attending a conference at 7th Armoured Division HQ during the afternoon of the 
9th June, Brigadier Pepper issued the following orders, 'that from 0800 hrs 10 June, 56 
Inf Brig comes under Command of 7th Armoured Div. ' 24 Use was being made of 56th 
159 
Brigade infantry to support 7tit Armoured Division as 13151 (Queen's) Brigade, had not 
yet been landed. 13151 Brigade was the infantry brigade nonnally attached to 7tit 
Armoured Division. The plan was to advance to the south on two axes: southwards on 
the east side of the River Aure and south eastwards down the road to Tilly-sur-Seulles 
and on to the hamlet of Juvigny. This was a distance of some 14 kilometres. After 
taking this area the front Line was to be consolidated along the east to west road between 
Juvigny and the village of Hottot-Ies-Bagues. The start line was the level crossing just 
south of Bayeux, beginning at 0830hrs IOtit June. 2nd South Wales Borderers were to 
provide a guard of one anti-tank gun at each bridge over the River Aure as they were 
reached. 56tit Brigade was to provide protection for the annour, consolidate on the final 
objective and provide flank protection on the River Aure. A large tract of land would 
therefore be occupied and a significant advance made to bring pressure on the continued 
holding of Caen by the Gennans to the east, and to allow a quick further ~ south to 
Villers Bocage by 7tit Armoured Division. 
There were some problems with this plan. Firstly the enemy had not been sitting 
idly by, and now the Panzer Lehr Division of over 14,500 men, 237 tanks and assault 
guns, including 89 Panther and 8 Tiger tanks and over 650 armoured half-track 
personnel Carriers, were moving into direct opposition to 50tit and 7tit Armoured 
Divisions. Their journey had not been easy and although reported numbers vary, they 
had lost over a hundred vehicles and a number of men. Their Commander, 
Genemlrnajor Bayerlein, had orders on 9tit June to take Bayeux, although initially he had 
to deploy his men with little infonnation to help him. However by the morning of 1 Otit 
June some of his units at least were established on a line from Jerusalem through Ellon 
and back to Trungy between Bayeux and 7tit Armoured Division objectives.25 Further 
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east they were joined by 12 SS (Hitler Youth) Division another powerful unit with over 
20,500 men. These were two very significant armoured units.26 
The second problem was that the British were moving into the type of 
countryside that had caused so many problems for 2nd South Wales Borderers and 51h 
Royal Tank Regiment in their attack on 8th June at Sully. Close, often Bocage type 
countryside, with substantial stone built villages and farms dotting the landscape at 
regular intervals, were ideal for defence. Also the Germans were determined not to 
allow any of the main east to west road axes fall into British hands. These were to 
become vital lines of communication for the German Army between Caen and the 
Contentin Peninsular and beyond to Brittany. Important road junctions down the Tilly 
road were at Jerusalem, Bucceels, Tilly itself and Juvigny. 
Promptly at 0830hrs on 1Oth June, 56th Brigade moved past the level crossing 
start line. But by llOOhrs it was reported, 'Both columns held up one mile south of 
Bayeux. ' 27 56th Brigade, 22nd Armoured Brigade and 8th Armoured Brigade were to 
have to fight hard making slow progress against determined opposition from the tanks 
and Infantry of Panzer Lehr. Each village, farm and the monastery at Juaye Monaye, 
became centres of resistance, and in the narrow lanes lined with high banks and hedges, 
in a countryside interspersed with woods and orchards, the situation was often confused. 
Charles Benford, in the leading Carrier of 2nd Essex Support Company, dealt 
with an early problem approaching the village of Ellon: "we came round a bend and I 
spotted a tank. I stopped my driver immediately and shouted to him to Back up! Back 
up! We got down from the Carrier and crossed the road. I took my PIAT Gunner with 
me .• .2s Cutting carefully down the hedge until they got to the turning leading to Ell on, 
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he realised it was a disabled British tank. Feeling relieved, they were returning to their 
Carrier, when another tank was heard approaching from the village and they prepared to 
engage this with the PIAT. "Lo and behold a tank appeared over the brow of the hill, I 
got my PIA T Gunner down behind the hedge and I said to him you have got one shot, 
get his track and he's disabled." But it was yet another British tank with a "Johnny-go-
lightly chap with his beret on" sticking out of the turret. Holding up a bright orange 
fluorescent recognition panel Sergeant Benford got the tank to stop. "The tank 
commander said, "Who the hell are you?" I said, "vanguard of a battalion." He replied, 
"Well get the hell out of it I'm in the middle of a tank battle!" The Essex officer was 
fetched on the Don R's bike and agreed to get the Carriers to turn round. "We couldn't 
do this in the road, as it was too narrow, so we drove through a five-barred gate into an 
orchard and out the other end. The fanner was there and doing his nut!"29 
By 1800hrs, 2nd Essex had got as far as the monastery at Juaye Monaye, where 
'D Company attacked under a fierce concentration of British artillery, followed by A 
Company, constantly harassed by snipers and Spandaus. ' 3° Corporal Toni Mansi of D 
Company remembers that: 
We were told that the Gennans were using the monastery as an observation post. 
There was a high brick wall surrounding part of the monastery and also, the 
entrance to the monastery was like a long driveway with a high wall on the right 
hand side and a short wall on the left, and then it opened out to where the 
monastery was. What we did was set the Bren gunner up at the entrance to cover 
us as we went to the monastery. As we got closer to the monastery, we could 
hear voices in the cellar, it had windows open to give light and we were hearing 
French people down there for protection. But there were snipers up in the roof, 
so we went forward and some of the chaps behind us went into the monastery, 
which they cleared. I don't know whether they captured or killed them. Then I 
remember we stopped in a deep hollow. There were shells screaming 
overhead. 31 
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The War Diary reports the Monastery cleared by 1930hrs, but that fighting 
forward towards Bernieres Bocage was still confused, and 5th Royal Tank Regiment lost 
two Cromwell tanks here. They had advanced seven kilometres that day. An hour later 
2nd South Wales Borderers had moved to concentrate their battalion around Ellon, a 
kilometre and a half to the rear of 2nd Essex. But during the day, they had captured and 
had a guard of infantry and anti-tank guns, on each of the four bridges they had been 
ordered to take. The last two bridges were south and to the west of 2nd Essex, and 
required some fighting for. Taking them cost officers and men killed and wounded in 
the bocage countryside. 
Meanwhile 2nd Glosters had been on the left axis of advance down the Tilly 
road, and supporting the armour by mopping up snipers and machine gun posts. The 
advance had been made by pushing a company down each side of the road while the 
remaining two companies made a firm base. Their War Diary reports that the progress 
was very slow, although by 1910hrs they were clearing woods in the area of Jerusalem, 
seven kilometres from the start line. Frank Clarke from B Company describes how 
when opposition was met at Jerusalem, the armour was called up to shoot up the village 
and poured "scores of HE and AlP shells into every likely looking building. The place 
was a shambles. "32 Later that night, B Company moved further south and occupied St. 
Bazire capturing a German tank and crew. In the early hours of 11th June in support of 
4th City of London Yeomanry, B Company were put in to clear Bucceels only two 
kilometres from the centre ofTilly-sur-Seulles. It had been a busy day and the Glosters 
had been fully employed supporting the armour. Ernie Partridge has this memory from 
south of Jerusalem: 
We had some tanks come past and I said, "I should look out. There are German 
tanks down there. I would keep your eyes open down there mate!" It was a busy 
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place. Lots of firing, bursts of machine gun fire and shells and mortars and lots 
of prisoners were passing throu§h as well. One of the sergeants in C Company 
knocked a tank out with a PIA T. 3 
After a slow start the combined forces of 56th Brigade and 22nd Armoured 
Brigade had made better progress during the latter half of I Oth June, and a large tract of 
land south of Bayeux had been wrested from the enemy. Both formations were learning 
all the time. For many soldiers of 56th Brigade it was their introduction to battle, and the 
more experienced 22nd Armoured Brigade learnt that fighting here was to be very 
different than in the desert. The following day the advance was to continue in similar 
terrain, except that the Panzer Lehr were getting ever more to grips with the British, and 
were consolidating their own positions. By 1000hrs on 11th June more German Mk. IV 
and Mark V (Panther) tanks were being met, and in the close terrain the British armour 
was at a disadvantage, coming forward onto well-camouflaged German positions, and 
the more powerful guns of German armour. 
On the right flank 2nd Essex now held the hamlet ofBernieres Bocage. Ahead of 
them 5th Royal Tank Regiment, moving forward supported by a Company of I st Rifle 
Brigade early on IIth June, suffered casualties, and some sections of 1"1 Rifle Brigade 
were shot up in the orchards approaching Lingevres. The War Diary for 5th Royal Tank 
Regiment reports that: 
The large open space between FOLLIOT and LINGEVRES was crossed by 'A' 
Sqn. On reaching the woods near LINGEVRES enemy tks opened up and two 
CROMWELLS and a FIREFLY were KO' d. 'A' Sqn in cooperation with I PI, I 
Coy IRB was ordered to proceed south through the woods to LINGEVRES. 
Good progress was made up to about 300x when Rifle Secs who had got too far 
ahead of Tk support were ambushed and suffered a few casualties. At this stage 
'A' Sqdn halted, 'B' Sqdn took up a posn on the right, 'C' Sqn taking posn in 
high ground in the rear. It was impossible to get through the wood. Lieutenant 
HEYNES was on the right flank of 'A' Sqdn close to the wood and was 
suddenly hit by a presumed Mk V Tk, which had crept up along a sunken road 
unobserved. 34 
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The view taken by the I "1 Rifle Brigade infantry supporting the tanks was 
slightly different, and they report that the tanks were slow in keeping up with the 
infantry, who themselves were rushed by a group of forty Germans. The Germans had 
got a tank (described as a Tiger, but undoubtedly a Mark V Panther) into the middle of 
the wood, 'Which our own tanks were unable to locate and dislodge; in fact he rather 
saw them off, and so they had to pull back a bit bringing our people with them. '35 In 
view of how 2nd Essex were next to be deployed and the effect on the battalion, the 
above action is of great significance. 
At midday a decision was taken that one person could not easily control the 
advance on two axes, so Brigadier Pepper and his HQ took command of the left axis 
attack towards Tilly-sur-Seulles with 2"d Glosters and 2nd South Wales Borderers under 
command; while Brigadier Hinde of 22nd Armoured Brigade was to control the right 
axis outflanking Tilly-sur-Seulles to the west, with 2nd Essex under command.36 All 
three of the 56th Brigade battalions' were to play an important part in the developing 
advance, but 2nd Essex were to suffer particularly badly. 
On the left flank, 2nd Glosters had cleared Bucceels by 1300hrs, held up by the 
need to provide a further crossing for armour to get forward to Tilly-sur-Seulles. At this 
point a battalion attack supported by tanks could be put in on the town. On the right side 
of the road A Company with B Company mopping up led the advance. On the left flank 
D Company led with C Company mopping up. B and C Companies were to pass 
through A and D for the final assault into the town. All went well, and in a dip at Pont 
de la Guillette, 1,000 yards from Tilly, a halt was made to give the final orders for the 
attack. From here the village of Tilly could not be seen, but on the hills to the east some 
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tanks, which looked Gennan, were observed. The advance continued to contact, using 
the cover provided by hedges and orchards either side of the road. Gordon Duffin 
describes contact by A Company with the first Gennans holding the ground in front of 
Tilly: 
We were advancing through this orchard, thick banks topped by hedges, hiding a 
sunken lane. Its peaceful, its quiet. The sun is shining. We get so far and then 
there is a forward slope. I think, "I don't like the look of this," because at the 
bottom is another thick hedge, hiding no doubt a sunken lane with a thick hedge 
on the other side. So we get halfway down this forward slope and a Spandau 
opens up from the middle of this hedgerow. So down we all dive in the grass 
about a foot and a half high. This Spandau keeps spraying the field we are in. 37 
A Shennan tank is brought up and the following interchange, reminiscent of an 
earlier war and reported by Gordon Duffin, takes place between the 2nd Glosters officer 
and the tank commander: 
The lid is up on the tank and there is a head sticking out. Then our officer, 
Wakefield, has stood up and is throwing a salute to the Herbert in the tank! I 
thought, "I don't believe this!" "Hallo. What seems to be the trouble here?'' Says 
the tank. Wakefield says, "We are in a spot of bother. See the hedgerow 
immediately in front? There is a Spandau in that hedgerow. Can you help us 
out?" The bloke says "Just a minute. Ah! I've got the bugger!" Well I can't 
believe this! How they were both not shot to pieces, but they are not! 38 
The tank fires its machine guns into the hedgerow and No. 8 platoon charge with 
fixed bayonets. "Firing like mad and shouting our heads off. At the hedgerow the 
machine gun has gone. The tank had fired two or three shots from its 75mm over our 
heads, BOOM! BOOM! Someone says "is he going to do that at every bloody 
hedgerow?" The advance is continued and soon halfway across an orchard they are 
showered with mortar and artillery fire and have to get down. 
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When this stonk is over its dark. I think, "Have I lost my sight?" But the dust 
and the smoke have turned it into night. This slowly clears and what was a nice 
tidy orchard is an absolute wreck. Every tree is shattered, the ground scarred by 
shell and bomb bursts. There is a ditch with a bank and hedgerow in front and 
we dash forward and get into it. There we stop. The Sergeant Major, who was at 
Dunkirk, says, "for Christ sake ~et into a firing position, or they will walk up 
and bayonet you where you lie!" 
On the left flank Frank Rosier of 14 Platoon, (Lieutenant Nordbruck), 
remembers advancing in open order, and their first problem was a wounded bull in a 
field! As the Platoon seemed inclined to run away from it, the officer shot it. But then 
the same stonk that caught A Company hit them and caused casualties. Frank 
remembers screaming with horror as a detached hand hit the ground in front ofhim.40 
As C Company went through D Company into the town, Maurice Wells was 
with them. His lasting memory is of being in a house and a German tank pushing its gun 
through the window. "We scarpered taking our weapons but left our kit. We went back 
the next day to collect it! What I remember vividly was how rough it was with house-to-
house fighting. As soon as we cleared one house and went on, Jerry came in behind us 
and we had to do it all again.'.41 A German tank near the village centre fired and 
shattered houses around the men of C and B companies. Lieutenant Evans trying to get 
to this tank with a PIA T was killed. Lance Corporal Rhodes knocked out a German 
half-track at close range with a PIA T. The infantrymen though, had little answer to the 
German tanks without armoured support, which dared not enter the village. Two A VRE 
tanks with spigot mortars helped out, but eventually lost their tracks to anti-tank guns 
and the crews set fire to them and joined the foot soldiers. 
The village was impossible to fight through, and although the cross roads at the 
centre had been reached, the Glosters could go no further. In the vicious house-to-house 
and street fighting, lone men and small sections stalked each other with Sten, rifle and 
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grenade. Section leaders and platoon commanders found difficulty in maintaining a 
grip, as in the close confmes of the village wireless reception was poor. With ever 
increasing German artillery and mortar frre raining down, the village was turned into a 
shambles. Eventually, around dusk at 2200hrs, it was decided to withdraw the battalion 
and firm base on the high ground between Pont de la Guillette and Tiily. Some men had 
a difficult time extricating themselves from the situation, including 14 men from A 
Company, led by Lieutenant Levine, who laid up during the night and withdrew in the 
early hours from under the German noses. As in all battles the stretcher-bearers did 
great work, and Ted Castle working in Tilly remembers, "picking a lad up and we got 
him on the jeep on the stretcher racks, and got back up the road to the aid post, but when 
we unloaded him we found he had been hit again on the jeep and killed. ,,42 
The following day the infantry from 131'1 Queen's Brigade (now landed) 
attempted to take Tilly but met with little success. A Company from 2nd South Wales 
Borderers reinforced 2nd Glosters and they even patrolled into Tilly. But the Glosters 
had to withdraw to the reverse slope during 12th June because of heavy enemy mortar 
and artillery fire. The Queen's withdrew through the 2nd Glosters and then 2nd Glosters 
withdrew back to St. Bazire, through 2nd South Wales Borderers at Buceels. The 
Glosters frrm-based for two days to rest, but even so the Battalion had to continue active 
patrolling. Tilly was to be held by Panzer Lehr for more than another week, despite 
further efforts to take it. 
At Buceels until the 15th June, 2nd South Wales Borderers were at the forward 
edge of the battlefield, and carried out many useful patrols, some up to a company in 
strength went into Tilly, but the Germans remained fortified in the town, despite heavy 
air and artillery attacks by the British. In their turn 2nd South Wales Borderers came 
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under accurate mortar fire, and on 13th June their new Medical Officer from 203 Field 
Ambulance Unit, Captain Heame, was killed and the Padre wounded by a 15cm artillery 
shell. Another Roya1 Army Medical Corps member, Private Abbot, was also killed. 
Seeing the Regimenta1 Aid Post in some disarray the Battalion cooks set to and helped 
Sergeant Harrison, the Stretcher Bearer Sergeant, to restore the situation.43 Dick Philips 
sergeant of the HQ Intelligence Section remembers Buceels as a desperate place: 
The shelling was really hairy there. We were crouched in this slit trench and a 
mortar landed two yards in front of us and we got away with it. The reaction of 
people is strange; chaps were laughing saying bloody hell that was close. 
Despite the area being devastated by shelling there was no mark on the crucifix, 
so many times I have seen that. I was glad to get out of that place. 44 
Typical patrols included one carried out by Lieutenant Davis southwest of 
Bucceels, making a reconnaissance forward with a section at night. Advancing with the 
section along a lane, he halted them and went on further a1one. He looked through the 
hedge and saw a large body of Germans digging in. He sprinted back down the road and 
called down artillery fire on the area. He remembers Bucceels as "a nasty place.'"'5 
Their stay at Buceels cost 2nd South Wales Borderers around ten dead and many 
wounded. 
Over on the right flank on 11th June 2 Essex were at Bemieres Bocage. It was 
decided after the withdrawal of 5th Royal Taflk Regiment and 1"1 Rifle Brigade, that 2nd 
Essex would be employed to take the woods near Verrieres Farm. The War Diary 
records that at 1200hrs the Battalion were ordered to take the wood. It is clear that the 
timesca1e for the attack gave no time for proper reconnaissance, and Colonel Higson 
was unhappy. The Batta1ion 2 i/c at the time, Major Elliott, states that he was not sure if 
the village of Lingevres, a short distance further southeast on the main east to west road 
was included in the plans, but that this was key to the position. The Essex were given 
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further time to prepare their attack. The Battalion '0' (Order) Group drove hastily to 
higher ground near Folliot to observe the area, but the trip was not worthwhile as 'the 
tops of all woods and orchards look alike in this country at a distance of 2000 yards and 
in this particular case the line of orchards to our south were on a slight reverse slope. ' 46 
Having not been helped by this reconnaissance, they returned to the Battalion 
who were being formed up to the east of Bemieres Bocage. A Company (left), and C 
Company (right), were to lead with B Company and D Company in the rear. Lieutenant 
Colonel Higson went forward between the leading companies with a Tactical HQ, and 
Major Barlow went forward between B and D Companies. The ground they were to 
attack over was the only open ground in the area, consisting mainly of cornfields. The 
supporting artillery fire 'was comprehensive.' Tanks were supposed to follow as soon as 
the orchards were cleared.47 Obviously the lessons of that morning were not lost on the 
armour. There was reluctance too, in moving up the Carriers of the anti-tank and mortar 
platoons over the open ground. There was over a kilometre of open ground to cover 
before the orchards were reached. Charles Benford's view, Sergeant of the Carrier 
Section was: 
They knew there were German tanks in the village, (Lingevres) beyond the 
wood. My particular brief was on the right flank at the rear and if there was 
enfilade fire from that direction, I had to try and contain it. In actual fact there 
wasn't anything there. Everything was out in front. Going across the cornfield 
the troops were more or less exposed. What surprised us was that the attack tqok 
place without armoured support.48 
Major Pat Barrass, C Company, remembers that they moved forward in open 
order, 2 platoons up with the Company HQs in the middle of each set of three platoons. 
They had to cross very open ground, a cornfield and a smaller green field before 
reaching the wood. Moving forward through a cornfield in front of the wooded area 
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nothing happened until halfway across. Then "all hell broke loose".49 Artillery, mortar 
and Spandau machine gun fire landed amongst the troops. A fair number of casualties 
started to be taken. The men ran at and into the woods, firing from the hip and with 
bayonets ftxed. At the edge of the woods they started to take cover, as the Germans had 
run from the area. Looking back men saw upturned rifles stuck in the ground, showed 
the position of the dead and wounded. Eric Watson Commanding 'B' Company was 
wounded in the leg. 
A couple of us put him in a ditch for the stretcher-bearers to collect. Incidentally 
I cannot speak too highly of our stretcher-bearers; mature ex-bandsmen. They 
carried out their often-dangerous duties, magnificently throughout the 
Campaign. I noticed a sergeant walking around, less his helmet organising his 
men. At the back of his neck, beneath his dark hair, I could clearly see two 
bullets embedded in his neck. I hope he survived. 50 
Tony Mansi, a Corporal with D Company, explains his view at the start of the 
attack, and how at first everything went well. "The corn was waist high, and as you 
looked across you could see the whole battalion. We were lucky enough to be in the 
rear, as you looked you could see what looked like a lot more men than there was, as we 
were all spread out."51 Two Me. 109's flew low across the Battalion, one crashing the 
other side of A Company. Suddenly there was firing from in front of them. Through the 
corn Tony noticed the Germans had cut what looked like two or three tracks and on 
them were firing a fixed line machine gun. "You could hear the bullets as they whizzed 
across and see a few men going down."52 They finally got through the cornfield to a 
track, which separated the wood and the cornfield and got into the wood at the right 
hand side. They were told that B Company was in trouble and were to go in and help 
them. "The wood had some dips and hollows in it for cover and was not too thick, not 
really like an orchard either. Our way out was to be down this track.'.s3 As they made 
their way back onto the track they were heavily mortared by six barrelled moaning 
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minnies. "There was nowhere to go, you could dive into the cornfield where there was 
no cover or this ditch at the edge of the wood. That's where I went and dived straight 
in."54 The mortar bombs exploded all along the track and when the explosions had 
stopped Corporal Mansi looked up and saw that Lieutenant Cannon and four or five 
others had been killed. The Padre, Father William Thomas used his own body to shield 
the wounded out in the open as best he could. His bmve and unselfish actions over the 
next 24 hours were to win him a Military Cross. Lieutenant Colonel Higson too went 
forward under fire and brought back wounded men. Corporal Toni Mansi gives an 
excellent account of how this close and deadly fighting continued: 
We made our way down this ditch spreading out and starting to dig into this dry 
ditch to get ourselves lower. There was a lot of noise, a Jot of firing and I moved 
further down the ditch as it was getting crowded as chaps; feeling more 
comfortable in the company of another soldier; bunched together even though 
told to spread out. In moving down that's where I found Major Petre (QC D 
Company, replacement for Major Ayres drowned on Exercise Fabius) who was 
on top of the bank. So I pulled his body down into the ditch so that it wouldn't 
get hit any more, although he was dead. Suddenly small arms fire came along 
the ditch. A bullet passed in front of me and went into the leg of a chap third 
along, and at the same time some bullets went behind me, and into Sparrow who 
was sitting next to me, through his pack and through his mess tins. There was 
nothing we could do, even when we saw the tanks we couldn't fire a rifle at it. 
We could hear the tanks and saw them. Lieutenant Cooper as I remember was 
standing up, and saw the tanks and called for a PIA T gun, but we never had a 
PIA T gun or cha_R! Then I remember seeing Lieutenant Cooper making his way 
back up the track. 55 
At least two Mark V Panther tanks engaged the Essex men out in the open They 
are likely to have retired back into the woods, as their own infantry didn't support them. 
A Company seem to have been the initial target of the tanks and they found that their 
PIATs were inadequate and quickly ran out of bombs. The tanks seemed to be firing 
solid shot, not the high explosive that was more dangerous to infantry. In a sang froid 
way it was reported, 'it was often necessary to side step to avoid being run over. ' 56 The 
Germans sent in another counter-attack and Lieutenant Colonel Higson purposefully 
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brought down British artillery fire on their own position. He believed his men in slit 
trenches and ditches would survive, and the Germans in the open would not. When 
darkness fell they were attacked again. "Half-track flamethrowers came up close with 
their terrifying weapons. One was knocked out and the Germans retired. I remember 
they were quite near, their lurid colours lighting up the trees.'..s7 Private Albert Daines of 
D Company recalls the fear of attack by this awful weapon: 
Then they had a tracked flamethrower after us. If it wasn't for Lieutenant Price I 
reckon we would all be dead. He picked up a PIA T and knocked this 
flamethrower out and but for him God knows what would have happened. 
Before you wouldn't have thought he was the type to do such a thing. 58 
By 0100 hrs with no armour support, and many wireless sets smashed, contact 
could not be established between Battalion and HQ 22nd Armoured Brigade, or their 
own rear link at Bernieres Bocage. So the 2i/c, Major Elliott, was instructed to find HQ 
22nd Armoured Brigade at Jerusalem and request armour support by first light. Arriving 
at Jerusalem on foot, Major Elliot found they had moved. Purloining a jeep from a 
junior officer he went across country to Bernieres Bocage and made contact with the 
Adjutant of 2nd Essex, Captain Townrow. Townrow had been worried that the rifle 
companies had been completely overcome by the enemy, and had already sent forward 
the anti-tank guns. From here Major Elliott went back and eventually found Brigadier 
Pepper, at·56th Brigade HQ at Folliot and explained the situation to him. This is reported 
in the Brigade War Diary as being at 0700hrs, but may have been earlier. 
Brigadier Pepper immediately set about organising more support, and later four 
MlO self-propelled anti-tank guns added to the 2 Essex defence. Finally Major Elliott 
anxious to return to the Battalion went direct by Jeep down a track from Folliot and 
under observation from the Germans. 'There were still several of our wounded lying out 
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with the many dead round the NE corner of the orchards. The enemy probably mistook 
me for a medical attendant, there was no firing. ' 59 
After gaining what sleep he could during the night, and escaping the ''venomous 
flame-thrower that seemed to go towards B Company,"60 Corporal Tony Mansi tried to 
frnd out how many men in his platoon were left. "One chap came along and said they 
wanted the platoon leader to report to HQ. Well that was me, because although I was 
only a corporal, Lieutenant Cannon and the Sergeant Major were dead and Sergeant 
Chandler was wounded.'.61 Colonel Higson was only a couple of hundred yards back in 
a hollow and asked him what the situation was. Mansi had only counted nine soldiers 
and himself out of 36. Higson put him in charge of the remains of the platoon and they 
were later told they were to withdraw under the cover of a smokescreen. 
In the meantime the Padre came around asking for volunteers, as there were a 
large number of wounded out in the wood, including Germans, and he wanted help to 
get to them. "As far as I know where we were laying, no-one went with him.'.62 Two 
Germans came into view quite early in the morning and a Bren gun team from another 
platoon killed one and wounded the other who was left, "there for hours shouting help, 
or Kamerad, until the Padre went out there. There was no telling when you went out to 
help them if you would be shot at. It was in most chaps' minds to stay put If they 
needed help that was hard luck.'.63 
Phillip Maillou was with the anti-tank guns and remembers being suddenly 
ordered to go forward that evening: 
So we all lined up, six guns on six Carriers and followed the Platoon 
Commander down by the side of these hedges and straight across some fields. 
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Down by the wood a Sherman tank commander, (probably one of the Ml 0 's sent 
in as support); reported to the 2nd Essex Carrier commander that a German tank 
was close and he had backed off. We all got the guns spaced out. It was pretty 
horrible; we could hear the shouts of the wounded in front. The next morning we 
made sure we were in a decent position with the guns and camouflaged the area 
up and not a lot except shelling going on. The guns were left as a shield while 
the Battalion withdrew, and then the guns completed a textbook tactical 
withdrawal, with each Carrier and gun pulling back through the guns in an 
orderly way. We were las! to leave. You can bet your life we had everything 
ready to go bar hooking up the guns! Anyway we were just finally hooking them 
up when some solid shot came flying over. The Germans were firing in our 
general direction when we started up the Carriers. We moved back with our 
heads pulled right down under the rim of the Carrier and passed one of our 
Carriers stuck in the ditch, which we eventually got out.64 
Before 2nd Essex withdrew a surprising change had taken place that morning, as 
Major Elliott was placed in command of the Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Higson 
seems to have been removed from command for not bringing up the anti-tank guns with 
the initial advance. One could ask if this is fair? The 2nd Essex were sent forward 
without armour support, over open ground with their objective on the reverse (unseen) 
slope. It would have been a great risk to advance the Carriers and anti-tank guns. 
Carriers were only lightly armoured and open topped. Even German mortar fire might 
have destroyed them, let alone the powerful tanks and artillery of the Germans. There 
remains the question of what happened to the armour support that was promised? None 
materiaUsed. Without armour support the attack on this wood by infantry only -already 
reported as impossible by 5th Royal Tank Regiment that morning- seems unjustified. 
The lack of direction and help during the attack from 22nd Armoured Brigade 
that had 2nd Essex under command is unfathomable. The moving of the Armoured 
Brigade HQ during the day, without apparent attempt to inform Lieutenant Colonel 
Higson, is evidence of a lack of grip from above. The most likely explanation is that 2nd 
Essex were just left to get on with it because at this time, after a deal of dithering, a plan 
was being hatched to launch 7th Armoured Division, including 22nd Armoured Brigade, 
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in a wide right hook west then south to Villers Bocage and on to Everecy. The dedicated 
supporting 131 '1 Infantry Brigade was now available and this plan fitted the original 
concept of an annoured thrust capturing Villers Bocage by the end ofD-Day. 
Doubtless the plan appealed to the 'dash' of the armour. Secondly quick 
exploitation south, through Tilly-sur-Seulles, by 7th Armoured and 50th Division was by 
now clearly impossible as Panzer Lehr continued to block the way. Finally a weakness 
had been identified by intelligence in the German lines that an armoured thrust could 
quickly exploit, between American units and the 50th Division front. Even so it seems to 
have taken the direct actions from General Dempsey to get this exploitation of German 
defensive weakness underway. In any event once underway it took a mere four hours on 
12th June to get 7th Armoured Division on the move. This whole exploitation was 
stopped in its tracks around Villers Bocage, famously due to the efforts of 101 81 Heavy 
SS Panzer Battalion. From this time Generals Bucknall (30 Corps Commander), Erskine 
(7th Armoured Division Commander) and Brigadier Hinde (22nd Armoured Brigade) star 
waned in Normandy leading to their eventual dismissal within only a few weeks.65 
The 2nd Essex lost at least 150 men killed, wounded and captured from the 
approximately 500 that made up the rifle battalions. A memorial to the action has been 
raised on the main road just west of Lingevres and immediately south of where the 
action took place. Three markers outline the actual battlefield area, which today is 
called 'Essex Wood.' The Essex withdrew under orders at 2030 hrs on 12th June to 
Folliot, where they arrived by 0030 hrs on 13th June. Despite needing rest and 
reinforcement urgently they were still within artillery range of the enemy and even rifle 
fire occasionally came close. The pity was that they had taken the wooded area near 
Verrieres and by withdrawing them it allowed the Germans to re-occupy the wood. 
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Within a few days the re-taking of this area was to cost the Durham Light Infantry very 
dear. 
By the afternoon of 15th June 2nd Essex were in Buceels relieving 2nd South 
Wales Borderers. 2nd South Wales Borderers went back to Ellon for ten days of rest. 
Meanwhile 2"d Essex came under temporary command of 151 st Brigade. At Buceels the 
shelling was still bad and 2nd Essex lost their second Signals Officer of the campaign on 
16th June, when Lieutenant Fradin was killed at Battalion HQ, along with two attached 
signallers from 151"' Brigade and Brigadier Walton of 151"1 Brigade, who was visiting, 
was wounded. Germans were reported having returned to Pont de la Guillette, and 2nd 
Essex snipers kept a watch on the bridge area. During this time (13th- 16th June) only 
28 replacements appear to have been sent to the batta1ion.66 
Also under temporary command of 151 51 Brigade on 14th June were 2nd Glosters, 
who were needed to help 6th and 9th Battalions Durham Light Infantry, who had taken 
heavy casualties, fighting for the area of Verrieres and village of Lingevres. Between 
them the Durham Light Infantry battalions had lost a total of around 80 men killed, and 
their armour support from 4/7 Dragoon Guards had lost 12 men killed. Despite a heavy 
air attack on Lingevres, including rocket firing Typhoons, one battalion of the Durham 
Light Infantry were reported to be nearly surrounded and something of a tank battle 
took place in the narrow village roads. 2nd Glosters were sent in to relieve the pressure, 
and their A and D Companies formed blocking positions southwest and southeast of the 
village. 
B Company, led by Major Basil Stephens, was approaching on their bicycles 
along a road with two Shennan tanks for support. The company laid down their bicycles 
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before a slight rise in the ground. Moving across country now, the two Sherman tanks 
were knocked out going through a hedgerow by an 88mm gun. Frank Clarke had the 
signallers' radio and asked for more support. More tanks appeared to help, together with 
an artillery barrage. Also three Typhoons flew in and rocketed two German tanks, to the 
delight of the Glosters. 
B Company HQ now came up, and the Company dug in and firm based in this 
area. Suddenly Frank Clarke thought he noticed movement in a gateway in the hedge. 
Observing closely, a second German dived across the gap. Alerting Major Stephens, 
Frank's platoon was ordered to investigate. Upon carefully approaching the hedge, two 
German soldiers supporting two wounded Durham Light Infantrymen appeared and 
offered surrender. Altogether forty other Germans appeared from the hedge to give up. 
Basil Stephens's surprised remark was "where did you get them from!" At the end of 
the action when returning to retrieve their bicycles they discovered a further problem; 
the Sherman tanks had flattened them all! That was the end of cycling in Normandy for 
the Glosters!67 
Half a mile to the east ofLingevres the youthful high spirits of Frank Rosier, 2nd 
Glosters, could have caused calamity. His section had to approach the village and had 
orders if attacked not to fight, but to report and return to their lines. Approaching across 
country to reach a roadside Crucifix, half a mile east of Lingevres, the section took 
shelter behind a wall. There were a small number of buildings in this area. Frank 
decided to dodge across the road and into a shop. He came out pleased as punch with 
some booty, but a German tank, which promptly shelled and destroyed the shop, had 
noticed either him or his section. Franks' sergeant, George Frame, got them to move in 
no uncertain terms, and when in a slightly better position reminded Frank forcibly "we 
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are not on a bloody scheme any more. Grow up!"68 On 15th June the Battalion returned 
to the Ell on area to rest. 
At Buceels on 16th June, 2nd Essex were being pushed forward to attempt 
another hard task - the taking of Tilly-sur-Seulles. Patrols sent forward late in the day 
reported no enemy movement on the slopes south and southeast of Pont de la Guillette. 
It was a miserable time there, and Phillip Maillou of the anti-tank platoon, remembers 
they needed an armoured bulldozer to get them through the bank and off the Bayeux 
road where they dug in the guns. It was pouring with rain and the German barrage was 
constant. 
We were really keeping our heads down. It was a miserable time. I can 
remember an issue of rum. We did a guard of two on and two off I remember 
my turn was at 4 o'clock in the morning and when I got up there was no one on 
guard! If an officer had come along we would all have been shot at dawn!69 
On 17th June orders were given to take Tilly, with the attack starting at 1600hrs. 
Helped by a troop of A VRES tanks and the usual artillery, the battalion advanced on 
either side of the road and dug in that night in a crescent covering the northern 
approaches to the village. The following day C Company got into the village followed 
by the other Companies, and were involved in house-to-house fighting and clearing for 
most of the day, and throughout the night. A feature of this was the extensive use made 
by the Germans of different mines and booby traps. Even as far back behind the Essex 
at Pont de la Guillette, Germans still infiltrated back. Charles Benford of the Carrier 
Platoon tells how they lost their officer Captain Harrison. "A four man section of 
Pioneers were sent out onto the bridge to lift mines. On the other side of the bridge was 
a German sniper. The sniper killed two and pinned the other two down."70 Another 
section went out to try and get them back, but dared not approach, and they got pinned 
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down. Finally it seems Captain Harrison decided he could get the men and went onto 
the bridge. The sniper killed him. "He was a bit of a daredevil. "71 
In Tilly itself, Corporal Harry Conn moved forward towards the crossroads with 
his platoon, house clearing as they went. A Spandau opened fire causing a brick splinter 
to cut Harry's temple. Throwing a phosphorous grenade into the Spandau team, they 
shot some down as they ran away screaming. A German tank appeared and opened fire. 
Corporal Conn asked for a PIA T, but it was confessed that they had all been left behind 
due to weight. They stayed in the ruins all night. The morale of some of the men was 
dropping and Harry punched one man who panicked trying to get out. Harry sent a 
Lance Corporal to get help but he stood on an anti-personnel mine.72 
Corporal Toni Mansi did not get far into Tilly. His section was carrying out a 
flanking attack on a house on the outskirts of the town, with another section doing a 
frontal assault. An A VRE fired three bombs into the house, and on the third bomb the 
section moved in. Corporal Mansi was patted on the back to go by the Platoon officer. 
Mansi got up and went over a little hedge with some wire, and could see the house with 
one or two trees in front and slit trenches in the garden: 
As I got to the slit trench I remember firing down the trench. As I went to fire all 
I remember is an explosion, a terrific blast and that was it. I knew no more until 
it was late evening time. I think that we had been left for dead. When I came to, 
I was face down. The sleeve of my jacket and legs of my trousers had gone 
where the blast had taken away the material. As I lay there I could see my arm 
was all covered in blood, there were leaves and grass all stuck to it. I had no 
helmet, and as I came to I tried to look around, and I could see a pair of boots 
and hear a voice calling out for help. As I moved around I could see it was the 
chap following me as I moved in. I had caught the blast from an anti-personnel 
mine that leapt out of the ground and caught me up each leg, one arm and 
buttocks, he was behind me and he got it full face. He was calling for help and I 
joined him. It seemed ages but suddenly a medic appeared and I said, "don't 
come in its booby-trapped," and you could see some of these wires. He said, 
"we'll get you out" and he dragged me back and got me up. He cut stuff off me, 
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and shook white powder over my wounds and bandaged me up. They did the 
chap next to me and he had a very bad face, terrible, and then after that a jeep 
appeared. I said to this medic "did we capture the house?" He told me yes and 
that everything was OK. I told him to take rations etc. out of my pack as that 
wasn't going with me. The two of us were put on the jeep and taken back.73 
By 0800 on 19th June it was being reported that the enemy had withdrawn from 
Tilly, but the Germans were shelling it heavily, and mines were proving a deadly 
problem. But the town had finally been taken from Panzer Lehr. From 1400hrs on 20th 
June, 2nd Essex were gradually withdrawn and went for rest to Ellon. The last of B 
Company was withdrawn under cover of darkness. Units of the Durham Light Infantry 
took their place.74 It has been written, "the lyrical name of Tilly-sur-Seulles became a 
synonym for fear and endless death."75 All three of 56th Brigade's battalions had fought 
hard and suffered terribly in this area of Normandy just a few kilometres square. 
50th and 7th Armoured Divisions had taken eleven days from Bayeux to cover 
the twelve kilometres down the Tilly 'road and capture the town. Units had also 
advanced to the west, and the lateral road from Tilly to Lingevres and on to La Belle 
Epine was finally in British hands. But the initial target of lOih June was still a kilometre 
and a half south of Tilly. The next lateral road from Le Pont de J uvigny to Hottot and 
beyond was firmly out of reach. However the Panzer Lehr Division had been badly 
mauled by the men of 50th Division and 7th Armoured Division and the German threat 
of a drive to the coast wrecked. The commander of Panzer Lehr, General Fritz 
Bayerlein, wrote after the war: 
The British counter-attacked next day (lOth June). They massed an unbelievable 
concentration of heavy artillery and I was glad when we finally were out of it. 
We pulled out ofTilly on 15th June and the British filled the gap. My chance to 
drive to the sea was lost. We pulled back south of Aunay to regroup. We had 
lost about 100 tanks to the British. Half my striking force was gone. 76 
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It was more than two weeks since the landing craft were loaded in England, and 
for the first time all three Battalions of 56th Brigade were out of the line, able to rest. 
They had each lost many men killed and wounded, while others had been taken out of 
the fight shell-shocked or 'bomb happy' - a term often used. How had they fared as 
untried units in their first major actions? Firstly it can be appreciated that in each major 
battle the men stuck to their tasks, despite the shocking scenes and loss of comrades 
around them. Secondly it is clear that in each major confrontation, the units often 
attacked without adequate reconnaissance being carried out, and often without sufficient 
prior planning and preparation being possible. They often had tremendous artillery 
support, but final assaults took place close in, and a determined enemy came out of his 
slit trench or building and fought back hard. In these initial contacts the men often 
fought without close armour support. Had both arms, infantry and armour, been 
proficient at working together as the German army did, casualties among both infantry 
and armour may well have been lower. Finally, they often faced an enemy that equalled, 
or possibly on occasion outnumbered them, and the important point here is that it was 
56th Brigade doing the attacking, when it is often considered that an attacker needs a 
superiority of three to one at least over the defender. As time went on, it was 
increasingly and inevitably the German defender, behind earth bank or building, who 
knew and had prepared the ground. Brigadier Pepper seems to have had a good grip on 
situations as they arose, and this is borne out by his leadership, and examples of his 
immediate action during the battles at Sully, Essex Wood and the attacks on Tilly-sur-
Seulles. 
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Chapter Six. 
Holding the Right Flank- Desperate Fighting in the Bocage. 
June 2181 to 8th August 1944. 
By June 21"1 1944 all three Battalions and Brigade HQ were concentrated in the 
area of Ell on for rest and refurbishment. That day the Brigadier visited the battalions 
between 1700hrs and 1900hrs and the War Diary reports that he 'gave a talk on the 
present situation on 2nd Army Front.' 1 Casualties sustained by 56th Brigade up to this 
time were as follows: Brigade HQ: 2 other ranks, 2nd South Wales Borderers: 9 officers 
and 144 other ranks, 2nd Glosters: 3 officers and 53 other ranks and 2nd Essex: 8 officers 
and 195 other ranks.2 The Brigade War Diary just gives the list as casualties and does 
not distinguish between dead and wounded or different categories of wounded. The 
War Diary of 203 Field Ambulance, the unit under command of 56th Brigade, mentions 
receiving heavy casualties on 8/9th June (2nd South Wales Borderers at Sully) and 2nd 
Essex and 2nd Glosters on 11th June (Verrieres and Tilly), but no actual figures are 
given. Also an illuminating entry from 203 Field Ambulance War Diary on 15th June 
states, 'the men of the battalions are definitely showing signs of stress. ' 3 
This is not surprising considering that the battalions had been in permanent 
action for eight days by then, including some very harrowing periods. Brigadier 
Hargest, 4 the official observer with 50th Division, reported on 21 "1 June 1944 that 
'the morale of 50 Div is still high after 15 days of fighting. The men are tired and 
need a rest - the present cold wet spell is very trying.' But by 25th June he was 
reporting 'the men are tired after 18 days unrelieved strain. The advances have no 
impetus. The English (UK) soldier will accept losses without losing morale 
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provided he sees some results - but this niggling is hard on him. '5 The strain 
imposed on the men of the fighting arms in 50th (N) Division was worsening 
because of the unrelenting nature of fighting in the bocage. With the situation 
bogged down through tenacious German defence and the type of countryside 
successful tactical manoeuvring became very difficult and costly in casualties. 
The Battalion War Diaries vary in the depth of their reporting of events and 
rarely seem to be able to keep up with the c~sualty figures. 2nd South Wales 
Borderers War Diary does not report at all on exact numbers of casualties or 
reinforcements during June 1944. The War Diary of 2nd Glosters gives 71 
reinforcements arriving by 25th June, but only 40 casualties between 6th June to 25th 
June. The latter figure is almost certainly inaccurate given the casualties reported in 
the Brigade War Diary and their heavy involvement between Bayeux and Tilly-sur-
Seulles over this period. 2nd Essex report 147 casualties for the same period, but this 
does not include the estimated 150 casualties at the Essex Wood action. Their War 
Diary reports receiving 202 reinforcements in this period. 
These discrepancies can be understood when considemtion is given to the fact 
that the officer writing the War Diary was the Battalion Intelligence Officer, 
probably a Lieutenant in his late teens or early twenties, whose main job was to 
provide briefings on situations to the senior officers in the battalion. He gained this 
information from the immediate interrogation of prisoners, information received 
from the forward companies and intelligence from higher formations. He would 
have had no formal training in writing the War Diary, and just picked this up as one 
of his jobs. Add this to the shelling and mortaring taking place on HQ areas only a 
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few hundred yards behind the front lines, and it becomes clear that to be able to 
keep information accurately became impossible at times. Considering the worries 
about the reinforcement situation touched on in Chapter 2, it would be unlikely that 
any infantry battalion would rise above or even reach its establishment figure at this 
time. 
During June 1944, the British and Canadian casualty figures from all causes 
were lower than the expected figure calculated prior to the invasion. They have been 
given as 24,698, of which 3,356 were killed. This means that for every man killed 
over six were wounded. There were many fewer casualties taken on D-Day than 
projected, but by the end of July 1944 they were exceeding estimates. The 
reinforcement situation during June was good with the number of reinforcements 
dispatched from the UK reaching 38,000.6 However now in the bocage, and with a 
series of operations planned by Montgomery chiefly to outflank or encircle Caen, 
the casualty figures would be heavy, and from the end of June the reinforcement 
situation for British forces grew steadily worse and reached crisis point by August. 
Gordon Duffin of 2nd Glosters remembers a conversation with his best fiiend during 
June 1944: 
Half to three quarters the people we knew disappeared. If they were 
wounded or killed or just moved to different units, even Companies within 
our own battalion, we never saw them again. We had only been in 
Normandy just over a week, and I find my mate Spike scribbling on the back 
of a fag packet. I say to him "You won't get a bet on here Spike, I don't 
know where you will fmd a bookmaker." He replied, "I am not writing that 
out kid. Check them figures and see if that's correct". So I check them and 
that it looks right to me. "What is it?" "Its how long we've got over here". 
"Well you can't know that" I said. "Oh yes, the figures tell us. That is the 
casualties we have had up to now, that's the number in the rifle companies, 
so we shall all be gone in six weeks. "7 
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A very similar story is told by Stan Daines of 2nd Essex that one day in their 
slit trench, sometime after the battle at Essex Wood, Stan saw his best friend and 
No.2 on their Bren gun "Biondie" Goodyear writing on the back of a cigarette 
packet. Stan remarked that it was difficult to place a bet from where they were; 
Blondie replied that he was working out their possibility of survival, which 
according to him was six weeks. Stan 'Biondie' Goodyear was killed by mortar fire 
on 2nd August 1944, and Stan Daines wounded and captured two days later.8 They 
lasted three weeks longer than Blondie's' calculation, but even before their death or 
capture, each had already received 'minor' wounds requiring medical attention. 
Of course some men lasted a short time, some longer. Some replacements 
lasted only a day or two or even minutes. Gordon Duffin lasted sixteen weeks 
between woundings and one of his friends went through until a month before the 
end of the war and then went 'bomb happy' and had to be sent back. Ted Castle 
states, "In three months in France the battalion (2nd Glosters) changed you know. 
They (The replacements) had had a few months training and we had been training 
for years. "9 In fact the majority of men interviewed for this study were wounded or 
injured at least once, and a number up to three times. They just kept getting sent 
back. Eventually there were not enough trained infantry for the conflict and men 
from all arms, and even Naval and Air Force men, found themselves quickly re-
trained as infantrymen destined for the Army. Repeatedly asking for a comb out of 
Royal Marines aboard ships and on shore stations to add to the infantry, by 
December 1944 Churchill, reflecting on, and trying to stop the break up of 50th 
Division, was complaining to his Chiefs of Staff that 'one set of men are sent back 
again and again.' 10 
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One thing that had changed within the Brigade was that it had become an 
experienced unit. It had stood stern tests and came through them as well and 
sometimes better, than other infantry units. "We were no longer green; rather we 
were troops who had been fully seasoned very quickly"11 Frank Rosier believes that 
"the British soldier was often fairly naive in combat. But the longer you lasted, 
something definitely changed in you after a few weeks of combat and your chances 
of survival increased."12 Montgomery had brought back to Britain three veteran 
divisions to take part in the Normandy Campaign, 50th Northumbrian (Infantry) 
Division, 51 "1 Highland (Infantry) Division and 7th Armoured Division (Desert 
Rats). Criticism has been levelled at especially two of these Divisions, 51"' Highland 
and 7th Armoured, ''Neither the Highlanders nor the Desert Rats seem to have been 
prepared for the difficult fighting in the bocage, where they appeared weary and 
frequently over cautious. "13 It is worth pointing out that these criticisms have not 
been made against 50th Division or the US 151 Division similarly brought back by 
Bradley. A discussion of this is beyond this study, but pertinent to the success in 
action of 56th Infantry Brigade in June 1944 are these words by Major General H. 
Essame, an officer in the First World War and Brigadier in Normandy, when 
outlining the difference between the experienced units and those units who had been 
training in UK since Dunkirk: 
They (the experienced units) tended to adopt a patronising attitude towards the 
rest of the Army who had been training in Britain since Dunkirk, training so 
strenuously that to many of them the prospect of real fighting, as contrasted 
with shadow boxing, had come with profound relief. They were in fact, the 
best trained and the best equipped troops who ever left the shores of Britain. 14 
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For the men of 56th Brigade, a few days were spent in resting and refurbishing 
equipment. By now mobile bath units and the town Public Baths at Bayeux were 
open for the use of troops, and this largely undamaged town, was a centre for rest 
and relaxation. Between 16th and 19th June 2"d Glosters went to Bayeux for baths, 
where even here the tension of battle could show itself, "Now Bayeux is completely 
different than D+ 1. There's bunting all up, packed with more service men than I had 
ever seen. Everyone is smart, flashing and gleaming. Then there are us straight out 
of the slit trench."15 Sitting down outside the Municipal Baths they dozed until 
Gordon Duffin received a kick. Looking up he saw three guardsmen "all done up to 
the nines." One guardsman looking down made fun of them. "Glosters, I have heard 
of county regiments, but I didn't know they were so filthy!" Another Gloster invited 
Duffin to "Shoot the bugger Duff!" The Bren gun was cocked and aimed. A 
timeserving Sergeant from the Guards apologised and defused the situation by 
giving his men a very serious talking to and explaining to the Glosters that "they 
(the guardsmen) are green and have only just landed."16 
Other men have better memories of Bayeux. From the diary of Lieutenant 
Somerville (2nd South Wales Borderers), "We found the town absolutely packed 
with troops and De Gaulle had just been there and all the civilians were out in the 
streets. Le Lion D'Or was going strong and I managed to get a bath and a 
marvellous dinner."17 Rank gave the possibility of a different experience than that 
of the ordinary soldier but even so Private Bill Speake, also of 2"d South Wales 
Borders, found himself sitting in a small packed cafe, drinking green coloured 
liquor and enjoying himself. On leaving he had not gone very far when he realised 
he had left his brand new sniper's rifle behind, and he returned at 'the double' to the 
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cafe. Before he reached it two Military Policemen posed the question "Is this your 
rifle son?" and upon receiving the affirmative instead of the expected arrest, Bill 
was told "Well son look after it as it is the only thing'that will look after you out 
here!" With that the Military Police returned to the cafe. 18 Back at the Municipal 
Baths, the French attendant had tears streaming down his face, as he listened to a 
hundred Welshmen singing 'a song from the tune of which he thought was 'The 
Marseillaise' but whose words he luckily could not understand.' 19 Concerts by 
'Stars in Battledress' were also held, and for a few days at least, the men were not 
face to face with the enemy, though in earshot of the battle. Normal battalion 
training and events were re-established as the 2nd Essex War Diary reports that Bren 
Guns were zeroed-in at a nearby quarry and training carried out to improve the 
battalion snipers working as a team. Parades and a morning service of Holy 
Communion were also re-established. 
This near idyll could not last, and 2nd South Wales Borderers were moved to 
La Senaudiere on 23rd June to fill a gap in 69th Brigade positions on the lateral road 
between Tilly-sur-Seulles and La Belle Epine that had been the objective of nearly a 
fortnight earlier, now finally reached. By late June the Brigade had a new task 
centred to the southwest of Bayeux, around an area of thick bocage country named 
the Bois de Saint Germain and a village named on maps as Granville. Battalion 
Senior and HQ Section officers were involved in reconnaissance and planning for 
the move. Maps today give a name of Crauville for this village. In 1944 the 
woodland of the Bois de Saint Germain was more extensive than today and has been 
described by 2nd South Wales Borderers War Diary as causing much anxiety, 
especially as it was large dense and gloomy. Cattle in this area added more 
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problems by roaming around and setting off trip wires and mines. 'A great number 
were killed and gave off an appalling Stench as they lay in the summer sun swollen 
like toy balloons with their legs thrust out stilly. As a result the area was full of 
flies and bluebottles. '20 
Interpretation of aerial photography pronounced the wood empty. This was not 
the case as was soon discovered. German camouflage and capacity for concealed 
movement was excellent in this area and usually throughout the Norman 
countryside. In fact the area proved to be well defended with numerous machine 
gun posts and heavily wired and mined strong points. By 1430hrs on 28th June 2nd 
Essex had established their company positions, taking over from 7th Green 
Howards. At midnight on the same day 2nd Glosters established themselves at 
Parfouru l'Eclin, relieving 1'1 Rifle Brigade, and on 1'1 July, 2nd South Wales 
Borderers had moved into position between 2nd Essex and 2nd Glosters, at a small 
hamlet called La Butte. Once again 56th Brigade held the right flank of the British 
Army in an arc of three kilometres in length, from west of Parfouru L 'Eel in, to just 
south of Langrage, thus flanking this strong German position. As it turned out the 
Brigade was to remain here for the whole month of July. 
Moving a complete battalion at once, including the Carriers, battalion transport 
and extra transport, was a complicated procedure. This was usually organised by the 
Battalion Motor Transport Officer or 'MTO'. Drivers had to know routes, speed and 
the signing on the routes. 'Operation Ocean Swell,' is a set of orders for the move, 
which remains with the 2nd Glosters War Diary. The whole battalion appears to have 
moved at once, with the Carriers leading in the order, Carrier platoon, mortar 
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platoon, anti-tank platoon and pioneer platoon. These were followed by Troop 
Carrying Vehicles (TCV's) in order Battalion HQ, A, B, C, and D Companies. Each 
company was moved in six TCV's, and the Battalion HQ required two lorries. Eight 
other lorries carried the battalion kit, ammunition, food and other sundry items. 
AJtogether probably over seventy vehicles were on the move. Consider that 2nd 
Essex, 203 Field Ambulance and other Brigade supporting units all moved on 28th 
June, and then the units they were replacing moved out, one gets an idea of the 
logistical problems involved. That this could be a~hieved in daylight and along 
narrow country roads was thanks to excellent planning and air superiority. 
Arrangements were made for the 2nd Glosters rifle companies to embuss in the 
Support Company field and drivers were ordered that 'It.is essential that all TCV's 
move fast and move together in order to avoid blocking the roads behind the 
debussing point. ' 21 Signs indicating 'Prepare to Debus' and 'Debussing point' were 
put in position at the end of the journey to prepare each lorry load for immediate 
dismount and dispersal. 
To begin with the battalions were involved in dangerous patrol work to find 
out where the enemy positions were and their strength. In country such as this 
where you could walk right up to a well-camouflaged enemy without seeing him, 
this was nerve-wracking work. Gordon Duffin and Ernie Partridge of 2nd Glosters 
give a good idea of what a daylight patrol meant to the infantryman in bocage 
countryside: 
So off you go up the road. Now you have a choice, do you go up the middle 
of the road, where you will be a sitting duck as you turn the bend, because 
that's where they will be? Do you walk in the ditch and tread on a mine or 
trip wire? It's up to you, please yourself. Some would choose the ditch, tread 
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on a mine or not. Some would choose the road and be shot or not, whatever 
their luck was. That is called 'Advance to contact'. You don't know where 
they are except they are in front. So you have to walk forward until you are 
shot at.22 
Ernie Partridge describes the patrol where he ended wounded. "Our Corporal, 
who was a nice chap, said to me "would you be scout today?" "Christ" I said "why 
me?'' He said, "well someone's got to do it!" "I said "if I do it today I won't get it 
tomorrow".23 Some grassland was crossed as far as possible off the road. Ernie was 
leading about forty yards in ahead of the first Section of the Platoon. He realised the 
ground had been mined, as all the grass on top had dried, and so he stopped the first 
section and indicated the danger by hand signals. He carried on down to a little track 
with the Platoon Commander and first section following. When crossing the track 
he saw a shed and signalled the section to stop and get down while he went forward 
to check. At this point the section were only about 20 metres behind. "Up to the 
shed, before I had time to shoot, this Jerry bayonets me through the leg. The men 
behind shot him down. I had crept up and surprised him really. I don't remember a 
lot after that as the medical blokes came up and gave me a jab. "24 
Patrols were also sent out to capture Germans for unit identification and 
interrogation purposes. The War Diary of 2nd Glosters still holds a number of patrol 
reports which are very useful in understanding why and where patrols were sent out. 
One particular patrol led by Lieutenant Burton on 3rd July received congratulations 
on its success from no less than General Bucknall at XXX Corps HQ. It was a 
daylight patrol starting at l210hrs and returning at 1355hrs. Its purpose was to find 
out the strength of the enemy at a location about 500 metres away and involved 
intricate movement along hedges, over a bridge and along buildings. The patrol was 
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described as a fighting patrol and consisted of Lieutenant Burton and thirteen men. 
As was sometimes the case an artillery shoot had been arranged to cover the patrol 
by isolating the enemy position and covering the withdrawal. It is a straightforward 
report that nevertheless brings home both the brutality of war and the high degree of 
training and commitment needed to complete the task successfully. After getting 
close enough to observe the enemy position 'I (Lieutenant Burton) doubled across 
the road and saw two Boche in a slit trench. I tried to pull them out, but they 
wouldn't come. A burst of Sten persuaded them, so I dragged them out. ' 25 One ran 
across the road as ordered, but the other, who was wounded, either would not or 
could not, so he was shot. In the meantime another German had appeared and 
crossed the road as ordered, but then lay down and refused to move. "I tried 
everything possible to get him to move but he refused." He too was shot. The patrol 
returned with the remaining prisoner and German machine gun from the position?6 
Another 2"d Gloster, Len Cox, was wounded on one of these early patrols sent to 
recce 'Burnt Out Farm.' (La Couarde Farm today). They were sent to see if the 
Germans had it occupied or not: 
During the afternoon we were sent on patrol. We went through this gate and 
up into the field and they fired a Spandau at us. I hit the deck then. I crawled 
down the field through a load of old thistles. The Spandau gunner saw the 
thistles moving, I had stopped for a breather and he hit me in the back next 
to my spine. What happened to the others I will never know, they had all 
gone except Gunga. The Corporal had been killed. Gunga went and got his 
Sten gun. I actually managed to run back! My wound felt numb at the time 
and only later gave a lot of pain. When I got back the lads dressed it for me, 
and a jeep came up and put me on a stretcher on top and took me back to the 
Battalion RAP. The doctor said we will give this man a cup of tea. It was 
one of the best cups of tea I had ever had! They sent me to the Field General 
Hospital in big marquees in Bayeux, where they removed the bullet and I 
was evacuated to England in a Dakota?7 
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By October Leo Cox had recovered. During his time recuperating he was given 
compassionate leave to return home and help clear up the family home as a VI 
rocket bomb had bombed out his family. Sent back to 2"d Glosters in October, he 
lasted a few weeks before being shelled and returned to Britain. Physically 
downgraded, and retrained after recuperating in England, he was again sent back to 
Europe to work in the Guards Armoured workshops and an Anti-Tank Battery. Such 
was the lot of the 'Poor Bloody Infantry' only able to leave the campaign in North 
West Europe after severe wounding, death or eventual victory. 
There were four main types of patrol: a fighting patrol, with typically thirteen 
men; standing patrols to observe and maintain dominance over say a crossroads, 
typically containing two NCO's and six men; a patrol 'to contact' with the enemy 
which might be made up of as few as an NCO and two men; and reconnaissance 
patrols, again of as few as one NCO and three men. Each day or night a battalion 
may have put out up to ten patrols at a time for different purposes. The following 
are typically British passwords, first challenge, then response, as used on 200 
Glosters patrols: FISH-ClllPS, WHISKY-SODA, CHOP-SUEY, COLD-FEET, 
PORK-BEANS, HOME-GUARD. 28 
Gordon Duffin, who talks about the frequent and frightening shelling and 
mortaring, gives a good idea of what holding this static line meant on a day-to-day 
basis in this area: 
They (the Gennans) would bring up an 88mm a couple of fields away and 
fire into the other side of the bank, which blew out all the earth and muck 
our side. After a couple of quick shots it was moved. Or bring up a mortar 
on a motorbike and sidecar at night. You would hear them drive up and set 
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up and fire half a dozen bombs then clear off. Because they knew which 
hedgerow we were in. We had to assume they were in the next hedgerow.29 
The vigorous patrol work discovered that facing the Brigade was the German 
277 Infantry Regiment, backed by tanks of 2 Panzer Division, one of the most 
experienced Panzer Divisions of the war. A great deal of planning had been going 
on in the background preparing for an attack by 56th Brigade to go in on gth July. 
However some days before this on 2nd July Brigadier Pepper had informed the HQ's 
ofthe Battalions that he was relinquishing command of 56th Brigade and was taking 
command of 131'1 (Queen's) Brigade. The Commander of 131'1 Brigade was to take 
command of 56th Brigade. It was an interesting change of commanders, especially 
as it seems a like-for-like swap. The reasons behind it need some examination, 
especially as in the Battalions not every one was happy with the change. In the first 
place Brigadier Pepper seems to have endeared himself to many as well as proving 
an able brigade commander. He had formed the Brigade with little time prior to D-
Day, and made it into an effective unit, building up its esprit-de-corps and identity 
through use of the unique Sphinx Badge, and by letting people know what was 
going on via the Sphinx newspaper. 
Frank Dilworth at Brigade HQ has this to say about Pepper: "He was a popular 
white haired old feller. He was all right and if you were in a field he would walk 
along the trucks where they were parked along the hedgerow and he would stop and 
talk to you all. "30 Tony Atcherley a signaller at Brigade HQ gives a similar picture: 
Brigadier Pepper was rather a lively nice fellow, who had to do a lot of 
dashing about, usually without his helmet, as a lot of people with red tabs on 
did, I don't know if they thought they were specially protected or people 
wouldn't be able to shoot at them! I didn't see a lot of him, but sometimes at 
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Brigade HQ he was usually talking to the Colonels and went swanning off 
again. So I think he spent his time zooming around the battalion HQs and 
presumably back to Div. sometimes. He probably didn't even carry a 
sidearm or anything. You felt he thought he was invincible, 
a really likeable character who you admired.31 
In his diary, Lt Somerville of 2nd South Wales Borderers was not happy, 
writing on July 5th when Pepper left that, "This was a great blow as he had been the 
inspiration of the Bde. All the men knew and loved him. He always had a smile and 
a word for everybody." More unhappily on the next day he wrote, "Our new 
Brigadier MS Ekin had been commanding 131 Bde and was changed with Pepper. 
Rumour has it he is not much good."32 
This is an important point, that the new Brigadier arrived already under a 
cloud, and it is worth examining the reasons. Much of this unfortunate state of 
affairs is revealed by the fact that he took over 131 31 Brigade in late January 1944, 
when its very popular Brigadier 'Bolo' Whistler was promoted and posted to 3rd 
Division. 131 st Brigade, it must be remembered, considered themselves part of an 
elite, the 'Desert Rats', 7th Armoured Division. General Erskine, in command of 7th 
Armoured Division, was also upset at this time by having to give up a number of his 
team that had been forged in the Western Desert. The new Brigadier Ekins was 
looked upon as adhering very much to the rulebook, and having a peacetime attitude 
to soldiering. A major in 13131 Brigade was later to say 'He would look at us at 
times as if we were from another planet. With our battle experience, he must have 
realised we had the edge on him. Even later on in battles it took him a long time to 
learn and fortunately he did not stay with us very long.' 33 
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During the battle on 13/14th June at Villers Bocage, Ekins had become cut off 
for a period from 131st Brigade HQ during the confused fighting. Possibly the 
change was brought about as the battlefield was looking rather static where 56th 
Brigade was, and it was thought that Pepper would be a better commander for 131 "1 
Brigade, who were more likely, as part of 7th Armoured Division, to be involved in 
bolder dashes. It also gave Ekins a fresh start with a Brigade in which the battalions 
had served mainly in the UK. One other thing that was clear by now, was that each 
of the three Lieutenant Colonels leading the battalions, Elliott, Biddle and Barlow, 
were seen as being good at their job, respected by their men. They had formed their 
own tight knit team. There are hints that their strength of character led to friction 
between them and the new Brigadier. 
An example of this appears in the attack on the Bois de Saint Germain and 
Granville (Crauville) feature. Lt Colonel Elliott when discussing the action and the 
part played by 2nd Essex acknowledges the fact that originally the Bois de Saint 
Germain, known to be strongly occupied, was not to be attacked, yet would remain 
a serious threat on the 2nd Essex flank. 'Eventually Bde directed that I send one 
platoon (of C Company) through the wood as a fighting patrol, but this was not 
satisfactory unless the position in the end proved less effective than patrolling had 
indicated. ' 34 The 2nd Essex War Diary notes, 'a stream of visitors from supporting 
arms all day as attack was laid on at very short notice. '35 In fact, although the tiny 
Royal Artillery Auster air observation planes could see ample evidence of slit 
trenches and tracks in the British sector, nothing could be seen over the German 
side. But this was due to the excellence of German camouflage techniques and their 
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need to stay hidden, otherwise the all-seeing aircraft would direct shells a plenty 
onto any target. 
In effect the plan of attack for gth July kept 2"d Glosters firm-based and in 
reserve on the far right flank, while in the middle 2"d South Wales Borderers was to 
advance over two kilometres from La Butte on either side of the road leading 
southeast to the crossroads at Granville, move on to capture the next junction on the 
lateral Hottot-Ies-Bagues to Caumont L'Evente road, and continue to the next 
ridgeline at La Chapelle. Meanwhile, 2nd Essex on the left, was to outflank the Bois 
de Saint Germain and cut the road to Caumont at La Croix-des-Landes. If successful 
this attack would capture a great deal of ground, and provide a jumping off point for 
the next stage attacking further south and east, and breaking out of the bocage. This 
attack also went in at the time when Montgomery began a major, and eventually 
successful assault to take Caen. Both battalions were given a great deal of support. 
Some armoured bulldozers were to be used to break through the banks of the 
bocage, and 2"d Essex had Sherman and 'Crocodile' flame throwing tanks, while 2nd 
South Wales Borderers report a wide range of support, including 'a platoon of 
4.2inch mortars, two platoons of medium machine guns, a tank squadron of 4/7 
Dragoon Guards, a troop of M. I 0 tank destroyers, a troop of flail tanks, a troop of 
A VREs and a troop of Crocodile flame throwers. ' 36 A field squadron of Royal 
Engineers were also attached to aid mine clearance. Add the Field Ambulance Unit 
and the 17-pounder Anti-Tank Battery attached to each battalion, and one begins to 
see the extent of planning and liaison needing to be carried out by an infantry 
battalion commander in organising an attack. Despite all these plans and patrols, 
what had not been realised was that the German 277 Regiment were launching an 
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attack also on glh July, using their three battalions backed by tanks of 2nd Panzer 
Division, against the British positions. 
The South Wales Borderers attacked at 0800hrs with heavy artillery support. C 
Company on the west, or right, of the road axis advanced south and reached the 
cross roads at Granville. They moved under cover of the artillery bombardment, but 
came under German mortar fire and encountered anti-personnel and anti-tank 
mines. These last held up the tank support, tanks and infantry became separated and 
the infantry forged ahead. Also A Company, on the other side of the road, was held 
up at the large farm just before the crossroads. After dealing with this fortified 
position they were further held up by heavy German mortar fire and Spandau fire, 
which came from the northwest corner of the Bois de St. Germain. Starting to 
reorganise they came under further heavy mortar fire and an A VRE tank supporting 
them was blown up on a mine. Further advance seemed impossible and movement 
stalled. C Company encountered enemy fire, but continued and reached their 
objective at La Chapelle cross roads. Here they spread out either side of the cross 
roads, covering some 500 metres. D Company came forward to support them, being 
heavily mortared on the way, and also having two men killed by an electrified 
fence. This last incident is unique as far as the author is aware. 
B Company were now ordered to exploit the advance of C and D Companies 
and attack the Bois de Saint Germain from behind, thus allowing A Company to 
continue on the left flank. This was a complicated manoeuvre and was almost 
complete when C Company was hit by an unexpected German counter attack. They 
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took many casualties and were forced back on B Company, who were facing the 
wrong way. 37 
Bill Speake was in the middle of this, digging in with the survivors of C 
Company near La Chapelle. As well as his duties as a sniper he was also acting as 
bodyguard to the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) with C Company. The 
Company Commander, Major Fay, had already been shot in the legs and was out of 
action. Captain Thum took over command. Speake's slit trench was near a hedge. 
Suddenly they were heavily mortared and a bomb landed next to him and the FOO. 
The FOO was killed. The mortaring was intense and Bill found later that his 
eardrums had burst. He remembers that German infantry were swiftly all over them. 
Worried that as a sniper he would be shot out of hand if captured, he had just time 
to hide his sniper rifle, maps and telescope by sliding them into the hedge, when a 
machine pistol was thrust in his back. Biii was taken through a gap in the hedge and 
noticed around a dozen other South Wales Borderers prisoners. Guarded by two 
German soldiers they were run through a gap in the next hedge with their hands up. 
But a camouflaged Panther tank under a tree, probably believing them to be 
advancing British infantry, opened fire and killed or wounded a number of the 
British prisoners. One of the Germans rushed through the gap and frantically waved 
for the tank commander to stop firing, which, realising his error, he did. 38 
Bill dealt with a soldier who was badly wounded in the arm, open from nearly 
top to bottom and bleeding badly. Desperately he held the few bandages the two of 
them had, over the wound to stop the bleeding. The Panther, now moving forward, 
stopped by Bill and the wounded man. The commander reached down in the turret 
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and threw down half a dozen fresh dressings. In the next few minutes their German 
captors made further acts of kindness. The captured and wounded men were moved 
back to a ruined cottage. Inside they sat around. One of the two German guards 
started demanding "Rauchen! Rauchen!". The soldiers explained they had no 
cigarettes. The guard took out tobacco and papers and passed them around the 
Welsh soldiers.39 
Not far away on the same flank, Bill Evans was with B Company. They were 
in a desperate situation, with only their right flank facing the German attack. Some 
German tanks kept coming over the hill, firing a few rounds at them, each time 
retiring back over the hill to safety. German infantry threw grenades from nearby, 
and Evans saw Germans crawling through a gap in the hedge. Using a PIAT, he hit 
and smashed the concrete electricity pole near where the Germans were coming 
through. ''No more Germans came down after that!"4° Carrying a 38 Wireless Set, 
his friend Strickland started to move up the other side, when a Spandau opened fire 
hitting him. He screamed, and Evans grabbed him and dragged him back through 
the hedge. Keeping close in to the hedge, Evans gave him a fireman's lift back to 
the stretcher-bearers.41 
One of the major problems was still tank-infantry co-operation, as the MlO's 
had withdrawn from the company area. Even so C Company immobilised two of the 
attacking German tanks before having to withdraw. The situation for 2nd South 
Wales Borderers was still very dangerous. A Company had had to withdraw two 
fields back. The area was continually drenched in mortar fire. The remnants of B, C 
and D Company withdrew to a point opposite A Company. That night C Company 
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eventually withdrew into reserve. It was reported to have only 24 men left. Over 20 
men of 2nd South Wales Borderers had been killed. Effectively the forward 
companies remained cut off overnight and it was found impossible to get rations up 
to them. 
The following morning D Company was attacked, and its left hand platoon 
was overrun. The ground was covered by fire from two German tanks. At llOOhrs 
on 9th July, a Carrier and three tanks managed to supply the forward companies with 
rations and the shelling and mortaring had become intermittent. Over 150 casualties 
had been dealt with at the Regimental Aid Post the previous day. B and C 
Companies relieved A and D Companies. Only shelling and mortaring took place 
and the position was maintained with 2 Glosters taking over some of the area for a 
time on 14th July. Between 9th and 11th July 130 reinforcements arrived with 2nd 
South Wales Borderers, and C Company numbers were increased. 
Returning to 2nd Essex on the left flank of the attack on gth July were faring, it 
is frustrating to find that the Battalion War Diary is particularly unhelpful. It has no 
entries between 7th and 11th July, an event that must be unusual if not actually 
breaking army regulations. Its writer was the Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Hugh 
Barrett-Lennard, who remained very busy during this period on tasks other than 
writing. He had joined the Battalion shortly after Essex Wood as a replacement. 
Eventually both Baronet and priest, he became one of the great chamcters of the 
Battalion, and was wounded at least twice. A year later he made up for his lack of 
writing at the time with his own series of notes. He writes that, 'looking at the map 
of the battleground one was quite shaken to see so many little blue dots that 
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indicated "known Spandau positions" and these were confirmed by the continual 
rattle of that deadly weapon. '42 
'Reveille was at 0300hrs and at first light we were forming up in orchards by 
the advanced companies and a bulldozer was smashing a path through the 
hedgerows for our vehicles to come up after the leading troops. '43 At this point the 
British artillery barrage tore into the German battalion co-incidentally forming up to 
attack at midday, causing them to suffer high casualties. Despite this, the reason for 
the tough resistance encountered by 2"d South Wales Borderers and 2"d Essex in this 
battle, is likely to be because the German infantry and their supporting armour and 
artillery were well positioned to receive an attack. Similarly to the South Wales 
Borderers, 2"d Essex infantry forged ahead, but tanks were unable to follow due to 
the presence of mines. They harboured in a field and gave supporting fire, while 
attempts were made to clear the road of mines. 
Lieutenant Colonel Elliott describes the problems of this ground 'We were 
asked to advance more than 2,000 yards through the thickest bocage imaginable -
some of the fields were no larger than tennis courts, and all banked and ditched with 
thick hedges interspersed with large trees. '44 Due to the problems faced by 2nd South 
Wales Borderers on their right flank, and the fact that it became increasingly 
obvious that the enemy were in force on three sides of the battalion, Lieutenant 
Colonel Elliott decided to halt the attack and get the companies to dig in. This was 
perhaps fortunate, although initially for the rest of that day and night the Germans 
only sent patrols to probe the 2"d Essex positions. The tank support withdrew 
promising to return in the morning. 
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Major Pat Barras told a story that exemplifies the close quarter nature of 
battles in this countryside. That evening he went into the woods unarmed to look for 
one of his platoons. Coming through a hedgerow and seeing a group of men, he 
approached them; suddenly realising they were a group of Germans. Taking to his 
heels, he crashed back through the hedgerow with the bullets chasing him. He 
reflects that if he had been armed with his Schmeisser, he may well have stopped to 
fire back and the ending been very different. 45 
The next day, before the tanks returned, there was an attack on their positions 
by 'hordes of infantry' and three German tanks, Mk. IV 'Specials,' which advanced 
down a track through the wood. Close in front of these tanks was Lieutenant 
Barrett-Lennard helping the stretcher-bearers evacuate some wounded. At this 
moment some ofC Company were clearing an area of the Bois St. Germain, when a 
company sniper rushed up to Corporal Harry Conn and said "we have got to get 
back quick." They retired back across the road just in time, as the three German 
tanks came along. A section led by Lieutenant Bob Filby ambushed the tanks with 
PIATS and immobilised the first and the last tank. The first tank was already firing 
on Barrett-Lennard's party. The commander of the middle tank appeared to 
surrender, then pulled up a Scmeisser machine pistol and shot an Essex man. He in 
turn was shot and another PIA T round hit this tank. One German escaped from this 
tank into the woods. Amazingly this 'German' (an Austrian) met Barret-Lennard in 
the 1950s at the Seminary in Rome, as both were becoming priests. 46 
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The situation was now serious with 2nd Essex battling it out against a large 
number of the enemy. However the tanks had returned and communications were 
good. Artillery was brought down to break up the enemy attacks and Typhoons 
attacked the German rear areas with rockets. It was probably this action that Philip 
Maillou from Support Company remembers as: 
Being with our Bren guns in the line. We can see through these trees no 
more than fifty yards, and we could see figures moving. Artillery is going 
over and two or three tanks were firing over our heads in support. We were 
knocking these infantry over. Afterwards we counted about sixty German 
dead. We thought how long is this going on? There is the gun sergeant and I 
am the gun corporal and we suddenly realise we have got a lot of empty 
magazines. So two or three of us start reloading the mags. We are behind a 
bank, but a lot of stuff is going over. All of a sudden there is a bang. Get a 
stretcher-bearer! Bugger off get one yourselfl A ricochet had taken a lump 
out of my leg. No one was going back to the First Aid Post under that fire. 
Eventually I did get back to the First Aid Post, where they put a bandage on 
it and had done with it. I returned to duty.47 
The 2nd Essex maintained their positions overnight and beat off more German 
attacks, the final one being stopped by the Crocodile flame tanks, even though each 
tank was holed. They had stopped and crippled a force possibly up to three times 
their size. During the action they too had lost over 20 men killed. On IIth July 2nd 
Essex and 2nd Glosters swapped positions, 2nd Essex going to Le Pont Mulot. 
Although no attacks had gone in here it was a very unhealthy place, described as 
'I ,000 yards of no mans land with burnt out farms and shell spattered fields and the 
endless dead and stinking cattle. '48 It was in this area that in the abandoned church 
tower at Torteval, on the road to 'Burnt Out Farm,' the 2nd Essex snipers found a 
French family including a child 'half shot and tied on chairs, hands behind back, 
and left to starve in no mans land. '49 But despite being in the front line the villagers 
tried to live as normal a life as possible and the cafe remained open for cider and 
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calvados. No eggs were available, as apparently the previous incumbents to 56th 
Brigade had slaughtered the chickens for food. 
The Brigade was to maintain its positions for the next two and a half weeks. 
There was a daily drain on manpower through the continuous patrolling and enemy 
shelling. Never mind that 50th Division artillery was giving back much more than its 
infantry was receiving. Over the whole of 21 Army Group 105,000 shells a day 
were being fired, well in excess of expected consumption. But the Germans had 
now brought a frightening weapon to the battlefront. The Nebelwerfer was a six-
barrelled mortar, sometimes vehicle mounted, but more often quietly manhandled or 
horse drawn into position. Cleverly they often had a banshee-wailing device 
attached, to strike fear into the troops they were aimed at. There were three brigades 
of them now in Normandy all opposing British or Canadian troops. They came in 
three calibres of l5cm, 2lcm and 30cm, and with a maximum range of three to five 
miles depending on type. 50 A battalion of 18 Nebelwerfers used together, could fire 
I 08 projectiles in seconds and concentrate their missiles into a small area, a 
terrifying spectacle for men on the receiving end. 
Again the Brigade was facing 2 Panzer Division, which was very well 
organised and has been described by one writer as 'one of the most experienced 
armoured divisions in the Wehrmacht. ' 51 They would not let the Brigade rest with 
constant attacks by mortar, self-propelled gun or sniper. The Brigade replied in kind 
and all officers were told that it was imperative to 'lean heavily on the enemy. ' 52 
This was accomplished by aggressive patrolling. Eventually, after a series of patrols 
by 2nd South Wales Borderers on 20th July, it was realised that the enemy had 
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withdrawn from the La Chapelle area and a 2nd South Wales Borderers patrol went 
forward and dug itself in. This was reinforced, and A Company then 'beat through 
the Bois de Saint Germain and established themselves on the southern edge of it. ' 53 
It was now realised just how well the La Chapelle position had been prepared for 
defence. It had been a very good observation post, allowing the Germans to look 
deep into allied lines. In the following days over 450 Teller Mines and 160 anti-
personnel mines were lifted from this area. There was extensive wiring, weapon 
slits and deep dugouts constructed by the Germans, turning the area into a small 
fortress. Despite the mine lifting, a scout car was blown up in C Company HQ area 
on 25th July and two South Wales Borderers were killed and two wounded. 
From this new position patrolling continued, especially towards the village of 
St. Germain d'Ectot, the next obvious target. One patrol brought back a wounded 
German who later died, but this established that 326 Division had taken over from 2 
Panzer. This may have explained why it had been slightly quieter and shelling less 
intensive, and by July 29th, completely quiet. On 31 51 July starting at 0530 hrs 2nd 
South Wales Borders attacked towards the ridge to the north of St. Germain d'Ectot. 
By evening they had their final objectives. It is recorded that in taking the final 
orchard on the ridge, D Company with bayonets fixed, actually trod in the flames of 
the Crocodiles supporting them. The following day, still using the Crocodiles, they 
took St. Germain d'Ectot, and pushed another kilometre forward to take the hamlet 
of Candon. On 2nd August they linked with 2nd Essex on their right, and 231'1 
Brigade on their left, at the next major feature south, Launay Ridge. This twelve-
day operation, again cost many wounded and twelve killed. Lieutenant Somerville, 
giving a vivid picture of the scene around St. Germain d'Ectot, describes the 
209 
aftermath of this continuous advance: 'we found a valuable Arty OP of the enemy 
and captured some valuable documents. There was a fair number of enemy dead in 
the St. Germain d'Ectot area who had to be buried. '54 
The 2nd Glosters had also been patrolling extensively through the Bois de Saint 
Germain, but were then moved back west, taking over American army positions on 
the 2nd South Wales Borderers right flank and further southwest. Some of their 
patrols led to small scale but vicious fighting, and they also took a number of 
casualties. On 29th July they gave up their positions to 2nd Essex and were to attack 
towards Launay and Anctonville. As they were forming up at 0500hrs a German 
aircraft dropped a bomb, which hit the 2nd Glosters ammunition truck, causing a 
number of casualties. However the truck was swiftly replaced, and via a series of 
platoon battles control was gained of the Livry to St. Germain road. On the way 
'Burnt Out Farm,' the area of so much patrol action during the month was finally 
taken, involving a major action by B Company. 
As the Glosters approached the farm, Germans in and around the buildings 
shot down and killed a section corporal and three privates from close range Spandau 
fire. Two of the Glosters Carriers shed their tracks in the narrow lanes while trying 
to manoeuvre to bring Bren gun fire to bear. A flail tank, brought up for support, 
blew up on a double-banked Teller Mine. The inevitable German mortar fire began 
to take its toll, and from further back German 88mm guns began shelling the area. A 
platoon sergeant lost his nerve and started "prancing around shouting like a 
madman".55 He was punched fair and square to bring him under control and 
escorted back to Company HQ. At about this time the Battalion 2i/c arrived to try 
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and get things moving. Climbing on the immobilised tank for a better view he was 
shot dead. 10 and 12 Platoons got closer to the farm with support from dismounted 
Bren guns from the Carriers. The men were again heavily shelled and mortared. The 
Company 2ilc then became seriously wounded. Finally the remnants of 12 Platoon 
charged the farm and cleared it at the point of bayonet. 'A small number of 
prisoners were taken. ' 56 This action was unexpected; 'Burnt Out Farm' was thought 
to be clear of enemy, or at worse lightly held. The action around the farm held up B 
Company for the whole day, and they onJy reached the expected 'start line' at dusk. 
This relatively small action, in the overall scheme of Normandy fighting, again 
underlines the difficulties faced by troops attempting to advance in the bocage. 
Afterwards the Battalion Pioneer Platoon lifted over 300 mines and dealt with 
eight booby traps on the ridgeline. The 30th July action alone cost 2nd Glosters two 
officers and sixteen other ranks killed, and five officers and forty-four other ranks 
wounded. But the actions of 2nd Glosters and 2nd South Wales Borderers had cleared 
the enemy from the ridgeline they had held for over a month. 
After a rough time patrolling from Pont Mulot, 2nd Essex were moved forward 
for the final assault on the Launay Ridge feature. Luckily by now the Germans were 
in retreat and showed relatively little inclination to hold onto this feature. Beginning 
from a taped 'start line' just forward of 'Burnt Out Farm' a heavy British artillery 
barrage preceded the advance, with the forward men of 2nd Essex following as close 
as 25yards behind this creeping barrage. Almost incredibly after the difficuJt 
fighting of the last month, 2nd Essex were expected to advance over one and a half 
miles, in only one and three quarter hours. Again the plan had been very rushed, 
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with Lieutenant Colonel Elliott only receiving his orders at 1600hrs for an attack 
starting at 1800hrs. Eventually his arguments managed to get the attack postponed 
until 2000hrs so that he could co-ordinate with the supporting arms and get his 
widely spread out battalion organised. 
However the weight ofthe artillery, plus mortars, tanks and Typhoons, blasting 
German positions, gave the enemy little inclination to hold on. 'Onlookers saw what 
was afterwards described as a perfect picture book attack. ' 57 Sergeant Peter 
Giggens, of the Mortar Platoon, went forward following the 25pdr creeping barrage 
to see if the mortars were needed. Early on they had fired some smoke. Orange silk 
marker diamonds were laid out on the front line and Typhoons also shot up the 
ridge. He was impressed by the amount of German gear lying about, which shows 
that a concentration of German troops was surprised by the attack and left in a 
hurry. Towards the top, the ground became littered with dead Germans. Suddenly 
the mortars stopped firing. He radioed back to demand why and was told that a 
mortar had exploded and killed two men. Peter told the officer to get on with it- the 
attack still needed support. Needless to say he felt he was not too popular for a time 
on his return after the attack, but he had been right.58 2nd Essex captured 100 
prisoners and the equipment of two battalions, including meals still cooking over 
German stoves. 
At last when this feature was taken, 56th Brigade had an unobstructed view in 
front of them over many miles of German held territory, and breathed a sigh of 
relief that the bocage seemed finally behind them. In fact the Germans had 
withdrawn as far back as 10 kilometres, leaving only small covering parties behind. 
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By 181 August 2nd Glosters had occupied Anctonville. After another two days around 
Launay Ridge the Brigade was taken out of the line and sent to the now safe area of 
Buceels north ofTilly-sur-Seulles for a well-earned rest. 
With Caen taken, the American breakout showing positive movement, and the 
quicker retreat of German forces, the overall Allied battle picture was slowly 
becoming more fluid and promising. The detail in the actions outlined above show 
why there is a comparison to be made between this period of the war in Normandy 
and the trench warfare of the First World War. The narrow lanes, tracks and deep 
hedgerows with fortified strongpoints bear some comparison with the trench 
systems of the earlier conflict. The weather too, was often less than kind this July, 
so that as in June, men had to put up with the wet in their tiny slit trenches and on 
patrol. During low cloud, this meant that they could not have the air cover they 
craved. Certainly casualties among the infantry were reaching levels attained at the 
worst periods of the First World War. Inevitably this constant drain on the Brigade 
was to have another effect, well known from 1914-1918, that of battle exhaustion. 
The Brigade (like all front line units) had suffered cases of battle exhaustion among 
officers and men from the beginning, and even from D+ I there were a very small 
number of incidents, where men purposefully injured themselves to get back home. 
After the terrible fighting around Tilly-sur-Seulles it is not surprising that cases of 
battle exhaustion occurred. However a number of memories recall some men being 
shaken by events, and there is some good evidence about the effects of the constant 
strain on men committed to the front line for extensive periods. 
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The War Diary of 203 Field Ambulance shows that on 8th July, the Officer 
Commanding 203 Field Ambulance, saw Brigadier Ekins 'reference numbers of 
exhaustion cases in the Brigade'59 and after a briefing from Brigadier Ekins on the 
expectation of the Brigade maintaining its defensive position on 13th July, it was 
noted that this was considered unsatisfactory 'as the troops definitely require a rest 
as shown by the large number of exhaustion cases admitted to this unit and it is 
hoped that one company a day will be taken out of the line and allowed to proceed 
to Bayeux for a bath and visit to the cinema or concert. '60 Lieutenant Colonel 
Myles, commanding 203 Ambulance Unit, was also very concerned about hygiene 
in the sites occupied by 56th Brigade Units. From 4th July he 'arranged to have a 
NCO from the Corps Hygiene Section to be attached and send him round to the 
battalions at regular intervals until the sanitation in the Bde is satisfactory. ' 61 
Despite this plea for rest from Lieutenant Colonel Myles, the battalion war 
diaries make no note of any real rest or recreation apart from baths visits until early 
in August, although a cinema called 'The Sphinx' was set up just to the rear of 56th 
Brigade positions at La Belle Epine. Normally the war diaries like to make mention 
of any recreational events, so it appears that the Brigade remained on duty 
throughout the whole of July and into August. This must be some testament to the 
efficacy and staying power of the officers and men, spending this time so close to 
the enemy and continually carrying out operations in this difficult bocage country 
described by one officer as 'the Rifle Platoon's nightmare. '62 
So from 3rd to 8th August, the Brigade moved back to rest to an area it knew 
well, and had previously cost it many casualties trying to gain. Despite the change 
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from constantly being on the edge of danger to a full rest, many reports indicate that 
it was somewhat depressing to be situated where so many bad memories remained 
However there were diversions in the shape of the Bayeux Baths and an ENSA 
show starring George Fonnby and his wife. The Battalions also put on Drumhead 
Services and their own concert parties. Even at rest though the wider war reached 
out to some men and Nicholas Somerville records that on August 7th 'Harry Reed 
had his home bombed out for the fourth time this war and went home on 
compassionate leave. He seems to have got used to it by now. '63 The VI or 
'Doodlebug' flying bombs were by now having a dramatic effect on London and the 
south east of Britain. 
Another big change for the Brigade was in hand, again caused by the number 
of casualties being inflicted on the British infantry. 56th Brigade was to leave 50th 
Division and join 59th (Staffordshire) Division. This was the most junior Division in 
the army, made up of Territorial Anny units. Its shoulder flash was a red pithead 
winding gear on a black triangular slagheap on a light blue background. Some from 
2nd Glosters at least, nicknamed them the 'Slag Heap Mob'. The move was not 
universally welcomed in the Brigade, as although only 'under command' of 50th 
(Northumbrian) Division, since the landings 56th Brigade had appreciated the 
excellent organisation and staff work of this experienced division in tenns of the 
provision of rest camps and baths, and the support of its artillery from 86th and 90th 
Field Regiments, which in the future were to be particularly missed. 
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At the Brigade drumhead service on 6th August, a message was read out from 
General Bucknall, commander of XXX Corps in appreciation of the service of 56th 
Brigade to XXX Corps: 
Given only a short space of time 2nd SWB, 2nd Glosters and 2nd Essex 
Regiments together with Brigade HQ troops have welded themselves into a 
first class team. This was a very high test for the three Regular battalions 
and illustrated how regular units can overcome all difficulties and how great 
was devotion to duty of all ranks. I realise with great regret that the 
casualties in the Brigade have been heavy and the fighting from the beaches 
fierce. I would be grateful if this letter can be read out to all ranks of 56th 
Infantry Brigade.64 
Bucknall and others though were already on their way out; swept aside by a 
string of changes Montgomery initiated, frustrated by lack of progress and believing 
these commanders were no longer up to the job. First to go was Bullen-Smith on 
15th July of 51st (Highland) Division: '51 Division is at present not (repeat not) 
battleworthy. It does not fight with determination and has failed in every operation 
it has been given to do. I consider the divisional commander to blame and I am 
removing him from command. '65 He replaced Bull en-Smith with Rennie. Then on 
2nd August Bucknall ofXXX Corps and Erskine of 7th Armoured Division received 
their marching orders: 'Have decided to remove Bucknall from command of 30th 
Corps and he will be returned to UK as soon as released by HORROCKS. Also 
necessary to replace Erskine in 7th Armoured Division. ' 66 The following day 
Montgomery sacked the well-known Brigadier 'Looney' Hinde of 22nd Armoured 
Brigade: 'Request Brigadier Mackeson be sent here by air to take command of 22nd 
Armoured Brigade vice Hinde. Certain changes necessary in 7th Armoured Division 
and Hinde is one. ' 67 
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Montgomery was under pressure from Churchill and Brooke for more tangible 
success, and relations with Eisenhower and the Americans were becoming strained. 
Also there was pressure to end the flying bomb attacks by the VI's by taking their 
launch sites, which were affecting morale and causing heavy casualties at home. 
These launch sites were still many miles away in the north of France. 
Montgomery's other headache was the increasing problem of replacement 
manpower. There was a perception that the Americans, now with many more troops 
on the ground, were doing the lion's share of the work. But the example given in 
this chapter of the resilience, fortitude and success of the men of 56th Brigade and 
the other infantry brigades, fighting against a highly experienced enemy while 
suffering heavy casualties in this most difficult of areas, flies in the face of such 
criticism. During July 1944, the focus of attention on actions carried out by the 
British Army in Normandy has often been concentrated by writers as diverse as 
D'Este in Decision in Normandy and Neillands in The Battle ofNormandy 1944, on 
such operations as Epsom, Charnwood and Goodwood, to envelop, take and then 
break away from Caen. These actions, and the perception of historians such as 
D'Este in Decision in Normandy and Ambrose in Citizen Soldiers for example that 
in some way Montgomery or the operations failed or faltered in execution, have 
formed the major part of descriptive writing and argument over Montgomery's 
tactics during July, while the hard slogging work that was done, pinning German 
forces on the right flank of the British Army, remains largely unacknowledged. 
217 
~ferences Chapter SiL Holding the Right Flank- Desperate Fighting in the Bocage. June 21"' to 
8 August 1944. 
1 TNA: PRO WO 171/650. 56 Infantry Brigade War Diary 1944. 2151 June 1944. 
2 TNA: PRO WO 171/650. 56 Infantry Brigade War Diary 1944. 21" June 1944. 
3 TNA: PRO WO 171/803. 203 Field Ambulance Unit. War Diary 1944. 9-15 June 1944. 
4 Brigadier Jarnes Hargest CBE, DSO and 2 Bars, MC. A New Zealander: in the First World War he 
served at Gallipoli and in Northern. France, rising to the rank ofLieutenant Colonel by the age of27. He 
was awarded the MC, DSO and Legion de Honneur. An MP in New Zealand from 1931 he re-joined the 
NZ Army on the outbreak of war. He saw action in Greece, Crete and North Africa before being captured 
in Libya, I 943, when his HQ was ovenun. With several other officers he escaped from Italy and returned 
to the UK. He was appointed official observer to 50th (N) Division for the Invasion ofNormandy and was 
killed by a shell or mortar on 12th August. He was well respected as a soldier for his leadership, courage, 
energy and concern for his men. Adapted from thel966 Encyclopaedia ofNew Zealand at 
http://www.teara.govt.nz/1966/H/Hargest Accessed 20th December 2008. 
5 TNA: PRO CAB 106/1060. Brigadier Hargest Reports. June 6-July I 0 1944. 
6 Ellis, Major LF., Victmy in the West. Volume 1. HMSO 1961. pp 307/308. 
7 Gordon Duffin. 2 Glosters. Interview with author 121h January 2006. 
8 Stan Daines. 2 Essex. Interview with author 21" March 2005. 
9 Ted Castle. 2 Glosters. Interview with author 9th January 2008. 
10 Churchill, WS., The Second World War. Volume VI. Penguin 1985. p 615. Letter to First Lord 
(Admiralty), Secretary of State for Air, General Is may for CIGS and COS Committee. InfofDI8tion to 
Ministry of Labour. December 3nl 1944. 
11 Vince, Lieutenant AA., 2nd Battalion The Essex Regiment. The Pompadours. D-Day to VE Day in 
North West Europe. p 12. Circa late 1940's. 
12 Frank Rosier. 2 Essex. Interview with author I" April2005. 
13 D'Este, C., Decision in Normandy. William Collins. 1983. p 271. 
14 Essame, Major General H., Normandy Bridgehead. MacDonald, London.l970. p 35. 
15 Gordon Duffin. 2 Glosters. Interview with author. 12th January 2006. 
16 Gordon Duffin. 2 Glosters. Interview with author. 12th January 2006. 
17 Brigadier Sir Nicholas Somerville CBE. 2 SWB. Personal Diary. 
18 Bill Speake. 2 SWB. Personal Memoir ''Bill's War." 
19 Boon, Major IT., History of the South Wales Borderers and the Monmouthshire Regiment. Part ll. 
The 2nd Battalion The South Wales Borderers D-Day 1944 to 1945 The Griffin Press, Pontypool, 1955. 
~40. 
Boon, Major IT., History of the South Wales Borderers and the Monmouthshire Regiment. Part ll. The 
2nd Battalion The South Wales Borderers. D-Day 1944 to 1945, The Griffin Press, Pontypool, 1955. p 42. 
21 TNA: PRO WO 171/1298. 2 Glosters War Diary 1944. Appendix A, June 1944. Operation Ocean 
Swell. 
22 Gordon Duffin. 2 Glosters. Interview with author 12th January 2006. 
23 Ernie Partridge. 2 Glosters. Interview with author 12th January 2006. 
24 Ernie Partridge. 2 Glosters. Interview with author 12th January 2006. 
25 TNA: PRO WO 171/1298. 2 Glosters War Diary 1944. July 1944, Appendix B. 
26 TNA PRO WO 171/1298. 2 Glosters War Diary 1944. July 1944, Appendix B. 
27 Len Cox. 2 Glosters. Interview with author 21" August 2006. 
28 TNA: PRO WO 171/1298. 2 Glosters War Diary 1944. 3-4 October 1944. 
19 Gordon Duffin. 2 Glosters. Interview with author 12th January 2006. 
3° Frank Dilworth. Royal Signals. Interview with author 23rd August 2006. 
31 Tony Atcherley. Royal Signals Corps. Interview with author 8th November 2006. 
32 Brigadier Sir Nicholas Somerville CBE. 2 SWB. Personal Diary. 5th and 6th July 1944. 
33 Delaforce, P., Churchills Desert Rats. Sutton, Stroud.l994. Major John Edney reported in p 3. 
34 Normandy Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel Elliott CO and Capt. H Barrett-Lennard IO, 2 Battalion 
Essex Regiment. The Pompadours. P 14. Essex Regiment Museum, Chelmsford. 
35 TNA: PRO WO 171/1295. 2 Essex War Diary 1944. 7th July 1944. 
36 TNA PRO WO 17111295 & 17111380 War Diaries 2 Essex and 2 SWB 1944. 
37 From War Diaries, History of South Wales Borderers; Boon; Sir Nicholas Somerville Personal Diary. 
Locations cited. 
36 Bill Speake. 2 SWB. Interview with author 18th November 2004. 
39 Bill Speake. 2 SWB. Interview with author 18th November 2004. 
218 
40 Bill Evans. 2 SWB. Interview with author 9th April 2005. 
41 Bill Evans. 2 SWB. Interview with author 9th April 2005. 
42 Normandy Memoirs of Capt. H. Barrett-Lennard. August 17th 1945. Essex Regiment Museum, 
Chelmsford. 
43 Vince, Lieutenant AA., 2011 Battalion The Essex Regiment. The Pompadours. D-Day to VE Day in 
l'j9rth West Europe. p 13. Circa late 1940's. 
Normandy Memoirs ofLieutenant Colonel Elliott CO and Capt. H Barrett-Lennard IO, 2 Battalion 
Essex Regiment. The Pompadours. Essex Regiment Museum, Chelmsford. 
45 Major Pat Barrass. 2 Essex. Conversation with author 7th June 2007. 
45 Father Sir Hugh Barrett-Lennard Bart. 28th October 2004 and Harry Conn 15th December 2004. 2 
Essex. Interviews with author, dates cited. 
47 Philip Maillou. 2 Essex. Interview with author 25th April 2007. 
45 Vince, Lieutenant AA., 2011 Battalion The Essex Regiment. The Pompadours. D-Day to VE Day in 
North West Europe. p 15. Circa late 1940's. 
48 Normandy Memoirs of Capt. H. Barrett-Lennard. Essex Regiment Museum, Chelmsford. 
50 George Blackburn. The Guns of War. 2000. pl23 & p 277 (Guns of Nonnandy). 
51 Keegan, J., Six Armjes in Normandy. Jonathan Cape. 1982. p 155. 
52 TNA: PRO WO 1711650. 56 Infantry Brigade War Diary 1944. 15th July 1944. 
53 TNA PRO: WO 171/1380. War Diary 2 SWB. 20th July 1944. 
54 Brigadier Sir Nicholas Somerville CBE. 2 SWB. Personal Diary 1944. 
55 Frank Clarke. 2 Glosters. Rookie Platoon. pp 38-42. Unpublished Memoir. 
56 Frank Clarke. 2 Glosters. Rookie Platoon. pp 38-42. Unpublished Memoir. 
57 Vince, Lieutenant AA., 2011 Battalion The Essex Regiment. The Pompadours. D-Day to VE Day in 
North West Europe. p 16. Circa late 1940's. 58 Peter Giggens. 2 Essex. Interview with author 22 ... March 2005. 
59 TNA: PRO WO 171/803 203 Field Ambulance War Diary. gth and 13th July 1944. 
60 TNA: PRO WO 171/803 203 Field Ambulance War Diary. 8th and 13th July 1944. 
61 TNA: PRO WO 171/803 203 Field Ambulance War Diary. 3rd July 1944. 
62 Normandy Memoirs of Capt. H. Barrett-Lennard. Essex Regiment Museum, Chelmsford. 
63 Brigadier Sir Nicholas Somerville CBE. 2 SWB. Personal Diary 1944. 
64 GeDeral Bucknall. Farewell Message from XXX Corps. Jrd August 1944. Original Copy sent to 2 
Glosters. Soldiers of Gloucestershire Museum, Gloucester. 
65 TNA: PRO CAB 10611066. Copies of telegrams between Headquarters 21" Army Group and War 
Office 1944 June-Aug; includes "M' Series. 
66 TNA: PRO CAB 106/1066. Copies of telegrams between Headquarters 21" Army Group and War 
Office 1944 June-Aug; includes "M'' Series. 
fS7 TNA: PRO CAB 106/1066. Copies of telegrams between Headquarters 21" Army Group and War 
Office 1944 June-Aug; includes "M' Series. 
219 
Chapter Seven. 
Breakthrough. Suisse Normande to the Taking of Le Havre. 
91h August to 14th September 1944. 
By early August 1944 the situation of the Allied Armies in Normandy had 
dramatically changed. The constant pressure and heavy attacks on the Germans 
throughout the month of July had brought the German Army to crisis. By July 1"1 the 
American Army had cleared the port of Cherbourg and had control of the majority of 
the Contentin Peninsula. They could then concentrate on advancing south. By 19th 
July they had reached the key town of St. Lo. On the British front Caen had finally 
fallen on 1Oth July. Further operations south of Caen allowed the British Army to start 
the drive on Falaise in the final week of July. Meanwhile the Americans developed the 
right flank. By the 30th July they had advanced as far as Avranches. The German 
Army was now in great difficulty. Villers-Bocage (a hoped for target ofD-Day) fell 
on 4th August to the British. The American Army smashed a German counter-attack at 
Mortain soon after, and then began slipping round the German flanks, eventually 
nearing Argentan and beyond by 13th August. Between the Americans to the south and 
the British pressing on Falaise from the north, was created the Falaise 'pocket' and the 
beginning of the swift withdrawal of German forces from Normandy. 
From 5th August 1944, 56th Brigade had come under the command of 59th 
Division, which was engaged in attacking Thury Harcourt on the east bank of the 
River Orne, 12 miles south of Caen. There was now a complete change in the type 
of countryside for 56th Brigade, from the bocage south of Bayeux, to the Suisse 
Normande south of Caen, an area of often-forested, steep-sided and sometimes 
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rocky hills, cut by rivers and streams. The countryside would present a different 
series of problems for an attacker to overcome, although by now the German Army 
was slowly being surrounded and engulfed by allied forces. The German Army was 
gradually retreating from a pocket, the exit of which would be become famous as 
the Falaise Gap. The attack on Thury Harcourt would further squeeze this pocket 
shut. 
59th Division had landed in late June and been involved in heavy fighting north 
and west of Caen since early July. Then in early August it had forced the crossing of 
the River Ome near Grimbosq. It had bitterly contested a German counter attack 
here as 56th Brigade arrived, and by 8th August had suffered well over 2500 
casualties. The arrival of 56th Brigade allowed I 76th Brigade, comprised of the 7th 
South Staffords, 6th North Staffords and 7th Norfolks, to be withdrawn from 59th 
Division due to its number of casualties. The other two Infantry Brigades left in 59th 
Division were I 77th Brigade (5th South Staffords, l/6th South Staffords and 2/6th 
South Staffords) and 197th Infantry Brigade (2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, 5th East 
Lancashires and 1/7th Warwicks ). 1 While I 77th Brigade pushed south on the west 
bank of the River Orne, 56th Brigade was to cross to the east bank of the river, and 
advance south and take Thury Harcourt. 
2nd Glosters and 2nd Essex were to be the first of 56th Brigade to cross, at La 
Pont de Brie near Brieux, and 3 miles north ofThury Harcourt. Brigade HQ and 2nd 
South Wales Borderers were initially to stay on the west bank and cross when the 
other two battalions were well established. A narrow bridge, still under shell and 
sniper fire, was to be traversed by both battalions, 2nd Glosters by day to take 
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Brieux, followed by 2nd Essex at nightfall. The plan was then to advance 'to contact' 
south down a minor road, and take the villages of La Forge a Cambro and 
Croisilles. This all had to be organised quickly by the staff of the two Battalion HQ 
on 9th August, with only a brief reconnaissance from the high ground west of the 
River Ome, and orders were issued that afternoon by Brigadier Ekins. 2nd Glosters 
crossed at 1500hrs, and after a brief battle had cleared Brieux by 1730hrs. It is 
worth quoting Lieutenant Colonel Elliott of 2nd Essex at length, to get an idea of the 
task and feelings of the two CO's, as they pushed forward with their men on the 
night of 9th August: 
Lieutenant Colonel Biddle (2nd Glosters) and myself were a little anxious about 
our right of way over the one narrow bridge. We were told however that it 
would be allotted to us for 2 hours (I think) 2200hrs to midnight. In the event 
we met a tank brigade and other vehicles returning from the bridgehead: there 
was complete chaos and apparently no proper traffic control. However we 
filtered the infantry across in single file, and started off into the night and into 
enemy territory, without a single vehicle or anti-tank gun between us. We were 
delayed some hours by this poor example of staff work. It was an extraordinary 
operation of war: two battalions of infantry marching side by side down a 
narrow road late at night, with some moonlight luckily, but with no idea of the 
enemy's whereabouts and no supporting arms. Our plan was simple. We had a 
'joint' advanced guard, etc. and we two CO's walked together. If we met 
trouble the Essex would deploy to the right if possible and the Gloucesters to 
the Ieft.2 
This operation for the time of year, and the fighting conditions prevailing in 
Normandy, seems an incredibly audacious one bearing in mind the experiences of 
56th Brigade earlier in the bocage country. This operation was carried out 
successfully through the nerve and leadership of the two commanding officers. 
Lieutenant Barret-Lennard, 2nd Essex Intelligence Officer gives this striking image 
of their progress: 
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We passed through a blazing and sulphurous village and this weird operation 
took us on marching through the night down a dark silent narrow Normandy 
lane wondering whether it was mined and very very quietly we continued, the 
two CO's walking side by side.3 
For the advance of several hundred men in hob nailed boots to have been 
mainly quiet seems something of a miracle, but in Courmeron, a village passed in 
the early hours, and temporarily 2nd Essex Battalion HQ, several sleeping Germans 
were captured the following morning! Despite this one 2nd Glosters report says, 
"The noise from the closed up marching columns seemed hideous. ,,4 Great 
leadership was displayed here, in the certainty that disaster would strike if the 
battalions bumped into a strong German defence. This included the knowledge that 
at Essex Wood in June, Lieutenant Colonel Higson had seemingly been sacked as 
commanding officer over just such an operation as advancing the battalion without 
the anti-tank platoon closely following. 
By first light they had cut deeply into enemy territory, and were only 300 
metres from La Forge a Cambro, although Lieutenant Colonel Elliott was still 
disappointed with the speed of advance caused by the time lost in crossing the 
bridge. However the good news was that some of their supporting arms were 
crossing the River Ome and were starting to catch up. As the battalions approached 
La Forge a Cambro they deployed, so as not to be caught out at first light. Some 
short engagements had taken place already and numbers of abandoned slit trenches 
searched. Lieutenant Col Elliott went forward to the advance party and heard 
sounds of digging over the next crest. The 2"d Essex rifle companies were brought 
223 
up and deployed ready to attack the village. It appeared that the Germans had no 
idea they had two battalions of infantry on their doorstep. 
Now tanks came up in support, and with an artillery barrage covering them, 
C Company put in an attack. C Company went over the crest and apart from the 
sound of battle no reporting back occurred to Tactical HQ. After 45 minutes 
Lieutenant Colonel Elliott reports he was getting somewhat anxious. Going forward 
to find out what was happening, he first met 120 German prisoners escorted by two 
men of C Company. Major Barrass had lost his wireless operator in dashing about 
urging his men on, thus explaining the lack of useful wireless reports. Nevertheless 
C Company had cleared the village. Over the next few days between It" and 15th 
August the Battalion moved south of Thury Harcourt to near Esson, and patrolled 
into, and held the difficult wooded area of the Bas Breuil. This thick wood 
overlooked the village of Esson and the tree cover was so dense that visibility was 
often down to a few yards. There were a number of small, but vicious actions fought 
within its confines. At one stage German forces armed with a preponderance of 
automatic weapons, overran a platoon of 2nd Essex, and the situation could only be 
restored by the use of heavy artillery. 
Arthur Dyer, a signaller with the Ml4 Signals Half-track at Battalion HQ, 
gives this gritty account of being in action in this area, and in his diary records how 
even the HQ of a battalion could be vulnerable: 
At noon we take up our position in an orchard. 5 dead cows there stinking in 
the sun - black with flies. We dig- Jerry pastes us - more moaning minnies 
and mortars. Same job - diving in and praying. One of our companies nearly 
cut off they are getting hell. Our Artillery is supporting us more now Jerry 
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must be tiring. We still dig- ground very hard, hands blistered. Still there is 
only one motto "dig or die." Our feet are sore cannot take boots off and the 
heat is causing sweat. 5 
There was hand-to-hand fighting as well, and at least some of 2od Essex 
casualties came from their own artillery and mortars bursting in the trees, but as 
they would later find out, these casualties were as nothing, compared to the German 
dead. Perhaps one story epitomises the sang-froid and soldiers humour in battle. 
Lance Corporal Jeffs took a message from Battalion HQ to an advanced platoon. 
Walking through this dense forest alone, and finding the platoon in one piece he 
offered: 'blimey, we thought you were all dead. You can come back now.'6 
As the 2°d Essex attack went in at La Forge a Cambro on lOth August, 
German artillery observers had spotted the 2od Glosters Tactical HQ, and a barrage 
badly wounded Lieutenant Colonel Biddle. Bill Robinson, who was the driver for 
the Battalion Padre, was present when this happened: 
We were in this small copse with little cover, and I dug a slit trench as soon as 
we arrived. Colonel Biddle came through with his driver Bill Fudge. Biddle 
got to the other side of this copse and got out of his jeep and sat on the bank. 
The Germans put a mortar stonk down on us and Biddle was wounded in the 
head very badly. When this stonk started I was into the slit trench like a rat and 
straight on top of me like a ton of bricks came Bill Williams the Padre. I think 
some of the medical orderlies were hit. Nearby there was a little farm being 
used by the MO and Colonel Biddle went in there. On the junction was a pile 
of slates all over the road and the Germans had put these down to cover some 
mines they had laid. One of the jeeps went up on this and a corporal was badly 
wounded. In the farm I saw Colonel Biddle and he wasn't unconscious, but 
you could see his brain exposed, a shame, as he was a very nice bloke.7 
Lieutenant Colonel Biddle survived, but was hospitalised, badly wounded. 
Temporarily Major Lance took over as CO, with Major Stephens as Battalion 2i/c, 
until Lieutenant Colonel Butterworth took command on 15th August. Inevitably all 
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three battalions, and even Brigade HQ, were to be subjected to heavy shelling and 
mortaring, sometimes almost continuously, for the rest of the opemtion. 
Meanwhile Brigade HQ and 2nd South Wales Borderers had crossed the 
River Ome into the main battle zone. On I Otb August 2nd South Wales Borderers 
crossed the bridge at 11 OOhrs and arrived south east of the village of Counneron. 
Nick Somerville's Diary records: 
Crossed the Ome amid a steady stream of traffic. There was so much 
congestion on one road that we had to get off it into the fields to enable two 
squadrons of Churchills to pass through. The whole bridgehead was under 
considerable shellfrre and it was not very comfortable riding up and down the 
main axis on a motorbike.8 
That night 2nd South Wales Borderers pushed two kilometres southeast, 
outflanking Thury Harcourt to the east. Their Battalion HQ was at La Forge a 
Cambro, on the main D562 running south to Thury Harcourt. They were in position 
by 0500 hrs on the morning of the lllh August. The German response was to 
heavily shell and mortar the Company areas. Clearly, despite the advance of 2nd 
Essex and 2nd Glosters, the Germans still had good observation over the battlefield. 
A squadron of Churchill tanks that came forward in support gave away the 2nd 
South Wales Borderers positions, and drew more fire from 88mm's and 
Nebelwerfers. 'A & C Coys bad a nasty time as they were alongside the tanks. 
Forge a Cambro came in for a belting from 'moaning minnies' and Bn. HQ was 
exceedingly hot. ' 9 Jeeps visiting the forward companies had to charge down narrow 
bumpy tracks at 45 mpb to quickly get through the observed zone. Eventually on the 
A Company road, all vehicles were banned except Ambulance Jeeps. This shellfire 
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caused fifty casualties to pass through the Regimental Aid Post that day. Battalion 
HQ moved south to be much closer to the advance Companies. 
The 12th August was quieter. Fighting patrols sent out overnight to the 
northeast enabled the supporting tanks to withdraw for maintenance. On the night of 
13th and 14th August, 2nd South Wales Borderers advanced further south and then 
east again by sending out fighting patrols, which were then followed by the main 
body. German resistance was in each case confined to mainly shelling, though this 
was often vicious and prolonged. Colonel Barlow's carrier was shelled and turning 
into a gateway to escape blew up on a mine. Barlow was not in it at the time, but his 
signaller was injured and the Gwmer Commander killed. Thury Harcourt was now 
outflanked to the southeast, and 2"d South Wales Borderers and 2nd Essex had 
virtually cut off the town by completing a semi-circle of advance around it. 
Men from Brigade HQ were not idle during all of this, and they were often 
under shellfire. Frank Dilworth as a 'Don R' (dispatch rider) was sent time and 
again, carrying messages back and forth across the bridge, under observed fire from 
artillery, mortar and Spandau to the forward positions, a feat that was to earn him 
the Military Medal: 
I had passed this cottage in a field that had been burning and there was a 
German lying burnt there. I was trying to find where the Essex were. I went 
towards the corner of the forest. On a bank were five dead Essex men. There 
was a sergeant in front and the others behind him. It must have been a burst 
that killed them. Also there were a couple of trenches with a dead German in 
each. To get down this valley and across the other side and up was beyond a 
joke and I did it four times during the day. The first time I went down there 
were two of our linemen knocked out trying to run a line down. It was suicide 
to try that really in that place. The 59th Div. bridgehead was getting nowhere. 
Going up the other side from the bridge were six Churchill's knocked out. 10 
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Riding alone a dispatch rider had only his wits, a well-developed sense of 
the battlefield, and the speed of his motorbike in order to survive. What is left out of 
the above commentary, is that on each crossing Frank probably noticed that there 
was already one dispatch rider blasted up into the trees near the crossing, noted by 
Bill Robinson of 2nd Glosters. It is likely that the same group of dead men described 
above were come upon by Tony Atcherley of Brigade HQ, who adds the honest and 
very human thought, that unlike some his comrades, he could never get used to 
corpses. 
I came across a group of six British soldiers ambushed in a forest. They were 
lying or rather half sitting in a little dell. Had it not been for the wounds and 
pools of blood, you would have thought they were sleeping, and a touch on 
their shoulder would wake them up. 11 
The Brigade HQ moved forward and took up position in a field or open area. 
In the middle of this area was a tall wooden structure that had been used as a 
German observation post able to look out over the trees. A number of men including 
the Don R's were sleeping in the open when: "all of a sudden shells landed, Bang! 
Then Bang! We all realised what was happening and shot into the ditches at the 
edge of the field. Again Bang! Right in the middle. They were trying to knock out 
the OP so we couldn't use it."12 As usual the Germans seemed to have the range of 
ground they had retreated from, to the metre. 
Now 2nd Glosters were in a position to directly attack Thury Harcourt. Initial 
59th Division intelligence reports said the Germans had left; however this proved 
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not to be so, and a 2nd Glosters patrol to the town at 0700hrs on 11th August reported 
back: 
Located teller mines and booby traps along the (main D 562, since re-routed 
and much larger) road and were able to reach the outskirts of the town. Here 
they came under heavy Spandau fire and were forced to withdraw. Valuable 
information was obtained. The French civilians were very pleased to see the 
British troops. 13 
One member of this patrol was Frank Rosier, and he remembers it vividly 
adding some detail to the above report. They were lucky to get back: 
When looking down on the town from the high ground to the north we thought 
it was a peaceful town and nothing appeared to be moving in the village. I was 
part of a ten man patrol and we got down to the bridge and lay on it a while 
and then started to go back up the hill. Then all hell broke loose and we fought 
hand-to-hand which was horrible, but all ten got back. I have the impression 
that the Germans purposely set out to capture some prisoners and had lain in 
wait.l4 
This good work could not be immediately put to use, as German pressure 
and attacks from the east required some fighting off, and support was given to 2"d 
South Wales Borders as they advanced, including aid to the beleaguered tanks stuck 
with them. Strong patrolling was also needed to stop Germans reoccupying villages 
at Espins and Le Moncel. However in the early hours of 12th August 2nd Glosters 
were tasked to seize Thury Harcourt, as Brigade intelligence reported it finally 
evacuated by the Germans. The start line was a road running east to west and three 
quarters of a kilometre north of the town. B Company was on the right and A 
Company on the left with C and D Companies in reserve. 15 This axis of advance 
meant approaching Thury Harcourt from the north. Here the land steeply slopes 
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down to the railway yards and River Orne on the right. A deep valley with steep 
sides and a stream was to their front and at right angles to the river. On the far side 
of this narrow valley, was the previously mentioned patrol road of 11th August. 
The two Companies left the start line at 1430hrs, preceded by a 
bombardment of the ground ahead. No opposition was encountered until reaching 
the outskirts of the town at 1500hrs. Then the Germans opened up a considerable 
fire. Firstly they had reoccupied the west bank of the River Orne just south of the 
town, and opened a steady and effective fire with mortars and artillery on the 2nd 
Glosters from here. Secondly, 2nd Essex were attacked on the left flank in the Bas 
Breuil, wood and required the artillery to beat off the Germans. Thirdly the town, 
far from being empty, was heavily defended with snipers and machine guns in the 
upper stories of factory buildings, the chateau and the railway station. When D 
Company went through A Company to clear the town, it too became pinned down, 
and confused house-to-house fighting broke out. Ted Castle, stretcher bearer with A 
Company HQ was looking down into the town, and gives this tense description of 
events as they received Spandau and mortar fire: 
We went in and after 2-300 yards all hell let loose. A Company got a plastering 
from mortars and Spandau fire and B Company got trapped in the town below. 
Our company commander, Major Wakefield, got hit. The lads had gone down 
this cliff into Thury Harcourt. The stretcher-bearers had to climb down and 
take casualties out on our backs. I brought up fifteen. One lad dropped down 
between a house and the cliff and I couldn't do any more for him. Major 
Wakefield couldn't move and I crawled up to him and he said, "There's some 
lads down there Castle. Get down there!" I said it was "pretty hairy" and he 
replied by saying "I know you will do your best". 16 
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Frank Rosier was in the town with D Company. They had climbed down a 
steep cliff with traces of a path through it. As they reached the bottom a Spandau 
opened fire and killed three men. They were ordered via the radio link to stay down 
until nightfall. They were in a depression that protected them from the German fire. 
They put the Bren gun up on the lip and occasionally returned :fire. With nothing 
better to do they settled down to a game of cards! However the enemy fire spattered 
the cliff above and threw chips of rock over them. After some time their Bren 
gunner was fed up with this, and picking up the Bren charged the German position 
and wiped it out. They returned to their card garne. 17 
At the beginning of the advance, Gordon Duffin of A Company remembers 
advancing across a :field in open order, with birds singing and flowers on the 
ground. But the platoon converged as they moved down into a thickly wooded area, 
and it seemed that A and B Company were joining on a narrow path leading 
towards a virtual cliff down into Thury Harcourt. This made the path crowded, and 
an obvious target. When they started going down a Spandau opened fire, and in 
leaping to get down Duffin tumbled some way down the slope. They ended up on 
the road at the bottom of the cliff. Running across the road, still under frre, they had 
to :find cover and got down at the side of the road. However a sergeant he did not 
know was standing up in the middle of the road, and despite shouted pleas to get 
down, calmly walked over to Duffin. They exchanged positions and the sergeant 
was immediately shot. Then the men dived down an embankment, and to a house at 
the bottom that shielded them from enemy frre. German frre caught the thatched 
roof alight. Ordered to look through a window to observe what was happening, 
Duffin could see Germans in a slit trench at 20 yards range. He fired a long burst 
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from his Bren gun and killed some Germans. He immediately moved away from the 
window, avoiding the quickly returned fire that penetrated the window and the 
surrounding daub wall. 
His section was now pinned down behind this house, and with the roof alight 
burning thatch was falling down on them. From opposite up the cliff they were glad 
to hear the order, 'A Company, withdraw back up the cliff.' Running back across 
the road they scrambled up the cliff to where Major Wakefield was being looked 
after by a sergeant. Gordon noticed that Wakefield had a wound in his leg, and it 
was the other leg than that on which he limped badly, having been wounded in the 
Desert Campaign. He told Gordon "the buggers have shot my other leg!" Gordon 
had received a shrapnel wound across the back of his neck, and went back to 
hospital at Bayeux. On the way there he was placed in charge of two wounded 
Germans. He was pleased to take charge of their wallets and insignia, but returned 
their photographs. After a short spell in hospital he was returned to 2nd Glosters. 18 
B Company was equally caught in the town. At one point they were being 
shelled and machine-gunned by a German tank from only three hundred yards. 
Later they were in danger of being cut off. Smoke Grenades were used to cover 
crossings from house to house, but the smoke only further indicated the positions of 
the Glosters and focused fire on them. The company were totally pinned down and 
at about this stage a horrific incident occurred. A soldier from the Glosters was hit 
by a Spandau in his ammunition pouches. The 77 Smoke (Phosphorous) grenades 
he was carrying ignited. In agony he implored an officer to shoot him, which the 
officer did. It was impossible to save the soldier in any way. 19 
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The withdrawal of 2nd Glosters was well covered by machine gun and 
cannon fire from Churchill tanks of 34 Tank Brigade. They could not get into the 
town because of the terrain. The tanks fired mainly smoke to cover the withdrawal. 
Eventually Major Wakefield was evacuated, after seeing most of his men away. 
Even with the obvious withdrawal of 2nd Glosters the Germans did not stop firing on 
them and Ted Castle had a further narrow escape: 
It was not tank country and it was a foggy night and the order was to pull back. 
Major Wakefield was still there wounded and in command. I was one of the 
last to leave; we got him out on a tank. All of a sudden a mortar bomb fell and 
blew me sideways, I wasn't wounded and carried on back. I think there were 
about twenty of us left in the company. I don't suppose they were all 
casualties. Some would have been dispersed in the action. Major Wakefield 
was a remarkable man and had already been wounded in North Africa leading 
to him having a permanently gammy leg. He recommended me for the MM for 
this action but I didn't receive it. 20 _ 
Thury Harcourt was burning heavily and 2nd Gloster patrols maintained a 
close watch. Over the night of 13/14 August patrols realised that the enemy 
appeared to be gone, and on 14th August a carefully managed advance into the town 
took place. By 1530hrs, with only mines and booby traps needing to be dealt with, 
the town was cleared, and it was found that the Germans had evacuated it. On 15th 
August a move forward was made by 2nd Glosters to occupy all the high ground 
south of Thury Harcourt, coming into line with 2nd Essex and 2nd South Wales 
Borderers. The results of the artillery bombardment on the Germans in the Bas 
Breuil wood, in support of 2nd Essex, now became evident. As the battalions 
advanced through the wood there was no opposition, just the putrefied bodies of 
many German soldiers. Arthur Dyer, signaller with 2nd Essex, writes how even 
moves like this were fraught with danger: 
233 
August 14th- Shelled again this morning. Blokes going bomb happy everybody 
dog tired. We push off at I lam on another hell ride. Ruins all around, shells 
falling, houses on fire, burnt Jerries, dead cattle, heavy casualties, not sleep. It 
is now almost Midnight I am on the set. It is roasting hot as hell, my eyes ache 
to close, feet are sore, we are all the same. Just as we arrived Jerry shelled the 
field, past worrying about shells, just sleep that's all we want. At one place we 
stayed at for an hour we sang Hymns and had a cup of tea. August 15 - We 
move into our new area, other troops go through us. This village is mine 
infested and burning. Carriers have been blown up and clinging to the 
wreckage is human flesh burnt and stinking. This is all around. However, here 
we close down the set and have a sleep.21 
The battalions rested in positions now dominating a large loop in the River Ome by 
St. Remy, well south of Thury Harcourt. The Germans had to abandon the area 
'leaving behind a large number of mines upon which a melancholy succession of 
vehicles and civilians were blown up. ' 22 
The following morning the 10 of 2nd Essex, Lieutenant Barrett-Lennard, 
with only a driver for support, was tasked to make a forward reconnaissance in a 
jeep. It was typical of the man that they drove forward, roaring down roads a 
reported twenty miles, possibly the farthest advance by only two men of the British 
Army in Normandy. Often the only thing slowing them was the incredulous crowds 
that greeted them. Forward movement only stopped when the Mayor of one village 
informed Barrett-Lennard that, "The Boche are packing up the other side of the 
Mairie!" On return to Battalion HQ, Barrett-Lennard was able to report the way 
ahead open. His shaken driver's only report to his mates was that "Barrett-Lennard 
is bonkers!"23 By 171h August operations in the area were closing down and the 
Brigade were lorried to the area ofFalaise. 
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Again the Brigade had taken heavy casualties during this nine-day operation, 
and over twenty men were killed in each of 2nd South Wales Borderers and 2nd 
Glosters. 2nd Essex suffered over twenty-five killed. Wounded were numerous, and 
it is worthwhile examining the weekly returns from each battalion war diary, to ftnd 
how far short each battalion was of establishment numbers at this time. 
On 12th August 2nd South Wales Borderers required 9 officers and 165 
NCO's and men, 2nd Essex required 8 officers and 119 NCO's and men, while 2nd 
Glosters required 11 officers and 150 NCO's and men. 24 These numbers were not 
guesses and had to be strictly checked. Demands were put in weekly on the 
appropriate· form, and were separate to the war diary daily reports of activities of 
each battalion. It is easy to understand the difficulty each battalion CO was under 
when he found that he was a company to a company and a half short of officers and 
men for the allotted tasks of his battalion. It is worth stating again that the men 
required were almost always rifleman. The CO had few options, and either reducing 
each company's strength to only sixty to eighty men instead of one hundred and 
thirty three men, or operating with only three rifle companies instead of four, was 
the normal response. In either case this meant that his tactical options were severely 
compromised and the firepower of the battalion was greatly diminished as well. The 
numbers quoted above were on the weekly demand sheets from early in the 
operation, and show the situation before 2nd Glosters attacked Thury Harcourt and 
sustained further heavy casualties. 
There is a further important point to be made about the reinforcement 
situation. By now the regimental system, by which men held in the Reinforcement 
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Holding Units (RHU) and fed forward to replace casualties in battalions from their 
regiment, had broken down. For some time it had not been the case for example that 
replacements to 2nd South Wales Borderers were from the South Wales Borderers 
Regiment. This was leading to a diminution of the very regimental spirit, or 
brotherhood, that the British Army relied on for its esprit de corps. 25 Very good 
evidence for this is provided by Lieutenant Colonel Elliott, commanding 2nd Essex, 
writing about his battalion prior to the move to 59th Division when resting at 
Buceels: 'There had been so many casualties that the standard of training of the 
battalion had fallen. We were now a strange collection of many regiments (by 
complete platoons as far as possible) and many still wearing their own badges.' He 
later mentions the problem of joining a new and strange division, and that 'many 
(2nd Essex) men were still in tattered uniforms.'26 It is worth remembering that this 
was a proud and regular army battalion and the situation for 2nd South Wales 
Borderers and 2nd Glosters was similar. Somehow in the ten days following their 
brief rest at Buceels, 56th Brigade went into battle, and again fought with distinction 
in exacting circumstances, against an enemy determined to hold open the jaws of a 
trap closing around them. 
The reinforcement situation was now so bad that Montgomery had to act. As 
early as 14th August, as 2nd Glosters carefully occupied and cleared Thury Harcourt, 
he had sent a personal telegram to the CIGS, Sir Alan Brooke, stating: 
Regret time has come when I must break up one Inf Div. My lnf Divs are so 
low in effective rifle strength that they can no (repeat no) longer fight 
effectively in major operations. Request permission to break up at once 59 Div. 
65 lnf Bde (He meant 56) will be retained as an Independent Bde for the 
present. Request this matter treated as urgent.27 
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Permission was very quickly given, and fairly quietly the men of 59th 
Division were redistributed to other divisions. It was made clear to the commander 
of 59th Division, Major General Lyne and his senior commanders, that this decision 
was taken purely because this was the most junior division in the British Army, and 
the contribution of the division to the Nonnandy battle had been greatly 
appreciated. 56th Brigade was to be moved for the final time to replace a brigade in 
49th (Polar Bears) Division. 
Before this change became official, 56th Brigade moved 12 miles to the 
southeast, with 2nd South Wales Borderers at Treprel and 2nd Glosters at Les Loges 
Saulces. Both battalions were immediately involved in further fighting and patrol 
work for 24 hours. 2nd Essex was kept in reserve. The Brigade was only six miles 
west of Falaise, and despite desperate rearguard actions, the German collapse was 
imminent. Relieved during 19th August, that afternoon and evening the Brigade 
started to move out in their lorries and carriers to join 49th Division southeast of 
Caen. They passed through Falaise which 'was in a terrible state, every house 
burning and the whole place littered with bomb craters, dead horses, Germans and 
civilians. '28 On 20th August 2nd Essex and 2nd South Wales Borderers were at 
Pendouze, where they were visited by their new Divisional commander General 
Barker. 2nd Glosters were at Airan. Church services were undertaken and the 
Brigade was in reserve. 
The area was infested with flies and mosquitoes, and some men became very 
ill, with dysentery reaching epidemic proportions. The 2nd South Wales Borderers 
Medical Officer dealt with over a hundred cases of dysentery. Also as a good 
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example of the continuing reinforcement problem, 2nd South Wales Borderers 
received 60 reinforcements from the Tyneside Scottish Regiment. These were from 
49
111 
Divisions' 70111 Brigade, which had been broken up through heavy casualties 
and 56111 Brigade was replacing. Despite this C Company, 2nd South Wales 
Borderers had to be temporarily disbanded allowing A, B and D Company to come 
up to something like full strength. Two days earlier on I9111 August the Weekly 
Return for 2nd South Wales Borderers shows the battalion as virtually 200 men 
short.
29 
Welcome as they were, 60 men must have been a grave disappointment, 
with requirements on this scale. 
49
111 (West Riding) Infantry Division was a First Line Territorial Division in 
I939. Some elements of it took part in the Norwegian Campaign in I940. Part of the 
Division went to Iceland as members of Alabaster Force, and later the rest of the 
Division followed. During this time the Polar Bear sign was introduced and painted 
on their vehicles. By I 942 the Division had returned to the UK. Originally 
earmarked as an assault division for the invasion of Europe, it lost this role to 50111 
(Northumberland) Division, due to Montgomery's wish to use a division already 
experienced in landings and battle to lead the way. However it was highly trained, 
and as a follow up division in Normandy it was involved in heavy fighting in the 
area between 50111 Division and the Canadian Army. As such it had taken high 
casualties fighting I2111 SS Hitler Youth Division and Panzer Lehr. 
In late July I944 it was transferred to 1"1 Corps, which was part of 1"1 
Canadian Army. It is often not realised that the British 49111 (West Riding) Division 
and 51 "1 (Highland) Division formed an important part of I 91 Canadian Army. The 
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Divisional Commander was General 'Bubbles' Barker, a dynamic thrusting leader. 
By now the Polar Bear Badge, redesigned with a much more aggressive looking 
Polar Bear, had become the Divisional shoulder badge worn by its troops. Due to 
some uncompromising actions between it and German units, the Germans came to 
call them the 'Polar Bear Butchers.' 56th Brigade caught up with 49th Division at 
Airan, southeast of Caen. 30 
On 19th August the Falaise 'gap' was closed, and the German Army had 
extricated as many men as possible from the Allied trap. That night US units further 
south reached and crossed the River Seine. This was excellent news, but caused a 
problem for the British troops and General Dempsey who 'could not readily deploy 
his forces coming from the crowded pocket with all their supplies and equipment, 
until the Canadians on his left veered northwards and the Americans on his right 
gave him passage.' 31 In fact events had placed the British and Canadian Armies in a 
relatively long, but narrow strip of land reaching from the mouth of the River Ome 
to Falaise, and the whole direction of advance had to be changed from south to east. 
The Canadian Army was tasked with clearing the coast of France and Belgium 
as far north as Bruges, taking the ports of Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais and 
masking Dunkirk. As far as 49th Division and 56th Brigade were concerned on 20th 
August, the immediate task of 1"1 Corps was to capture Le Havre and St. Valery 
after crossing the River Seine. However, whatever the success of the US Army's 
advance to the south over the River Seine, 49th Division still had over forty miles to 
go, and four rivers to cross, to reach the town of Pont Audemer. A fifth river, the 
River Risle, then remained as the last major physical feature before the River Seine. 
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In the way were a number of German units, some still desperately defending every 
river, ridge, wood and village. 56th Brigade were advanced to Bonebosq in 
preparation for the next move. 
The first part of the task required an advance to the town ofCormeilles. This 
involved crossing the River Touques and then the River Calonne to reach the town. 
On 24th August at 0300hrs, 2nd Glosters crossed the River Toques in the dark, and 
moved north towards Cormeilles, past positions held by the Hallamshire Regiment. 
By advancing on Le Breuil en Auge, they relieved German pressure around the 
town and allowed a Bailey Bridge to be constructed, giving easy access across the 
river to the follow up battalions. 2nd Essex pushed on and meeting some resistance 
had to attack Cormeilles at last light. The town lay in a steep wooded valley. 
Covered by artillery and tank fire they entered the town fmding the Germans had 
left. 2nd Glosters had pushed up in support holding the left flank of the advance. 
Only light enemy shelling is reported in the War Diaries. At 0800hrs 2"d Essex 
crossed the river and took the town suffering only a few casualties. In 24 hours the 
Brigade had pushed the advance 14 miles east. 
The orders were to continue the advance and 2nd Glosters left Cormeilles, 
following up armoured cars that had already sped forward to contact. Five miles to 
the northeast the Germans were not prepared to give up the town of Epaignes 
without a more serious fight. Three of the reconnaissance armoured cars were 
knocked out on the approach to the town. By further reconnaissance, and talking to 
local civilians and Free French fighters, 2nd Glosters had it confirmed that the area 
was held in force by up to two companies of Germans. 2nd Glosters moved forward 
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and German resistance showed that an attack in battalion strength was required. The 
plan was to send D Company to clear the left flank and enter the village from the 
northwest, A Company right flanking to enter the village from the south, and B 
Company to use the main road into town as its main axis of advance. The Germans 
were well dug in in the surrounding woodland, and had well sited Spandau positions 
and mortar observation. 
In the end 2nd Glosters got into the town, where some fierce hand-to-hand 
fighting took place, and eventually the Germans were driven out. Parts of the town 
were on fire including the church. It was suspected that the Germans had fired it to 
deny its use as an observation tower. Usually one side or the other destroyed such 
features. Ted Castle remembers this battle as: 
Having a right do at Epaignes. When we took it the town was all in flames. 
The Germans fought in the town and it was a real rough house. I can remember 
Frank Clark and B Company there in town. We lost a lot of lads there, which 
kept the battalion. weak. A Company was sent in to relieve B and D Company 
who were taking a hammering. 3 
In all 2nd Glosters had 14 men killed and over forty wounded. Two members 
of the Royal Armoured Corps and a Royal Engineer also lost their lives. 2nd 
Glosters had killed 48 of the enemy and taken 5 prisoners. The number of German 
dead gives an indication of how hard they fought to hold this little town knowing 
that the end result was inevitable. This operation had taken all day, starting at 
0930hrs on 25th August until 2230hrs, when the town was finally reported as 
cleared.33 The town has erected one of the few monuments commemorating British 
soldiers in Normandy who died in action. It is about 100 metres before entering the 
eastern side of the town, on the main D 139, and lists the men who died here. 
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At 0730hrs the following morning, 49th Reconnaissance Regiment moved 
through to clear the way ahead, and by 1300hrs the battalion was on its way to Pont 
Audemer and the west bank of the River Risle. Both 2nd Essex and 2nd South Wales 
Borderers came forward to take this crossing. Elements of 6th Airborne Division 
were there before them, still in-the fight despite plans to withdraw them shortly after 
D-Day. However they were unable to cross the river due to its width. Also the 
Germans had blown the bridges, and numbers of enemy snipers and observation 
posts were firmly established on the other side. Again the valley sides were steep, 
heavily wooded and 120 metres high, and the Germans were regularly shelling the 
town. 
A great change had taken place in the distance advances were covering. 
They could now be measured in miles each day rather than yards. By the early 
afternoon of 26th August all three battalions of 56th Brigade had been brought up to 
Pont Audemer. With 49th Division held up along the River Risle, 56th Brigade were 
tasked to cross at night to open the way, using 2nd Essex on the right flank, and 2nd 
South Wales Borderers on the left, advancing through the town. The first problem 
was to find the best place to cross. Lieutenant Colonel Barlow visited the town with 
Sgt. Richard Philips to find out any information from the local population. Inside 
the town it seemed chaotic. German shelling was going on, and the local French 
Forces de I'lnterieur (FFI) were out in force, some reportedly looting shops in the 
town. One can see that Lieutenant Colonel Barlow had a job on his hands and 
Sergeant Dick Philips remembers this well: 
242 
I clearly recall accompanying Colonel Barlow to the local Maquis HQ to find 
if there was a fordable point across what was really a deepish stream. There 
must have been over 40 Maquis present and each one of them had a different 
idea of where the river could be forded. The arguments between them became 
quite heated and the CO decided to make a discreet withdrawal. 34 
After leaving this bedlam, what followed involved a reconnaissance with a 
member of the FFI, crawling through offices and shops, in and out of ground floor 
windows and via a tannery until they were only a few yards from the water's edge. 
Here it was indicated that the water was shallow enough to ford the river. The 
reconnaissance party arrived back at battalion at 2030hrs and Lieutenant Colonel 
Barlow made his plans quickly, including having white tape laid from an assembly 
area in town through all the buildings encountered, to the crossing point. He got the 
leading Company to start following the tapes at 2130hrs and crossing the river by 
2230hrs. The Germans were continuing their shelling of the town. B then A 
Company crossed, holding their weapons above their heads, and took the high 
ground dominating the town 400 metres beyond. B Company were hit by a burst of 
Spandau fue when pushing through the buildings beyond the crossing, and suffered 
12 casualties. A feature of this advance was the excellent Signals work organised by 
the Signals Officer, Sam Weaver: 
The plan was for each of the two attacking companies to be given a drum of 
telephone wire to unwind behind them as they advanced. So lines had to be 
laid from Battalion main HQ on the hills above the town (British side) to Tac 
HQ in the town and then from Tac HQ to the crossing place along an 
extraordinary route. Because Main HQ was an unusually long distance from 
Tac HQ, line-laying signallers were in short supply as so many were needed. 
So when it came to allocate a gang for the line from Tac HQ to the crossing 
place, Nobby, (Cowan, the Signals Sergeant and Sam Weavers mentor from 
the New Forest) turned to me and asked, "shall you and I lay that Sir?" Once 
more I was gratified to think that Nobby considered me sufficiently adept for 
this task. 35 · 
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Although somewhat cut off, the boot was now on the other foot, and the 
following day the two companies dominated the German positions. At one stage 
five Bren guns were grouped to lay down a devastating fire on one Spandau 
position. That night D Company crossed via the partially destroyed main bridge in 
the middle of the town, and all the companies pushed forward to take a crossroads 
north of the town. Then Battalion transport was brought down into town, and by 
first light on 28th August, Battalion HQ had crossed the River Risle and joined the 
rifle companies. 
Meanwhile, 2nd Essex attempt to force a crossing further south using storm 
boats, foundered when the noise of launching the boats alerted the Germans. Flares 
and Verey Lights lit up the river, which was then swept by machine gun fire. A 
second attempt using the wreckage of the bridge in the town centre was slightly 
more successful, as a Section of A Company crossed. But then the Germans woke 
up and threw grenades into the water around the second section. and opened up on 
the town with mortars and 88mm guns as well as Spandaus, making further attempts 
impossible. By daylight the small force was ensconced in buildings on the far bank 
and refused a German demand to surrender. Sniping and shelling ensued by both 
sides. 36 But with 2nd South Wales Borderers in force on the heights dominating the 
town, it became obvious by late afternoon that the Germans were quietly 
withdrawing, and by 1500hrs on 27th August the rest of 2"d Essex were following A 
Company across the river. Now Engineers could set to work and build Bailey 
Bridges to enable armour and vehicles to follow up. 
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The crossing by the two battalions was very successful due to the audacious 
nature of the operation and the discipline and bravery of the men carrying them out. 
What they had achieved was all the more impressive because the off-the-cuff 
planning that had to be done by the senior officers of each battalion. Normally a 
defended river crossing required comprehensive reconnaissance, planning and 
training of troops. In just over a week since the actions to take Thury Harcourt, 56th 
Brigade had yet again shown its effectiveness crossing a number of rivers and 
taking several towns. 
Ahead, the remaining German forces had now been squashed into a small area 
with the River Seine at its back. Along with l47th Brigade on its left, 56th Brigade 
was tasked with taking the Foret de Brotonne, and moved forward to seal off the 
southern edge of the wood. After over a week of continual action most men were 
exhausted. The large area of forest, covering around thirty square miles, was 
surrounded on three sides by a large loop of the River Seine. Intelligence reports 
believed the Germans would make a strong rearguard stand here, as they evacuated 
as many men, and as much material as they could, by ferry across the river. 2nd 
South Wales Borderers moved to an area to the south of the forest near the town of 
Bourneville, in brilliant weather, and with the skies full of Allied aircraft. On 28th 
and 29th August they were involved in small scale, but vicious encounters around 
the edge of the forest. On the right of 2nd South Wales Borderers both 2nd Glosters 
and 2nd Essex encountered similar problems of mortars, mines and Spandau 
positions, and took casualties. 
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However, 49th Division's General Barker believed that the resistance was only 
a crust, and ordered a rapid advance through the forest by all three battalions. So 
after the edge of the wood was heavily attacked by rocket firing Typhoon aircraft, 
all three battalions advanced, using different roads and rides through the forest. 
Often driving ahead firing automatic weapons into the woodland, they were amazed 
at what they saw. The forest hid the wreckage of the German Army in this area 
Each battalion has left a record of what it saw. The 2nd South Wales Borderers 
noticed that, 'the whole of the forest had been used as a huge vehicle park. Glancing 
to the right and left down the rides one could see lines and lines of trucks and guns, 
mostly burnt out which had been parked here to wait their turn to cross the river. ' 37 
For 2nd Glosters, 'we were astonished at the chaos that was found in the wood. 
There had not even been time to booby-trap this tempting array of souvenirs. ' 38 
Finally 2"d Essex recorded 'The Foret de Bretonne proved to be what everybody had 
hoped- the graveyard of the bulk of the equipment of the 7th Army. ' 39 
Driving right through the forest on various routes the Brigade came into the 
open and down to the River Seine. Many prisoners were driven into the hands of 2nd 
South Wales Borderers. In wrecked towns like La Mailleraye, the now free French 
people feted them, despite enduring many days of bombing and strafing by the 
Allied air forces as well as looting by the withdrawing Germans. 
Now a rest was given to the Brigade, although units had the task of counting 
abandoned vehicles and weapons in the area. Sam Weaver, of 2nd South Wales 
Borderers, claims he gave up counting at several hundred vehicles, but had great fun 
driving some of them around. There were over three hundred abandoned in La 
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Mailleraye alone. Unfortunately 2nd Essex lost an officer engaged on this task, when 
his jeep blew up on a mine. Also many hundreds of horses had been released and 
were running free. Many were injured and had to be put down, and French farmers 
driving into the area appropriated many more. Quite a number of soldiers amused 
themselves riding bareback, which was usually a comedy. 2nd Essex claim every 
man had a mount, and Major Dauncey, of 2nd South Wales Borderers, was seen 
driving a pony and trap. During their stay, a small patrol of 2"d South Wales 
Borderers daringly crossed the River Seine by boat, and investigated a shipyard 
containing a damaged U Boat. More importantly they could report that the Germans 
had withdrawn back from the river. Many German soldiers stranded in the woods 
and cut off, were rounded up over these few days. 
The final part of the plan was now to be implemented, that of taking the port 
and large city of Le Havre. Both 51'1 (Highland) and 49th (West Riding) Division 
were to cross the River Seine and surround Le Havre to the east and north cutting it 
off completely. The marching groups of 2"d South Wales Borderers moved not far 
north to Caudebec and began to cross in storm boats. D Company were across 
complete, followed by A Company when tragedy struck. The turning tide caused the 
speed of the river to increase, and one of the storm boats overturned, drowning 14 
men of A Company. Crossing was suspended for the day. In 2006 a plaque was 
unveiled at Yvetot honouring these men. Meanwhile essential transport was ferried 
across further south of La Mailleraye. By midnight the marching troops of D and A 
Company that had got across, the carriers of Support Company and vehicles and 
personnel of the Tactical HQ were together on the north side of the River Seine 
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commanded by Major Dauncey. On the morning of 3rd September this group 
advanced north into enemy territory without making contact. 
On the south side of the river the remainder of 2nd South Wales Borderers 
marching troops crossed in DUK.WS, in the same area as the carriers the previous 
day. They then marched 18 miles to a concentration area, and were then taken in 
lorries to join A and D Companies. That afternoon Lieutenant Colonel Barlow and 
the remainder of 2nd South Wales Borderers crossed and joined the battalion, 
making it complete.40 On 2nd September 2nd Glosters were told they would proceed 
via Rouen then had this order cancelled. This was replaced by an order for the 
marching troops to cross by DUK.WS and storm boats. The weather turned rough 
and the move was cancelled. Crossing took place the next day. 2nd Glosters 
transport went via Rouen. The sheer numbers of vehicles using the Rouen route held 
up the transport, and they eventually joined up with the marching troops on 4th 
September. 41 
Syd Hampton, 2nd Glosters, remembers that the transport got up to the outskirts 
of Rouen "then the MT Sergeant did a recce down by the docks and found German 
equipment and dead horses and nowhere to cross. So we started driving and it took 
all night to go around and end up opposite where we had started!"42 It is interesting 
to note, that like all good soldiers of the British Army, they took time to have a 
speculative look around for any extras they could scrounge! 2nd Essex seem to have 
had an easier time of it crossing the river at four separate points, but using 'ferries, 
assault boats and amphibious craft'.43 The word ferry indicates the key to their 
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crossing. On the other side three German lorries were made available to them to 
help with transport on to Le Havre. 
The problem of getting around the River Seine at Rouen blew up into a major 
argument between Generals Dempsey and Bradley. Dempsey accusing Bradley at a 
press conference that he had been obstructed by US traffic. Bradley thought this 
'one of the greatest injustices done to the American Army' and complained to 
Montgomery, who apologised and gave Dempsey a strict telling off for running 
down Bradley in public. This row arose again in 1951 when Bradley criticised 
Dempsey in his biography A Soldier's Story and Montgomery again interceded on 
behalf of Dempsey via Eisenhower. 44 This gave a valuable insight into the rivalries 
and pressures Generals were under, but a clearer transport plan between the British 
and US Armies in the area may have saved the lives of fourteen men of 561h 
Brigade. 
Now 1"1 British Corps, led by General Crocker, and under command of 1st 
Canadian Army, closed up and isolated Le Havre by surrounding the town on its 
northern and narrow eastern flanks. The River Seine cut the town off to the south, 
and the sea to the west. The port was heavily fortified on its seaward side, with a 
number of batteries containing 35 coastal guns. Strong defences had been 
constructed in depth on its landward side. No plan for assault from the river or sea 
was tenable. Originally the reduction of this fortress city was examined prior to the 
invasion, when '21"1 Army Group produced in March 1944, a study on Operation 
Axehead' seeking to capture Rouen and Le Havre by 90 days after D-Day.45 Now 
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only 75 and 81 days after the landings, on 20th August and 26th August 1944, two 
messages from Montgomery tasked First Canadian Army with its capture: 
20-8-44. First Canadian Army. It is important to clear the port of HAVRE very 
early; the railway communications from the port, eastwards and northwards, 
will be required for the maintenance of the armies and much time will be saved 
if these can be secured intact, together with all possible railway stock. 
26-8-44. First Canadian Army. One Corps will be turned into the HAVRE 
peninsula, to destroy the enemy forces in that area and to secure the port of 
HAVRE. No more forces will be employed in this task than are necessary to 
achieve the object. The main business lies in the north and the PAS DE 
CALAIS.46 
Coincidently with the Montgomery order of 20th August, the commander of Le 
Havre attempted to get the civilian population to leave. But expecting a quick allied 
advance, and urged to disobey the order by the local resistance, few took the 
opportunity to do so either then, or on 31 51 August following a second German 
decree. Le Havre was the second largest port in France and able to accommodate 
the largest ships afloat. Its port comprised over 12 miles of quays. It also contained 
three petroleum wharves, three shipbuilding yards, and two aircraft factories. It was 
hoped that if captured quickly with little damage, it could be put to work to the 
Allied advantage with its potential as an important port and distribution centre.47 
Also Le Havre still had the potential to be of more than nuisance value to Allied 
shipping operating in the English Channel. On D-Day its torpedo boats had sunk the 
destroyer HMNS Svenner and narrowly missed the battleships HMS Warspite and 
HMS Ramillies. Prior to the invasion air reconnaissance showed 5 Torpedo Boats, 
50 minesweepers and 21 Patrol Craft in the port. Bomber Command destroyed 
much of its potency for maritime operations on the 14th and 15th June during two 
heavy raids. By August only six Motor Torpedo Boats remained operational there. 
250 
On July 6th a mass attack by 26 manned Marder human torpedoes was launched 
from Le Havre sinking two minesweepers. In late August with the Allied advance 
reaching the River Seine, British Naval patrols blockading Le Havre were increased 
to stop German supplies and reinforcements reaching the port, and deny the escape 
from the port of all remaining vessels. Between 26th and 29th August four naval 
battles took place at night sinking nine German vessels, and from 30th August the 
port of Le Havre stayed empty.48 
As early as January 1944, Le Havre had been declared a 'Festung' or fortress 
by the Germans, and by the end of August its commander General Wildermuth had 
had orders to make the docks unusable and defend the city to the last man. Its 
defenders were a mix of Army and Navy personnel and of varied combat value. 
However there were at least three months of provisions and ammunition within Le 
Havre, and Allied estimates put the number of all German combatants as high as 
8,700 although the real figure turned out to be over 11,000. Some of these were 
reckoned 'of low fighting value. ' 49 On the landward side, the River Lezarde ran due 
south through the town of Montivilliers and exited into the River Seine, providing 
the boundary between the port of Harfleur and Le Havre. The heavily defended 
northern plateau was bounded to the east by the River Lezarde and to the south by 
the River Fontaine. The source of the small Fontaine river rose near the village of 
Fontaine-le- Mallet and ran west to east into the River Lezarde at right angles. 
The Germans had dammed these rivers and flooded their valley floors. South 
of the River Fontaine rose the southern plateau, its top covered by the Foret de 
Montgeon and leading down into the city. At the northern outskirts of the city were 
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two large I 9th Century forts, and throughout the city were roadblocks, fortified 
buildings and pillboxes. A plan was now put into operation to lay siege to this 
fortress that was to lack little, and bring force to bear in order to reduce the defences 
very quickly and with as little loss of life to British forces as possible. Maps and 
aerial photography was used extensively to help create detailed scale models of the 
area from sand and cloth. 
The two Divisions of I 51 Corps were spread covering the northern and eastern 
land access to Le Havre. 51"1 (Highland) Division covered the west, and 49th (West 
Riding) Division covered the east. Under command, 5 I "1 Division had the 33rd 
Armoured Brigade, I "1 Lothians (Flail tanks less one squadron), 2 squadrons of 42 
Assault Regiment A VREs and C Squadron I 4 I Royal Armoured Corps (Crocodile 
flame tanks). 49th Division had 34th Tank Brigade, 22nd Dragoons (Flail Tanks), 42 
Assault Regiment (less two squadrons), A Squadron 141 RAC Crocodiles, plus 151 
Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrying Squadron. This was a squadron of 44 
'Kangaroos', self-propelled artillery with guns removed and converted to carry 
troops into battle. This was a relatively new Canadian idea. There were also the 
usual divisional troops attached such as field ambulance, engineers and artillery. 
56th Brigade were chosen to lead the attack to take the northern plateau 
between Montivilliers and Fontaine-le-Mallet and establish crossings over the River 
Fontaine. The right flank was to be dealt with by 2nd South Wales Borderers, and 
the left flank by 2nd Glosters. 2nd Essex were then to move through in the Kangaroos 
and take the edge of the southern plateau. Both 51"1 Division and 147 Brigade from 
49th Division were then to move through into the city and port. 2nd Glosters had five 
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strongpoints to deal with, 2nd South Wales Borderers three, and 2nd Essex two 
strongpoints. The German strongpoints consisted of buried concrete bunkers and 
pillboxes with walls up to three metres thick. Trenches, some of which were 
covered, linked these anti-tank and machine gun positions. At least one position had 
a turret-mounted flamethrower. Each position was wired in and mined. Across the 
front of the German positions was a deep anti-tank ditch with further minefields. 50 It 
is possible to examine the remains of 2nd South Wales Borderers target strong points 
around Empremesnil Farm to this day. Barbed wire surrounding the present day 
fields is still staked out using the original German stakes. 51 The defences of Le 
Havre showed that it was indeed a fortress, and would need considerable softening 
up prior to an attack if a large number of casualties were to be avoided. An 
important problem for the Allies was the large number of French civilians still in the 
city. 
In order that an ultimatum could be sent to the Germans, General Barker 
declared a truce overnight on 3rd September. The Germans refused to surrender but 
wanted a truce lasting two days to allow the evacuation of French civilians. General 
Crocker refused due to a lack of time. 52 
There then began a softening up process. Over 900,000 leaflets were dropped 
into the area by plane or shellfire, aimed at persuading German soldiers to desert. 
Some did desert, and even brought important information over. Loudspeaker 
broadcasts were aimed at a similar result, and could be plainly heard up to three 
kilometres into German lines. This prompted the fortress commander to remove any 
doubtful units from his front line. A very active artillery programme was followed. 
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At sea HMS Erebus, a monitor with two 15inch guns, and the battleship HMS 
Warspite with eight 15inch guns, took on the coastal batteries on the lOth 
September. On two previous occasions, 5th and 8th September, HMS Erebus had 
twice been hit herself and forced to retire. The German batteries had also been 
heavily bombed but were still not out of action. On I Oth September the two warships 
fired over 300 15inch shells and finally silenced the batteries. 
But most distressing was the bombing by air of not only targets in the northern 
assault area, but also in the city. On 5th September the southwest portion of the city, 
believed to contain the German HQ was heavily bombed for nearly two hours. On 
6th September another two-hour raid by the RAF on the defences of the plateau 
southeast of the Foret de Montgeon took place, and on 8th September another raid 
hit the area of south of Octeville. I ,000 bombers dropped 4,000 tons of bombs and 
incendiaries in these raids. The official British Army view is recorded that 'During 
these attacks the forward troops were withdrawn to 3,000 yards from the target, but 
they were delivered with extreme accuracy and were well concentrated. '53 However 
during these raids the Germans suffered comparatively little, but the centre of Le 
Havre was destroyed, and over 2,000 civilians killed. 
Although he did not know the size of the French casualty toll, these acts 
prompted Captain William Douglas Home (a younger brother of Sir Alec Douglas 
Home, Conservative Prime Minister 1963) to refuse to take any further part in the 
operation, despite a direct order from his Commanding Officer. A subaltern and 
liaison officer between 51"1 Division and his unit, 141"1 RAC, he was aware of the 
German offer to evacuate French civilians. He had previously been disturbed by the 
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bombing of Caen, and had already written to newspapers outlining his distaste for 
the Allied war aim of unconditional surrender. He was later sentenced to 
dishonourable discharge and served eight months hard labour. In 1988 the War 
Office declined to reopen his case and he died in 1992.54 The seemingly 
indiscriminate use of bombing over the town upset many other men and Nicholas 
Somerville, now Adjutant of 2nd South Wales Borderers, recalls feeling, "appalled 
to see the damage and civilian casualties through the bombing. I felt bitter about 
that". General Crocker is reported to have said, "This isn't war its murder."55 
A further problem was the weather, which had remained wet. The wet ground 
caused problems for the armour, and the attack was postponed. When the weather 
improved the attack was ordered to begin on the evening of l Olh September. The 
South Wales Borderers Mortar Platoon fired 1500 rounds into Fontaine-le-Maillett 
from an established dump in preparation the night before the assault. 
The supporting armour and infantry of 561h Brigade combined to make eight 
gaps through the German minefields and reduce the fortified positions. Just prior to 
the attack over 800 bombers unloaded a further 4,600 tons of bombs on the German 
forward positions, reducing some woodland to matchwood. The battle was to be 
intensive, with 2nd South Wales Borderers having more problems than 2nd Glosters. 
In the gapping operations 22 tanks were lost on mines or anti-tank guns and 
'throughout the night and following day both tracked and wheeled vehicles 
continued to strike mines in the lanes. ' 56 Five lanes were completely abandoned, 
and others were even impassable to carriers, due to the mud. The Petard firing 
tanks, and awesome flame throwing Crocodile tanks, were terrifying in their ability 
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to destroy prepared positions. On the 2"d South Wales Borderers front it is reported 
that the flame gun of one Crocodile tank wiped out a whole platoon of Gennan 
infantry. However 56th Brigade completed its task very well, and by the following 
day things were going so well, that General Barker altered his plan and was still 
using all three battalions of 56th Brigade to clear into the town and down to the 
docks. 
Such a well-organised and brilliantly planned attack remains fixed in the 
memories of those who took part. Some though, were out of action before lOth 
September. Private Frank Rosier remembers being pulled back for the bombing. 
Frank, and a friend Bert Figg, had used their time usefully in gathering some food. 
Frank had some eggs stowed down his battledress top and a chicken over his 
shoulder. What Frank describes "as the smallest mortar bomb in Nonnandy"57 fell 
between the two men. Bert Figg went down gushing blood from a neck wound. 
Frank picked him up and shoulder carried him back, but he too had been hit in the 
head and could see less and less. He managed to get his injured friend back before 
collapsing. Bert Figg recovered, but Frank lost an eye and was evacuated. Sam 
Weaver, of 2"d South Wales Borders, now found himself taking on the role of 
Intelligence Officer. As the attack went in he was at the small Tactical HQ on the 
edge of a wood near Fontenelles. The area came under shellfire and Lieutenant 
Colonel Barlow wanted them to get into some disused slit trenches. Seeing they 
were lined with straw, and worried about his hay fever, he remained above ground. 
"With the microphone and headphones on. Inevitably, I suppose, I was hit in the leg 
by a shell splinter.'68 He now allowed himself to be dragged into the trench and was 
evacuated back to UK. rejoining 2nd South Wales Borderers in December. 
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Some days prior to this Dick Philips, the Intelligence Section Sergeant 
received a visitor with important information: 
A Frenchman came in. He was employed in the office of the Commander Le 
Havre. He brought in 'Most Secret' German documents, showing every 
minefield and the defences. He brought it to me; I gave it to Nick Somerville, 
who gave it to the CO. Then Colonel Barlow did this day patrol, looking at the 
going for tanks in the area. He wanted me with him in charge of the patrol, and 
we went quite a long way, until fmally we were under quite heavy fire. Despite 
the heavy fire we saw a farmer ploughing. We shouted to him to get out of it, 
but he carried on until there was a mortar burst and the horse was badly hurt. 
By this time I said to Barlow "I think you had better get down sir." Later when 
we got back, it was reported to me that Colonel Barlow had said that he 
thought Sergeant Phi lips would never get down! 59 
The information provided by the Frenchman was very important, and the 
attack was put back for some days to change the assault plans. Despite the high 
degree of planning, casualties in the attack were inevitable. Ted Castle records the 
excellent briefing given to 2nd Glosters and the sad loss during the attack of a very 
popular and brave officer: 
For the attack on Le Havre we had one of the best briefings I ever had. The 
attack was well thought out. The night before the attack about 500 Lancasters 
bombed the town, the next night over 500 guns opened up, then there was 
another bombing raid. We got into position about late evening, and we got out 
of our trenches and moved across some land. There was a tank got hit by a 
mine and was on fire. I went across and there was a chap in the tank, and we 
had to take his leg off with a jacknife to get him out. We got so far, but came 
under heavy defensive fire and Major Lance MC got hit. He lost his jaw. I ran 
to him and we put him in the Bren Gun Carrier. He shook hands and said 'keep 
going, keep going' but be died soon after, and it knocked the guts out of A 
Company, morale went right down. Later when we were down in Le Havre, 
dug in at the cemetery, the sergeant major came up and he said, "I have got 
some bad news, Major John is dead". Tears were running down his face as be 
said it and mine as well. He was so well respected, a man of few words and a 
disciplinarian, but you would follow him to hell and back. 60 
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When entering the town, Dick Philips remembers the armed and helmeted 
French Maquis going in with them, and that alongside the danger an episode of 
comedy might relieve the tension of battle: 
There were quite a lot of French Maquis there. The first tank proceeded 
downhill into Le Havre, and all hell broke loose. The Maquis disappeared 
except one car. The next thing that happened, we were behind these Churchill 
Tanks. We went downhill and turned right and came on very heavy machine 
gun fire. These two fellows got out of the car and run into a shop doorway. 
This big Churchill came down, swung around and didn't see the car. It went 
straight over the top of the car and backed off. These two Frenchmen had their 
heads in their hands, as they had borrowed the car without permission from 
one of their brothers in law! So you had a flat car! The Shermans came along, 
and soon put paid to the German machine gun fire. I later remember seeing a 
bridge blown up so high, going up and up and up, and suddenly 
disintegrating. 61 
Gordon Duffin with 2nd Glosters remembers that they advanced behind a flail 
tank. As they approached the wood a large RAF raid flying through thick German 
Flak blew it to splinters. He came on an officer crying, and saying that he could not 
go on. They managed to get him to go with them, but he disappeared fairly soon. 
Coming up to a German blockhouse an A VRE tank slowly approached it and fired 
its petard. The blockhouse disappeared in a cloud of smoke. They spent the night in 
a very deep bunker, which was the telephone exchange for the northern plateau. 
This was full of cigars, cognac and food, and one very dishevelled German. A small 
group of RAF men that had been shot down in the bombing of the wood came up to 
them and were sent back. They had wanted to know where the officers' mess was! 
The next day as they advanced into town they came across the first of streams of 
surrendering Germans. That night they bivouacked in a cemetery, and the following 
morning captured the Fort Sanvic, where much loot was to be had from the 
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surrendering Germans. Gordon himself kept three pistols and money worth £60 - a 
considerable sum in 1944. Stopping their advance further down in the town, they all 
started cheering like mad when the lid of a tank was raised, and the tank man 
shouted "its all over they have capitulated!"62 
The transport started to catch up with the rifle companies and Syd Hampton 
driving a lorry full of 2nd Glosters ammunition remembers, "we were parked in a 
farmyard saw the bombing raids going in. We were ready to follow up and were by 
this barn, when Jerry replied with artillery, and a shell landed sizzling in the manure 
heap, probably delayed fuses. We moved off quickly!" Then, following a flail tank 
they had just got into the built up area, when hundreds of Germans started coming 
up the road "like a football match!" His cockney friend Danny said, "look at all 
these bastards!'.63 
Then a German said in perfect English, "How far have you come from mate?" 
I was amazed, I nearly collapsed! He was English and had apparently been 
working in Germany in 1938 and married this German girl, couldn't get home 
when the war started, and been whipped into the German Army. I remember a 
cemetery on the right and the Provost Sergeant Glyn was there and said, "look 
after them a minute. Make them turn out their pockets." He had got all these 
German officers. We got 50 Francs off one of them. Just after that some RAF 
blokes came up, one of them was Canadian, and we gave them some fags. 
They had been shot down in a Lancaster. 64 
In fact the battle was not quite over. The town had to be properly cleared. In 
the area of the port snipers, and Spandau teams held out for some time. 56th Brigade 
were in the thick of it, as seeing an opportunity to get on quickly, General Crocker 
had changed his plans and pushed 56th Brigade into the town then port area, rather 
than waste time with other units coming through them. One of the problems in 
clearing the town was to persuade armed civilians to get out of the way. When told 
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of Germans holding out in the local gaol soldiers of 2nd Essex found, 'There was a 
good deal of indiscriminate shooting. After considerable persuasion we cleared the 
armed civilians out of the way - they were very dangerous, many youths being 
armed literally to the teeth. '65 When a Sherman tank blasted down the gaol gates it 
was found to be empty. To be fair, many of the local FFI had been more than useful 
in gathering information before the attack, and then helping to gather, guard and 
march away prisoners afterwards. 
There were thousands of prisoners and a considerable amount of loot. Each 
battalion claims well over a thousand prisoners, 2nd Glosters over 1,600, so the 
Brigade as a whole took more prisoners than it had men. A number of officers and 
men complain that very often prisoners were searched (and therefore loot gained) by 
rear echelon troops. "There were a tremendous number of prisoners and we put 
them in this school. They, (soldiers from other units), went to town on the first lot 
we delivered. They kept us back and relieved them of any valuables, watches and so 
on. ,,66 The 2nd Essex CO even put an armed guard with bayonets fixed over one 
valuable cache of alcohol, thus ensuring that his battalion could enjoy it later. There 
are numbers of stories concerning money taken from German paymasters. Certainly 
some of it made it back to Post Office and bank accounts in Britain. Some men are 
purported to have buried a vast sum and returned several years after the war to 
retrieve it, only to find that it could no longer be converted. Certainly a great deal of 
alcohol was retrieved by the Brigade, and when 56th Brigade was put into reserve 
for a well deserved rest near Lillebonne, there were football matches with the locals, 
dances and battalion parties. In fact what they did not know was that they were 
grounded, due to 151 Corps transport being taken to operate with the forces now 
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going into action much further north in Operation Market Garden, the drive on 
Arnhem. While around Lillebonne the men could only wonder at the vast air armada 
that crossed the skies to Arnhem, and what it meant for the future. 
The operation to take Le Havre was a great success. Planning, and the 
determination of the attacking troops, were two reasons why this most heavily 
defended stronghold fell so quickly and thankfully with only small numbers of 
British casualties for such a prize. Other reasons doubtless include the low morale 
of the German troops locked up in Le Havre and the attitude of its senior officer, 
General Wildermuth. He was not a young fervent Nazi, and is reported to have said 
'it was futile to fight tanks with bare hands. In the event of an attack by tanks, 
resistance nests which no longer had any anti-tank weapons, were then at liberty to 
surrender' .67 
A concern of the men who took part in this operation is with the large numbers 
of casualties inflicted on the French by bombing, and the fact that in the past the 
taking of Le Havre has often been presented as a Canadian success, whereas mainly 
British units were involved, under Canadian high command. 
For 56th Brigade as a whole, there was a period of rest, enforced by the use of 
49th and 51 81 Divisions lack of transport. However by the end of September they 
were involved in intense fighting on the Belgian-Dutch border near Popple, at the 
taking of the area around Antwerp and the advance north past Walcheren. They 
were then moved to Nijmegen and spent the winter in an area known as 'The Island' 
until becoming the assault brigade for the final capture of Arnhem in April 1945. 
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But the reality of what they had been through since June 61h was often brought 
home in a more down to earth fashion, and before they left Le Havre, an officer 
approached Gordon Duffins' Platoon: 
We had flopped down on a patch of grass where our officer said "Ab good, I 
want a picture of all you D-Day lads." He was using a German camera he had 
looted! We line up, and there are only seven of us left from over thirty that had 
started out on D-Day. Of the seven, only two remained unwounded by the end 
of the war.68 
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Conclusion. 
By the 20th August 1944 the deployment of 56th Brigade was settled for the 
remainder of the war, as it became a permanent Brigade within 49th Infantry Division. 
By September it had successfully operated as part of that division in the advance to the 
River Seine and the taking of the fortress city of Le Havre. With the end of its 
operations in France and loss of its title of 'Independent' it is a good time to review its 
achievements and effectiveness since formation in March 1944. Some comparisons 
with similar units operating in Normandy will be made and the problems associated 
with using casualty figures explored. Finally an evaluation will be made of the 
methodological issues, which have arisen in a thesis that has drawn heavily on veteran 
testimony in order to reconstruct and analyse the operations of the 56th (Independent) 
Infantry Brigade in the Normandy Campaign. 
It will be remembered that the constituent battalions of 56th Brigade had all 
been on Home Service since the middle of 1940. Variously used for coastal defence 
construction, reinforcement units for sister battalions serving overseas and even 
farm work, the battalions were in various states of readiness for action in early 
1944. Certainly 2nd South Wales Borderers and 2nd Essex seem to have been 
particularly depleted of men and first line transport. Also because they were Home 
Service units, inevitably the three battalions contained a number of officers and men 
who were unsuitable by age or ability for the coming battle in Normandy. The 
process of forming a brigade ready for action saw a weeding out and further 
reductions in the numbers of men in each battalion. It seems somewhat incredible 
that starting only in March 1944, the Brigade had to be formed, organised, brought 
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up to strength, trained to land in Normandy on D-Day, fulfil the task of advancing 
to Bayeux and holding the forward right flank of the British Army before playing an 
important part in future operations. Yet that and more is what 56th Brigade achieved 
between 6th June and 14th September 1944. 
The reasons for this success are important, and lay in the belief, will and 
dedication of the commanding officers of each battalion in 1944 to surmount all 
problems and get the job done. Without doubt one thing that helped see them 
through was that the officers and men were in Regular Army battalions with a deep-
rooted regimental history behind them. The men who made up the battalions were 
indoctrinated in this background, had faith in their comrades, and despite the 
vagaries of three years of military employment in the UK, were well trained to the 
standards of the British Army in 1944. In other words the Army system of the time 
based on pride and attachment to the regiment seems to have helped greatly in the 
formation 56th Brigade. Equally, Brigadier Pepper has to take much credit as both 
manager and director of the whole entity. His vision and simple expedients of 
playing on the 'Independent' role of the Brigade (the only independent infantry 
brigade in Normandy) and a shoulder badge of the Sphinx that made each member 
of the Brigade stand out within the rest of 21 "1 Army Group as being unique, quickly 
gave them a pride and 'team' identity. 
It is perhaps the speed with which this was achieved that seems improbable. 
So many tasks had to be tackled; heavy schedules for re-equipping, training, and 
planning, with the landings only just three months away. Aside from manpower 
issues, it is a second tribute to the Army system at this stage of the war, which saw 
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such effective officers in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and Major with both high 
organisational and leadership skills in place within the battalions. This system did 
not show wanting when engaged in combat, even after each battalion had to have a 
replacement commanding officer during the time in Normandy. Equally at the level 
I 
of junior and non-commissioned officer, there was a similar effectiveness and 
professionalism, and this has often been highlighted during interviews with the 
veterans, and reported in the battalion war diaries and other associated literature. 
Once in Normandy the Brigade operated very effectively. Despite a late and 
fragmented landing beyond its control, it concentrated at Buhot in reasonable time 
and moved forward into contact with the enemy, achieving the majority of its tasks 
that day, except the taking of Bayeux. It was undoubtedly the correct decision to put 
off taking the town until daylight, especially as a reconnaissance on the night of6/7 
June by 2nd Essex was opposed. When comparing it with other similar sized D-Day 
units, 56th Brigade operated as well as the others landing on Gold Beach. The 
lateness of the landing of the Brigade because of the heavier resistance from the 
Germans, especially at Asnelles and Le Hamel, was the main factor holding the 
Brigade back from taking Bayeux until 7th June. This is certainly not to condemn 
the ability of the assault or other follow up brigade. Each worked efficiently and 
with great bravery. Their problem, particularly on the right flank of Gold Beach, 
was that the heavy bombing programme intended to subdue the defences failed, 
some defences had not previously been recognised, and unexpectedly the defence 
was much tougher, being provided by a German field division rather than a static 
coastal division. This gave the assault battalions a far harder time of it than 
anticipated. 
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Together with the continuing poor weather, which caused a slow build up of 
forces from D+ 1, this saw the effective end of the plan to put an armoured brigade 
as far south as Villers Bocage by the end of D-Day. Instead, by 11th June, Panzer 
Lehr and 12th SS Panzer Divisions had arrived in the battle area, and the direct route 
to Villers Bocage was thwarted at Tilly-sur-Seulles. Some days later the attempt to 
gain Villers Bocage by a right hook foundered initially under the gun of Wittman's 
lone Tiger tank. Despite this, it must be recognized that by the end of D-Day the 
forces landing on Gold Beach had made a most significant thrust into German held 
territory. 
In retrospect we can see 56th Brigade in action as a series of extended 
periods of front line activity. Firstly D-Day and the consolidation of the beachhead 
area as far west as the line of the River Aure, the action at Chateau Sully and 
advance to consolidate the ground south and west of Bayeux. This period already 
showed the difficulty of operating in the bocage and the tough opposition they 
might expect from individual snipers and Spandau teams, willing to risk and give 
their lives. Also it became clear that infantry and tank co-operation techniques were 
severely lacking in effectiveness. Commanding officers and the Brigadier realised 
that in this landscape there were to be found no good spots on high ground giving a 
clear view over enemy positions from which to observe arid plan future actions. 
Senior officers often had to become highly mobile, and hence vulnerable, using 
jeeps for reconnaissance. Also if the Allies had control of the air the German Army 
would prove that it had excellent techniques of camouflage and cover. 
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A second period would see 56th Brigade used with the armour to try and 
smash through the German line in the area between Tilly-sur-Seulles and Lingevres. 
This was a period of near impossible tasks and heavy casualties, taking on very 
effective units of Panzer Lehr, who proved that their tanks could operate equally 
well in both the restricted streets and rubble of a town like Tilly-sur-Seulles and the 
orchards of the bocage at Essex Wood. But the month of July spent in the area in 
front of St. Germain D'Ectot shows beyond doubt that the men of 56th Brigade had 
themselves become tough and intractable fighters, whether holding a heavy German 
attack, or on one of the endless and frightening patrols by day and night into the 
bocage. Here the fighting can be compared to the static warfare of the First World 
War and reliance on artillery, both British and American, helped the Brigade stand 
its ground. 
By the time they were moved to 59th Division in August to help in the 
operation to take the area around Thury Harcourt, the Brigade could show that 
despite its casualties and serious replacement problems, their regular and conscript 
soldiers had forged a very reliable professional unit. The efficiency of the actions 
here prove this, for the Germans would have liked to hold open the pocket closing 
around them at this shoulder. The· two fmal periods of action with 49th Division, 
advanci.rig to and crossing the River Seine and the taking of Le Havre, underline the 
effectiveness of 56th Brigade, as the approach involved a number of difficult and 
defended river crossings, as well as the fmal assault into the fortress of Le Havre. 
What is surprising, considering the recent history of its battalions and the 
short period of time 56th Brigade had to prepare for the invasion, is that it was put in 
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to land with the very experienced 50th Division and expected to achieve as difficult 
a set of tasks as faced by the other three experienced brigades in the division. Apart 
from a short period of time under command of 7th A.nnoured Division, 56th Brigade 
fought mainly under command of 50th Division during June and July 1944, fitting in 
well. Exact comparisons between battalions and brigades are difficult because so 
much depends on the enemy and the ground one has to fight across. What is clear is 
that each brigade and battalion in 50th Division is deemed to have fought well. 
Casualty figures point to the intensity of fighting and while on 11 - 12 June 2"d 
Essex report over 150 casualties at Essex Wood, on the same day 6th Green 
Howards of 50th Division, while working down the east ofthe River Seulles towards 
Tilly-sur-Seulles, suffered over 200 casualties at Cristot. 
Examples such as these show that while units of 56th Brigade suffered high 
casualties at times, they were no worse than casualties in other battalions in the 
Division fighting a similar battle. However the taking of heavy casualties and 
continuous fighting could have extremely detrimental effects, and in one well-
known case 6th Duke of Wellington Regiment, of 49th Infantry Division, suffered 23 
officer and 350 other ranks casualties between 13 June (when it was put into battle) 
and 30 June. This caused poor morale and sometimes hysteria to break out in the 
troops. The commanding officer reported that, '6 DWR is not fit to continue in the 
line.' Consequently the battalion was disbanded. 1 The point is that no unit of 56th 
Brigade gave concern for its fighting efficiency, even when suffering large numbers 
of casualties. Indeed after suffering casualties, the battalions of 56th Brigade often 
had to remain in the field and continue fighting for extended periods of time. 
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Part of this study has involved dealing with casualty rates. In Normandy 
these were high for all front line units. French2 gives a figure of 75% casualties 
within the seven British infantry divisions and 37% within the three armoured 
divisions during the Normandy Campaign. On average for each infantry division 
this meant the loss of 341 officers and 5,115 infantrymen out of 7,200 men in the 
nine rifle battalions in each division during the Normandy Campaign. French also 
compares losses of men in the British Army during the Third Battle of Ypres 
(Passchendaele) July-November 1917 as averaging 2,324 per day, while between 6th 
June and 28th August in Normandy 1944, the British Army lost more men per day at 
an average at 2,354. 
South of Gold Beach the cost of this can still be graphically witnessed by the 
series of Commonwealth War Grave Commission cemeteries at Ryes (652 burials), 
Bayeux (3843 burials and 1808 names on the Memorial to the Missing), Jerusalem 
(47 burials), Tilly-sur-Seulles (990 burials) and Hottot-les-Bagues (1005 burials). 
The journey to visit them all covers barely fifteen miles, and one is reminded 
forcibly of the similarity to the First World War cemeteries in Northern France and 
Belgium. In this dreadful scenario the men of 1944 had at least more hope of 
survival when wounded than their fathers. Medicine and surgery had made great 
leaps forward since, and partly because of, the First World War. Evacuation was 
much speedier and the 5cwt Ambulance Cars, better known as Jeeps, adapted to 
carry four stretchers, transferred the wounded quickly from within the battle zone to 
the Regimental Aid Posts and on to the surgical hospitals located at centres such as 
Bayeux. Men stable enough to be moved were then transferred to Britain by ship, or 
more quickly by air. Len Cox, 2nd Glosters was shot on 5th July 1944, "They sent me 
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to the Field General Hospital in big marquees in Bayeux. They took the bullet out 
there. I was lucky really as I could have been paralysed. A Dakota later flew us 
home."3 Ernie Partridge, bayoneted in the leg in late June 1944 was driven by jeep 
back to the Regimental Aid Post, patched up and sent directly to the coast, where he 
was transferred by DUKW to a hospital ship. This took him back to Portsmouth and 
soon he was on a hospital train to Guildford Hospital. 4 
Organisation and welfare on this scale meant that there was much less risk 
of infection, and depending on injury, men could be returned quickly to the battle 
zone. This included battle exhaustion cases, who were removed often only as far 
back as their own rear echelon and allowed to rest before being returned. Even more 
extreme cases of battle exhaustion remained in Normandy, and depending on their 
recovery returned to unit, or transferred to work in the rear areas. The quarterly 
returns of 203 Field Ambulance, working under command of 56th Brigade shows 
that up to 13th July 1944 (33 days in action) they dealt with 206 battle casualties and 
134 sick. Of the 206 battle casualties, 66 were gunshot wounds, 83 splinter wounds 
(showing that mortar and artillery fire were major casualty causes) and 35 were 
blast wounds. The remainder suffered multiples of the above or bayonet wounds. 
Mortar or artillery as well as grenades caused some of these last casualties. Of the 
sick there were only 17 cases officially diagnosed as 'exhaustion' (meaning battle 
exhaustion), however 24 were classed as battle accidents and some of these may 
have been purposeful self-wounding. Only one case of venereal disease appears to 
have been treated, but later in the campaign for North-West Europe VD was to 
become much more widespread in the Allied armies. 
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Of interest is the fact that 18 cases of malaria were treated. These would 
most likely be re occurrences from men who had served in the Desert or Italy. The 
original Brigade Major, Major Buchanan only lasted two weeks in March 1944 at 
the formation of 561h Brigade, and then went down with malaria and had to be 
hospitalised.5 Not all the men treated by 203 Field Ambulance were from 561h 
Brigade, neither would every 561h Brigade casualty go through 203 Field 
Ambulance. However the return gives a good idea of the cases caused directly 
through battle and other cases of sickness or accident that such a unit commonly 
dealt with. It is noteworthy that more than a third of the cases were caused through 
sickness not attributable to battle. 
Exact casualty figures for units are difficult to ascertain. Two different 
places that were accessed for 561h Brigade give slightly differing results. The 
Nijmegen Bevrijdingsmuseum 1944 give those killed from D-Day until the end of 
the fighting in Le Havre as follows: 2nd Essex 130, 2nd Glosters 80 and 2nd South 
Wales Borderers 117. This museum has special links to 49lh Division, which spent 
much ofthe winter of 1944/45 in Nijmegen, so long in fact that it became known as 
the 'Nijmegen Home Guard.' The Role of Honour6 produced by the 
Bevrijdingsmuseum 1944 was the work of a number of museum staff painstakingly 
using Commonwealth War Graves Records and other sources. It is likely to be 
correct or very nearly correct. Another often used source, Army Roll of Honour -
World War IT7 gives slightly higher figures, 2nd Essex 135, 2nd Glosters 87 and 2nd 
South Wales Borderers 130. However this source is more likely to be incorrect as it 
was completed by March 1949 using untrained National Servicemen, operating a 
Hollerith Punch Card machine. Initial errors were reckoned to be around 7% and 
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despite amendments later there are still errors in the record. Two examples of errors 
are that some men are listed twice as serving in two different units, or the wrong 
unit at death. This is most often clearly shown on Commonwealth War Grave 
Commission entries for officers who were transferred from the original Regiment 
into which they were commissioned to serve a different Regiment. However other 
ranks are also sometimes shown in this way. The Registrar for Deaths and the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission also used this source and so their records 
are suspect to a smaller degree because of information and changes made in the 
intervening sixty plus years. 
A concrete example from 56th Brigade is that of Major Hopper, killed on 
30th July 1944 with 2nd Glosters. He is listed only as Artists Rifles in the Army Roll 
of Honour database and so does not appear as a 2nd Glosters casualty. Luckily since 
1949 someone has ensured that the Commonwealth War Graves Commission has 
that information and his Certificate of Remembrance mentions, 'Attached 2nd 
Glosters. ' 8 With the destruction of some primary sources during and since the 
Second War, it is unlikely that a complete record can ever be made. Families 
conducting research are now the most likely to find and correct errors. The surest 
way of doing so is to access a soldiers Record of Service. However for the Second 
World War and after, only those still living whose record it is, or the close relative 
of a deceased who served, can apply for that person's Record of Service from the 
Ministry of Defence. 
During research and interviews for this thesis the author also discovered that 
even though these battalions were often short of men, it was still quite possible for 
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an officer or 'other rank' to be transferred to another unit. Stan Daines and Stan 
'Blondie' Goodyear of 2nd Essex had this happen to them. While they were at the 
Regimental Aid Post being treated for minor wounds, probably around 11 July, 2nd 
Essex received a full complement of reinforcements. On their return they were not 
needed on the establishment, so were returned to the reinforcement unit and were 
then sent on to 4th Dorsets in 43rd (Wessex) Division. Serving with 4th Dorsets, Stan 
Daines was captured on 4th August, and Stan Goodyear killed on 2nd August. It 
became clear during interview with Stan Daines that they were not the only Essex 
Regiment men so transferred. By following this up using a 4th Dorsets War History, 
it became clear that 4th Dorsets lost virtually every man of A Company on 11/12 
July on an attack at Maltot. On 15th July they were sent out of the front line to 
reorganise and were heavily reinforced: 'a large contingent from the Essex 
Regiment, including some officers, went 'en bloc' to form a completely new A 
Company.'9 In attacks between Jurques and Ondefontaine between 1"1 August and 
5th August, it was again A Company, 4th Dorsets that took the brunt and many 
casualties. 'Blondie' Goodyear lies in Hottot-les-Bagues CWGC Cemetery. Ex 2nd 
Essex, his headstone proclaims the battalion he died with, 4th Dorsets. The question 
must be how many others at Hottot-les-Bagues whose gravestone shows 4th Dorsets, 
were originally 2nd Essex and 56th Brigade? Only one, an officer, is so marked. 
This author believes it doubtful that all the men sent to 4th Dorsets were 
from 2nd Essex; even reinforced, 2nd Essex could not have borne the loss of up to 
120 men without comment. However they may well have all been from the Essex 
Regiment via the reinforcement unit in Normandy. The 4th Dorset War Diary 
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mentions the arrival of 7 Officers and 350 Other Ranks from 33 Regimental 
Holding Unit over 11th -12th July 1944. 10 
The largest numbers of casualties was by wounding, but unfortunately we 
have no sure way of knowing the number of wounded suffered by each battalion. 
The only sources reporting this are the Battalion War Diaries, and these could not 
be kept up to date and relied on as discussed in Chapter 6. In major actions a figure 
of between three and six wounded for each man killed is a reasonable calculation. 
However on the numerous patrols carried out, there might be no wounded, a number 
of wounded or three men (a whole patrol) killed. So it is unwise to expect that we 
can find an easy equation to give a reliable figure. As an obvious example the 
incident of the 14 men drowned from 2"d South Wales Borderers in the River Seine, 
related in Chapter 7, caused no wounded. But during the campaign in Normandy it 
is highly likely that total casualties taken by each battalion rose to at least 75% of its 
established strength of 845 men, and what it is always important to remember is that 
the majority of these casualties were with the rifle companies, and that sometimes 
the rifle companies were down to as few as 50 or 60 men, or the battalion was only 
working with three rifle companies, not four. Appendix Seven on pages 290 to 292 
graphically illustrates the replacement requirements of the three infantry battalions 
of 56th Brigade from June to September 1944. 
A further way of enhancing knowledge and understanding of 56th Brigade 
actions in Normandy by the author has involved undertaking field trips to virtually 
every location where they fought a major action in Normandy, and attendance at 
Regimental commemorations in the area. Some have involved more extensive 
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investigation than others. As the author is skilled professionally in the use of maps 
this has been very useful in helping determine changes in the landscape and size of 
habitable areas using original base maps from 1944, and comparing them with the 
modem Institute Geographique Nationale (IGN) French maps of various scales 
between 1:25,000 and 1:100,000. The main problem associated with this has been 
the change of grid system between the 1944 maps and the present day. It allows one 
to say 'this attack went this way,' or 'this is burnt out farm' and understand the 
complexities of terrain facing the soldier in Nonnandy. 
An important aspect fairly quickly realised by comparing modem maps with 
those of 1944 is that the agricultural area in the bocage has been greatly adapted and 
reduced since 1944, and many hedgerows removed in some areas. But the modem 
1:25,000 IGN maps show change of crop use within large fields by green boundary 
lines. By comparison of some contemporary aerial photographs and maps of 1944 it 
was found that these lines coincided with the old bocage field system, with often 
nowadays a minor track or low earth bund clearly marking the division on the 
ground. It is unfortunate that The Aerial Reconnaissance Archive (T ARA) of the 
Second World War has been fairly inaccessible for some time and expensive to use 
by individual researchers. Hopefully this will be resolved by its move to the Royal 
Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland but for this 
study disappointingly only a few aerial photographs at the Imperial War Museum 
Department of Photographs and on the original T ARA website could be usefully 
accessed. 
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The most important part of this study and its outcomes has been the use 
made of oral history through interviews with 45 living members of 56th Brigade and 
written depositions from a number of others. Thus an important archive specific to 
56th Brigade has been collected. Copies of tape transcripts, of between 2,500 words 
and 18,000 words each, will be deposited with the National Army Museum and 
Imperial War Museum. The three Regimental Museums and Royal Signals Museum 
will receive copies of transcripts relevant to them. The vetemns involved in the 
study are all aware that this procedure will take place. When initially listing the 
documents available to investigate 56th Brigades' role in Normandy, this author was 
surprised to find that there were only two relevant veteran accounts at the Imperial 
War Museum Department of Documents and four at the .Imperial War Museum 
Sound Archive. The National Army Museum had no extra relevant documents. 
Considering that 56th Brigade comprised over 2, 700 men on formation, this shows a 
lack of first hand combat information. 
The compilation of the British Official Histories of the North West Europe 
Campaign 1944-1945 was tardy. Victory in the Wes!, Volume], Normandy, was 
completed in 1962; Volume 2, The Defeat of Germany was only completed in 1968. 
There has never been an official attempt by the British Army or Government to 
obtain a wide range of veteran testimony from the Second World War. In contrast, 
the United States has had a long history of officially collecting evidence from men 
in combat. According to the US Army Center for Military History, 'the US Army 
has a long tradition of using oral history to preserve historical information and to 
enrich its official written histories with material otherwise unavailable in the 
documentary record.' 11 During the Second World War the United States War 
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Department's Historical Branch sent appropriately trained men out into the combat 
zone to collect first hand accounts of actions. One of the most well known of these 
was Forest Pogue, who had gained a Ph.D in 1936 and held the rank of Master 
Sergeant. Tasked with collecting information with V Army in Europe, he was 
awarded the Bronze Star and French Croix de Guerre for his efforts collecting 
information in the front line. Samuel Marshall as chief combat historian was 
similarly employed, and ended his military service in 1961 with the rank of 
Brigadier General. Both produced written works and books after the war which 
became well known for their insight and reporting of combat. 
The lack of trained British combat historians means that there has never 
been a large-scale accessible collection of first hand accounts of the British Army in 
battle, as there is within the US Army, and this leaves a void in our historical 
record. In the way that US Army historians operate, they gather around them at 
appropriate periods soon after combat, young trained soldiers, and get a clear and 
immediate insight as to how an action developed. Over time of course memory 
fades. These depositions are of great use in two ways; firstly by allowing a fairly 
immediate and in depth examination of what went on, allowing lessons to be drawn 
by the military on the success or otherwise of tactics, and secondly by allowing a 
wide historical record to be collected for use in the future by historians and the 
general public. It means for the British historian in a study such as 56th Brigade, that 
they still have to do research and the difficult task of following up leads and 
sources, to find eyewitnesses scattered across the country. 
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These witnesses are all of course now elderly, and for this study were aged 
between 82 and 94 years of age in 2008. In the study of 56th Brigade, what has 
perhaps been surprising is that so much information can be gathered well over sixty 
years later. The forty five interviews with the veterans has provided over 125,000 
words of transcript from tape, and gives a wide ranging account of these units ofthe 
British Army from 1939 to 1945. Three veterans' deposition begins prior to the 
Second War. The usefulness of this method has been to enable the author to add real 
insights into the official documents that have been accessed to examine 56th 
Brigade. Also they are a check against official documents and unit histories and are 
another useful source giving more general views of this country during the Second 
War. It allows a comparison at different times of morale, actions and events, and 
even individual feelings within the 56th Brigade. 
In one sub-unit, A Company, 2nd Glosters, it has allowed a comparison of 
events through the eyes of three members of a single company, although all were 
wounded at various times during the campaign. Luckily the whole range of veterans 
interviewed includes a variety of ranks and posts, from private to major, including 
men who were promoted to officer on the field of battle, and from driver to 
company commander. As well as the interviews, some veterans have provided 
photographs, copies of diaries they kept, contrary to military discipline, during the 
campaign, as well as memoirs and notes they have made since the end of the war. 
These have all provided good source materials, adding extra information and insight 
to the interview. Finally a number of the veterans have kept up a regular 
correspondence that sometimes adds extra information or helpful advice. Hardly 
any of this was in the public domain before. 
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Interviews were originally very carefully planned and structured with a 
series of primary and secondary questions. These hardly ever came into play. 
Sometimes there was an initial period of awkwardness during first meeting, but this 
soon wore off and interviewees tended to talk well and cogently whatever their 
social background and rarely straying off the topic. Interviews were planned to last 
about two to three hours 12 but there was a time difficulty, as it was impossible to 
travel so far away from home just to have a short period with each veteran. All 
veterans made the interviewer very welcome, and usually a long morning or 
afternoon was spent interviewing with appropriate breaks. On a number of 
occasions lunch had been pre-organised by the interviewee (without reference to the 
interviewer!) and the interview carried into the afternoon. Possibly because the 
veterans are of retirement age a meeting such as this can be construed as a social 
occasion. During the interview handwritten notes were kept and points of 
clarification made at opportune moments or towards the end of the interview. A 
transcript of the tape was word processed at home and a copy sent to the veteran for 
checking and agreeing. Sometimes this meant that added information became 
available. A few veterans have been able to be visited more than once. This loose 
technique seems to have worked well. Follow up letters are always sent, as has been 
a yearly update of progress on this study to each veteran at Christmas. 
The use of such material has to be scrupulously managed. It is unfortunate 
that of the two US War Department Historians mentioned earlier, SLA Marshall 
was criticised after his death for making up some of his battlefield statistics gained 
from testimony, and he has been accused of inaccuracy and bias. A later student of 
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Forest Pogue, Dr. Stephen Ambrose, has equally been accused of inaccuracy, 
plagiarism, serious historical errors and controversial statements over a number of 
published books. This is a great pity as he has published a number of popular books 
on the theme of the Second World War in Europe and these, like some of the books 
published by Marshall, may in part be diminished by these accusations. Ambrose 
died of lung cancer in 2002, but a full discussion of these allegations can be found 
on the History News Network. 13 The way to avoid such controversy is very clear. 
The historian must be scrupulously truthful about his or her sources and be very 
careful in weighing the balance of evidence when using primary documents and 
considering the probability of a natural built in bias, whether these are the war diary 
of a battalion, a Cabinet Office historical paper or a personal memoir. It is only in 
this way that we can produce 'good' history that can be trusted by future 
generations and that does justice to the generation that fought and sometimes died in 
Nonnandy over sixty years ago. 
What for you is a haunting memory of danger and sacrifice one summer long 
ago, is for your country, and for generations of your countrymen to come, one 
of the proudest moments in our long national history. I take it upon myself to 
express the immense debt of gratitude we owe to you all. 14 
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APPENDIX ONE. 
56th Ondependent) Infantry Brigade. Sign and Shoulder Flash. 
This picture of the distinctive Brigade shoulder flash is taken from the front cover of 
56th (Independent) Infantry Brigade Operational Order No. 1, preserved with 56th 
Brigade War Diary, March-December 1944. TNA: PRO WO 171/650. 
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APPENDIX TWO. 
Exercise Smash: The area of Studland was given over to practice landings by 501b 
Division with an advance inland to ' take' and firm base after Wareham. This 
replicated the Gold Beach D-Day landings and advance on Bayeux. The map is 
clearly marked up with the expected movements during the exercise of the Reserve 
or 'Follow up' Brigades, 151 stand 56th Brigades. 
There were four 'Smash' exercises altogether. Each of the first two exercises tested 
one assault brigade; 69th then 231 51 Brigades. The next exercise had 69th Brigade 
assaulting the beach followed up by 151 st Brigade. Finally SMASH IV had 231 51 
Brigade assaulting the beach followed by 561h Brigade. This map is reproduced from 
TNA: PRO WO 199/2320 Exercise Smash. 
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APPENDIX THREE. 
Exercise Fabius: 50th Division landed on Hayling Island with the Canadians to their 
east and further east again the British 3rd Division at Littlehampton. In fact the reverse 
ofthe D-Day plan. 
Because of the limitations of the landing area marching troops had to re-embark. The 
sea state led to the deaths by drowning of the men from HQ D Company, 2"d Essex. 
The Assembly Area north of Hayling Island roughly marks where 50th Division 
transport had to drive around to, giving practice before D-Day to both civilian and 
military forces in marshalling large numbers of vehicles. 
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Appendix F to 56th Brigade Operational Order No.l. This order confmns that the 
marching troops were expected to be ferried ashore by LCM and to be prepared to 
be landed on any available beach. The timings oftbe landings are also evident. 
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APPENDIX FIVE. 
This map clearly shows the planned and hoped for positions of 50th Division by the end 
of D Day. In fact the line achieved ran from Vaux-sur-Aure, St. Sulpice, Esquay and 
just south of St. Gabriel and Creully. From Vaux-sur-Aure back to the coast the 
achieved line passed through La Rosiere to Arromanches. CAB 44/243 30 Corps, D-
Day Planning Appreciations and Operations. 
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APPENDIX SIX. 
Bayeux to Juvigny, 1944 Map. This map shows the important villages and towns 
for the operations involving 561h Brigade, lOth - 20th June 1944. The nearly straight 
road leading southeast from Bayeux to the hoped-for objective of Juvigny via Tilly-
sur-Seulles shows the axis of advance. Just southwest of Bayeux can be seen St. 
Loup Hors and Monumirel the final positions of 2"d Glosters and znd Essex on 7th 
June 1944. The wood/orchard attacked by 2"d Essex on 11th June is in the southeast 
corner ofMap Square 7969. From WO 171/803. 
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APPENDIX SEVEN. 
Below in table form are the ' Weekly Returns' of reinforcements required by the three 
Infantry Battalions of 56th Infantry Brigade from 3rd June 1944 to 30th September 
1944. These are not 'Casualty Returns' , but reflect the inability of 21st Army Group to 
provide adequate replacements. It provides graphic evidence for the replacement 
problem facing the British Army in Normandy during August 1944. 
2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers reinforcement requirement June -
September 1944. 
Date. Officers. Other Ranks. 
03 June 1944 Nil 10 
10 June 1944 3 31 
17 June 1944 Nil 13 
24 June 1944 Nil 17 
01 July 1944 5 32 
08 July 1944 5 14 
15 July 1944 6 45 
22 July 1944 7 53 
29 July 1944 8 73 
05 August 1944 7 116 
12 August 1944 9 165 
19 August 1944 12 185 
26 August 1944 5 108 
3 Sept 1944 6 88 
9 Sept 1944 3 88 
16 Sept 1944 8 137 
23 Sept 1944 7 85 
30 Sept 1944 8 137 
Notes: 
1. Nominal roll for 15/7/44 notes 6 officers wounded that week. x1 admitted 
Advanced Dressing Station with exhaustion, x1 missing and x1 returned 33 
Regimental Holding Unit. 
2. Nominal Roll 29/7/44 notes that the 8 Officers required were x I Captain and x7 
Lieutenants and 2nd Lieutenants. 
3. From Battalion War Diary WO 171/1380 Weekly Returns. 
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2nd Battalion Essex Regiment reinforcement requirement June - September 
1944. 
Date. Officers. Other Ranks. 
03 June 1944 2 5 
10 June 1944 1 15 
17 June 1944 5 38 
24 June 1944 3 8 
01 July 1944 3 5 
08 July 1944 1 3 
15 July 1944 6 15 
22 July 1944 6 32 
29 July 1944 6 36 
05 August 1944 8 74 
12 August 1944 8 119 
19 August 1944 11 200 
26 August 1944 13 60 
2 Sept 1944 12 67 
9 Sept 1944 11 68 
16 Sept 1944 11 66 
23 Sept 1944 5 44 
30 Sept 1944 8 101 
Notes: 
1. 122 reinforcements arrived on 24/6/44. 
2. From Battalion War Diary WO 17111295 Weekly Returns. 
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2nd Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment reinforcement requirement June -
September 1944. 
Date. Officers. Other Ranks. 
10 June 1944 1 19 
17 June 1944 3 11 
24 June 1944 0 5 
01 July 1944 0 15 
08 July 1944 2 0 
15 July 1944 1 28 
22 July 1944 2 34 
29 July 1944 6 56 
05 August 1944 10 121 
12 August 1944 11 150 
19 August 1944 11 166 
26 August 1944 8 124 
2 Sept 1944 9 42 
9 Sept 1944 9 66 
16 Sept 1944 10 98 
23 Sept 1944 5 74 
30 Sept 1944 6 92 
Notes: 
1. May 23rd 1944 Nominal Roll was 39 Officers and 794 men. 
2. 1116/44 (Tilly sur Seulles) 13 wounded. By the end of the day there were many 
more killed and wounded. 
3. The reinforcement situation only gradually improved. By November the Battalion 
was still short of 80 'Other Ranks' and even during December was only down to the 
low 20's weekly. 
4. From WO 171/1298 Battalion War Diary Weekly Returns. 
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